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Editor’s Note

It’s no secret that University of Chicago undergraduates devote colossal efforts into their studies. Yet despite our collective care for academics, very rarely do we critically engage with one another’s intellectual work. In fact, we rarely even read each other’s papers, let alone study their arguments. The pinnacle example of this scholastic culture is the BA thesis. While some seminars try to encourage peer review, at the end of the day, most BA papers are dropped into an adviser’s bin and are never to be seen or read again.

Our mission is premised on the value of peer collaboration and engagement, including reading, improving, and preserving undergraduate papers. It is thereby our pleasure to present Volume 2, a collection of diverse research projects spanning qualitative and quantitative methods, theoretical orientations, and sociological imaginations.

This volume opens with Tovia Siegel’s nuanced theory of time and incarceration in her ethnography of youth police-stops in Chicago. The inequalities facing disadvantage communities on the South Side are further highlighted in Sarah LeBarron’s novel model of transit deserts in Chicago, and Bohannon’s mixed-method analysis of social capital and collective efficacy in South Chicago. With Andrea Haidar, we get a picture of how Arab Americans utilize narrative processes to tell a specific Arab American “story” to mobilize and manage stigma in Dearborne City. Sumaya Bouadi’s paper takes the same location, and provides new data on the voting patterns in Dearborne, illustrating the political reactions of Arab Americans to increase stigmatization by the Republican Party after 9/11. The volume concludes with Bea Malsky’s Marxist-Feminist inspired critique of a duo of smartphone games. I hope you find something in this volume that engrosses you.

Sincerely,

Tim Juang
CJS Executive Editor
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Doing Time on the Streets of Chicago’s South Side

Tovia Siegel
B.A. Sociology

The lives of poor African American and Latino youth on Chicago’s South Side are punctuated by frequent interactions with the police. Although policing is frequently studied, previous research has not addressed the role that time plays in teenagers’ experience of being policed. This study draws on existing literatures of criminalization and state control over time and adds to both by illustrating that the state exercises power in everyday life through police control over young people’s time. Analysis of qualitative data from interviews with twenty-one Southside youth reveals that young people are forced to give up their time to police during 1) routine involuntary foot stops, 2) when they cannot provide information police seek, and 3) when they call the police, processes named for the purposes of this paper “sidewalk lockup,” “sidewalk sentencing,” and “extended emergencies,” respectively. The experiences of the youth interviewed show that police control over time in everyday activities forces youth to “do time” outside of prison in repeated segments of involuntary waiting. This finding compels a re-conceptualization of how the state exercises power by demonstrating that the state creates a climate of precarity via police control over time by extending the experience of “doing time” from prisons to neighborhood streets at frequent but unpredictable intervals.

Introduction

“Mr. Parker,” police call out to sixteen-year-old Jacob1 as he walks around his South Side Chicago neighborhood one afternoon. The officer on duty that day begins recording Jacob’s address on a contact card without even asking the young man where he lives. When he reaches the “Date of Birth” section on the contact card he is filling out, the officer asks himself “What’s the year he was born again?” before answering his own question with “Oh right...’98.” Police in Jacob’s neighborhood have stopped him so many times that officers know his personal information by memory.

Jacob shared this anecdote when I asked him if he had ever interacted with the police. When I first posed the question of police interaction, Jacob laughed. The cause of his laughter quickly became clear. My question held a level of absurdity for Jacob because the police stop him on what feels like a daily basis. In his words, “They...

1. All names of people and places used in this essay are pseudonyms in the interest of maintaining the anonymity of the young people with whom I spoke.
[the police] see me and I go the other way… ‘Cause I don’t feel like being stopped by the police every day…I don’t be feeling it. That stuff [police stops] be boring. I get stopped by the police too many times.” During these near-daily stops, officers ask Jacob where his brother is and whether his friend Khalik is around today. Jacob shrugs and responds, as he did in the last stop and the one before that, that the youth the police are asking after are “somewhere out here” and he gestures to the neighborhood around him. Then the police let him go, at least until the following day, when they stop him again. For Jacob and his friends, being stopped by police is a part of everyday life, as routine as walking home from school or playing basketball with friends.

Drawing on data from conversations with twenty-one young people from the South Side of Chicago, I illustrate that African American and Latino teenagers in poor and working-class neighborhoods in Chicago are forced to cede control over time to the state when their everyday activities are criminalized and subject to police intervention. I identify three processes by which the state exercises power in the lives of youth through forced cession to police of control over time. The first is a process I call “sidewalk lockup,” in which young peoples’ mundane routines are criminalized through near-daily police stops, some of which last an hour and render youth deviant in ways they were not before being stopped. In the second process, “sidewalk sentencing,” teenagers are punished by being forced to give up their time when they do not produce information police seek from them. In the third, “extended emergencies,” young people who call the police are forced to wait a long time for services and already precarious situations are extended by hours. My findings show that the experiences of the young people in my study demand an adjustment to our understanding of the state. Rather than operating as a regimenting body, the state functions as a punishing body that imposes a climate of precarity in the everyday lives of African American and Latino youth through the coupling of the omnipresent penal system and inadequate state resources.

Criminalization, Time, and State Power

African American and Latino youth in Chicago, in particular young men on the city’s South and West sides, interact frequently with police. Over four months in 2014, Chicago police officers made more than 250,000 stops that did not result in arrest. While the number of stops is large, the racial breakdown of these stops is particularly noteworthy: 89% of those stopped were African American or Latino whereas those groups comprise only 61% of Chicago’s total general population (Stop and Frisk in Chicago 2015). This type of aggressive policing has been well documented nationally and is symptomatic of ideologies and policies that have constructed the penal system as the primary means for “restoring order—inseparably economic, ethnoracial, and moral—and for curbing all manners of ‘social problems’” (Hemmens and Levin 2000; Wacquant 2009, 152). Loïc Wacquant argues that the penal system, of which policing is an integral part, is a central institution through which a growing penal state criminalizes poverty.

Much of the existing scholarship on policing merely demonstrates what so many African American and Latino residents of highly-policed urban neighborhoods already know—that these neighborhoods and their residents are subject to frequent and often harsh policing (Browning et al, 1994; Hemmens and Levin 2000). Few of these studies specifically examine the experiences of young people, even fewer of them include the voices and experiences of the people being policed, and, perhaps most troublingly, only a small number examine the broader social and political contexts that produce police-civilian relations. These shortcomings in policing research are particularly significant because studies that do focus on young people show “juveniles are subject to more surveillance, prohibitions, harassment, and degradation at the hands of police” (Hurst, Frank, and Browning 2000, 40). In broader context, the contemporary network of educational, economic, and penal systems “arguably leaves youth most vulnerable to the rapidly increasing social insecurity that has defined the past two decades and looms in the future” (Ossei-Owusu 2012, 304).

Scholars need to focus less on who is criminalized and more on how people are criminalized. Much of the existing scholarship on criminalization of youth works to answer the question of who is criminalized by police, and young African American and Latino men are consistent findings in this literature. Victor Rios provides one
of the most comprehensive accounts of how the styles and behaviors of young black and brown men are criminalized and he places processes of criminalization in the broader context of a youth control complex steeped in racism and stretched across the penal system and educational, commercial, and social institutions (Rios 2011). The young men with whom I spoke, nearly 2,000 miles from Oakland, relayed experiences and expressed sentiments that were remarkably similar to those of the young men with whom Rios spoke.

While Rios’ work is extensive, it still misses what I find to be a crucial element of criminalization, control over time. Without examining control over time, one misses subtle but deeply injurious parts of the process of criminalization, a failure that would severely limit one’s ability to imagine ways to effectively combat criminalization. I define control over time as the forced relinquishment of a person’s capacity to choose how to spend any given amount of time. Controlling time as a method of controlling people has been written about in different contexts, but not in the context of policing. Rather than “being a coincidental [byproduct] of power,” control over time is “one of its essential properties” (Schwartz 1974, 869). Power is exercised, Michel Foucault argues, through the manipulation of time into particular regulated segments that produce temporally disciplined subjects (Foucault 1977, 150-151). Disciplining temporal regimes are necessarily precise, regular, and repeated and they operate not as repressive applications of power, but rather as productive mechanisms that create a particular subjectivity (Foucault 1977, 151).

Control over time by the state is a crucial dimension of the influence of the state in the lives of citizens. In his ethnography of Argentineans waiting in line at state social service agencies, Javier Auyero shows how “patients of the state are being manufactured” through the everyday process of waiting in line (Auyero 2012, 18). Auyero explains:

[I]f the state really wanted to include welfare beneficiaries...it does not make much sense to make them wait in the zones of uncertainty and arbitrariness...If, on the other hand, what the state is actually doing is creating subordinate subjects...then the uncertainty and arbitrariness that dominates the spatial and temporal universes examined below can be viewed as a very effective route (Auyero 2012, 22).

Auyero shows that forced waiting can itself be a mechanism of state control, rather than just an unfortunate byproduct of a more concrete institution, such as the welfare office. The suspension in uncertainty that Auyero identifies as the experience of his subjects is prevalent in the American criminal justice system in record keeping, case processing, and lower court procedures (Kohler-Hausmann 2013; Feeley 1979).

As with welfare lines and lower courts, police use control over time as a mechanism of state power. However, interaction with police is different than waiting at a welfare office or spending the day in a lower court in three crucial ways. First, for the teenagers with whom I spoke, being policed is a near-daily experience. It seeps into the everyday and becomes mundane in a way that neither going to the welfare office nor going to court is mundane. Second, while one can anticipate going to the welfare office or court, being stopped by police, while incredibly common, comes at unpredictable times. Third, police interaction is inescapable. A young person being handcuffed on the curb cannot exit a police stop the way a person can step out of a welfare line or skip a court date. Mundanité coupled with unpredictability and inescapability renders policing violent in a way that is distinct from social services and the court system. For African American and Latino teenagers in Chicago, in particular for young men, being policed means living in an environment in which being forced to cede control over time is a constant but unpredictably timed possibility that becomes everyday reality.

Studying this environment tells us something about the state. The routine interactions between youth and police on Chicago’s South Side are especially salient sites in which to study the state not only because police are an arm of the state, but also because it is in the mundane that the state exercises the most power in citizens’ everyday lives (Wacquant 2009, 289; Holston 2008, 15). More outwardly influential interactions with the state such as experiences of arrest, police violence, or time spent in prison, while significant, do not reveal the way the state shapes a young person’s walk to school or trip to the park with friends. Thus, it is precisely because of their mundanity that the near-daily interactions with police described by the young people with whom I spoke merit study as lenses into the exercise of state
power. I define state power loosely as the capacity of the state to influence the lives of individual citizens and populations, primarily through mechanisms of regulation, control, and intervention.

State power is exercised in the event of an everyday stop-and-frisk in which the person who is stopped is forced to (at least temporarily) give the police control over his movement, his personal information, and his time. Cession of control over time is not merely a neutral byproduct of ceding control over bodily movement and personal information. Rather, control over time is “a medium of hierarchic power and governance” (Munn 1992, 109). In police stops, the event of a person who has been stopped being forced to give up his time warrants examination in its own right. Analyzing the everyday criminalization of young black and brown people by police indicates a need to modify the formulations of control over time that Foucault and Auyero respectively forward. Further, this analysis shows that Wacquant’s theory of the relationship between the penal system and the social support system is not entirely adequate because it oversimplifies the relationship between the two state systems. My research adds to literature on state control over time as well as that on criminalization and shows that in order to understand the function of the state, we must examine control over time as a mechanism of criminalization.

Setting and Methodology

In this paper I draw on semi-structured interviews and informal conversations with twenty-one African American and Latino youth between the ages of fourteen and twenty years old. All of the youth with whom I spoke live in predominantly African American or Latino poor and working class neighborhoods on the South Side of Chicago.2 These neighborhoods are largely residential. The only common formal commercial enterprises are stores that sell chips and cigarettes, liquor, or beauty products. There are occasional signs for currency exchanges whose bright yellow letters illuminate dusty windows. Apartment complexes tend to be relatively small, typically brick three flats and occasionally a building with six or eight units. Houses are small as well and usually sealed off from the street with locked gates that enclose small yards. Most houses have front porches on which intergenerational groups sit for hours in the summer, conversing with one another and neighbors who pass by. While some houses are home to six or eight residents, the population is not dense because many lots are empty, sometimes as many as half of the houses on a single block.

I met my interviewees through several community organizations with which I have been affiliated either as a member or as an employee. While I loosely guided these conversations and prompted participants with general questions, I let conversation flow and allowed participants to ask one another questions and converse with one another. For all of the conversations and interviews, my prior personal relationships with the subjects were crucial in allowing for candid discussion of sensitive and potentially incriminating topics. While I would not have been able to complete the research without having built a high level of trust with the young people with whom I spoke, our prior relationships and their knowledge of my personal politics may have made them more likely to talk about bad experiences with police than they otherwise would have been. Similarly, I chose to conduct group interviews to make the participants more comfortable. However, the relationships among the participants may have influenced their responses to my questions. I try to account for these biases by focusing my analysis on the experiences the young people describe rather than their perceptions or opinion of the experiences. Even with this focus, I acknowledge biases likely exist in the responses of my participants because of my methods of data collection.

2. As of 2010, in one of the neighborhoods in which many of the youth I spoke with live, approximately one third of neighborhood residents were younger than eighteen years of age, about half of neighborhood residents were African American and approximately one third were Latino. 35.7% of residents under the age of 18 lived below the poverty line and the unemployment rate for residents over the age of 16 was 10.7%. According to U.S. Census projections, these statistics probably have not changed significantly since 2010 (U.S. Census, Data Portal). This neighborhood was the most financially prosperous among those where interview subjects live. The neighborhoods of the other youth have similar racial demographics and are similarly or less affluent economically.
Policing and Control Over Time

In this section, I discuss three processes whereby policing forces young people to wait, sometimes for hours and in dire conditions. I call these processes “sidewalk lockup,” “sidewalk sentencing,” and “extended emergencies,” and delve into the content behind these names in the three following subsections. Ultimately, these processes demonstrate that the state constructs a climate of precarity imposed on young people through control over time in police interaction, a phenomenon I discuss in the concluding section.

Sidewalk Lockup

“Damn, I gotta waste time doing this?”  
—Anthony, 17 years old

In routine police stops, young people are suspended in abbreviated bouts of incarceration when they are forced to cede control over their time to police. They are made to wait for officers to decide a stop is over and shoosh them on their way to school or home. Examining the manipulation of time itself as a means of control in police stops reveals that 1) police interaction creates deviance by manipulating control over time and 2) the state’s control over time imposes instability into daily routine. We often understand forced relinquishment of control over time as a byproduct of other forms of control exercised in police stops, such as restriction of movement, physical bodily violation, or extraction of information. While these forms of violence are very much present in police stops, so too is the violence that comes from controlling another person’s ability to direct his own time. I use the term “sidewalk lockup” to describe the process by which youth are deemed “suspicious,” stopped by police, and forced to wait until officers decide to let them continue on with their days. Time is regulated in our culture; one must arrive at school by a specific time in the morning and return to one’s home by another specific time at night. By forcing young people to give up control over their time in stops, police hinder teenagers’ ability to meet socially regulated time constraints and effectively render teenagers unproductive in ways they were not before being stopped. Thus, the state controls and criminalizes youth through police stops not by regulating their time in a Foucauldian sense but by interrupting their regulated time. The state creates an unstable environment in which having to give up control over one’s time is a constant potentiality that is actualized at frequent but unpredictable intervals.

For teenagers on the South Side of Chicago, interacting with police is as common as walking to school, running out to the store, or playing basketball with a group of friends. Through tactics of quality of life policing that target “potential troublemakers” (mostly young African American and Latino men) as they move around their neighborhood, policing seeps into the everyday lives of those policed until being policed becomes a mundane activity itself. Albert, an eighteen-year-old African American man, described one mode of criminalization of everyday activities built into the Chicago Municipal Code. Though generally soft-spoken, Albert spoke loudly and looked angry as he described being arrested for gang loitering when he and his friends were merely standing outside.2 Albert and his friends were “just…outside just coolin’, just walking by the park, just walking up and down the street…” when police officers asked the group why they were “out here.” The officers told the teenagers that if they were not doing anything, they needed to go in the house. Albert wondered, “What we gotta go in the house for? [We] ain’t doing nothing, just wanna be outside.” Although Albert just wanted to be outside, he knew what would happen if he did not listen to the officers. He told me, “They [the police] still just lock people up, write down a card just for no reason. [The police ask] what’s your age? How old you is…Yeah, contact cards…” If a group Albert is with is large enough, they will be arrested for gang loitering. In his words, “They [the police] just be doing that, trying to get everybody

3. According to the Municipal Code of Chicago, “Gang loitering means remaining in any one place under circumstances that would warrant a reasonable person to believe that the purpose or effect of that behavior is to enable a criminal street gang to establish control over identifiable areas, to intimidate others from entering those areas, or to conceal illegal activities.” If a police officer suspects gang loitering, the officer shall “(i) inform all such persons that they are engaged in gang loitering within an area in which loitering by groups containing criminal street gang members is prohibited; (ii) order all such persons to disperse and remove themselves from within sight and hearing of the place at which the order was issued; and (iii) inform those persons that they will be subject to arrest if they fail to obey the order promptly or engage in further gang loitering within sight or hearing of the place at which the order was issued during the next eight hours” (Municipal Code of Chicago § 8-4-105).
and if you in a crowd deep, they gonna lock you up for
gang loitering just ‘cause it’s a lot of people.” Albert and
his friends are intimately familiar with legal mechanisms
of criminalization whereby a group of young black men
standing outside on the Southwest Side of Chicago, an
activity which would be legal if performed by other peo-
ple in another place, is potentially classifiable as gang
loitering and grounds for arrest.

As the mundane is policed, being policed becomes
mundane and interruption of daily routine becomes dai-
ly routine. For nineteen-year-old Christian, who used to
take walks through a wealthier neighborhood adjacent
to his own, being policed is quite literally an every day
experience. Christian used to think to himself, “‘Dang
I can’t even go in [the wealthier neighborhood] without
somebody, without the cops harassing me.’ It used to be
a lot…everyday,” he explains. When I asked Christian
to estimate how many times in total he had interacted
with the police, he replied, “To be honest, I really don’t
know how [many times] but it used to happen so many
times I used to just lose count…” Being policed is such
a frequent occurrence that it no longer feels significant
to Christian. “It [getting stopped by the police] really
doesn’t feel like no big deal to me,” he explained, “be-
cause I was living in an area that it was crimes and drug
and shootin’ so…and I look at it, guarantee you I was go-
ing to get pulled over anyway…” For him, police inter-
vention in daily activities seems inevitable. Police stops
are not exceptional parts of Christian’s days. They occur
so frequently that they become mundane.

When a police officer stops a young person like
Christian on the street, the teenager is forced to give up
control over his time until the officer decides the stop is
over. Regardless of whether they want to interact with
police, teenagers “gotta waste time [in stops],” in the
words of seventeen-year-old Anthony. In a conversation
with Anthony and some of his closest friends, I asked
the group, “Do you feel safer when you’re walking down
the street and you see a cop car parked there?” Anthony
responded, “I be good until they [the police officers] say,
‘Come here.’” Before I could pose a follow-up question,
Anthony’s best friend Alyssa turned to him and asked
in a confused voice, “But…you know you didn’t do
nothing?” Anthony’s response to Alyssa sounded tired.
“I know [I did not do anything]” he said, “but I’m like
‘Damn, I gotta waste time doing this? I could be walk-
ing down the street somewhere.’” Anthony did not refer
to the fact that his identifying information would be
recorded at nearly every police stop—though it likely
would—or that seemingly mundane stops might end
in arrest—though they may. Instead, he focused on the
time required by such stops. As Anthony explained to
Alyssa, when police decide to stop a young person, the
young person has no choice other than to spend his time
being stopped, even if it feels like “waste[d] time.”

During the wasted time of police stops, teenagers
exist in a suspended state of incarceration, which I call
sidewalk lockup, while they wait, sometimes up to an
hour, with their hands cuffed or palms on the hood of a
police car until an officer decides to let them go. Nineteen-year-old Christian, who has interacted with police
so many times he lost count, lives a few neighborhoods
away from Anthony but his experiences with police are
remarkably similar. Christian is usually just walking with
his friends when police stop him. “Sometimes it takes
like an hour,” he said, describing police stops. Christian
speculated that the police spend the time looking for his
and his friends’ criminal records, a fruitless effort in the
case of Christian who has interacted with police count-
less times but has never been arrested. In Christian’s
words, during a stop the police are “lookin’ through the
computers, trying to see [if] I got a background or a
gun possession or do they really know me or is I the one
that dropped somebody or did I kill somebody or did I
broke into somebody’s house…” All of that can take up
to an hour during which time the person or people be-
ing stopped “just sit there, handcuffed to each other. Say
if there’s four or five of us, we’ll have handcuffs chained
to each other or we’ll just have our hands on the car,”
Christian told me. He estimated that he experienced
eight such stops with handcuffs and long waits between
the ages of fourteen and eighteen. In each instance he
was forced to wait, suspended in his daily routine, un-
able to control his time, locked up on the sidewalk.

Sidewalk lockup is not acknowledged as a fragmen-
tary incarceration in part because of legal technicalities
that allow it to be justified under the guise of necessity.
In Supreme Court Case United States v. Place, the court
“decline[d] to adopt any outside time limitation for a
permissible [street] stop” (U.S. v. Place, 462 U.S. 696

Doing Time on the Streets of Chicago’s South Side
Rather, the standard for a permissible length of time of a police stop is linked to the concept of "reasonableness," the length of time an officer would reasonably require to determine the innocence of the person being stopped (Terry Stop Law & Legal Definition). In other words, the length of time of a stop is legally conceived of in relation to the content and outcome of the stop, not in relation to time itself. In practice, this means that stops can last for long periods of time, technically indefinitely, and the length of the stop can be justified by police as an unfortunate but necessary byproduct of law enforcement, even when it is much more than an unfortunate byproduct for the people being policed.

The length of time of a police stop can force a young person stopped to actually be deviant in ways he was not before being stopped. Jerome, a tall thin seventeen-year-old, was stopped one night, likely because, as a young black man on the South Side of Chicago, in Jerome's words, he "looked like a potential criminal." Jerome was forced to disobey city curfew because of the length of time he was detained by police. In other words, he was stopped because he looked like deviant citizen, and the police actually rendered him deviant in a way he would not have been had he not been stopped. Jerome described how this particular stop took place on a summer Saturday "around 10, 10:30 [at night when police began] harassing [him] about curfew," which begins at 11 o'clock at night. The police patted down Jerome, checking for drugs or weapons. They found a bottle of acetaminophen pills that he was carrying because he had recently broken his hand. The officers passed the bottle of common painkillers among themselves and told one another in grave tones to "check that." They handcuffed Jerome and questioned him about the pills, implying that he might be carrying illegal drugs. By the time the interaction was over, it was 11:15 PM and Jerome actually had disobeyed curfew. The police forced Jerome to wait at least half an hour, and by doing so, rendered him deviant. By commanding Jerome's time, the police simultaneously force Jerome to give up control over his time and force him to engage in criminal activity, the unfounded and inaccurate suspicion upon which they stopped him in the first place.

The relinquishment of control over time forced on youth like Jerome in police stops teaches us how the state exercises power through the interruption of routine. Unlike the bodies disciplined by regulated time schedules that Foucault describes, on the South Side of Chicago the state exerts power on teenagers by interrupting their regulated schedules at frequent but unpredictable intervals (Foucault 1977, 150-151). This manifestation of power does not contradict Foucault's formulation. On the contrary, the state's interruption of the routines of discipline depends on the existence of regimens to interrupt. That said, the experiences of the young people I interviewed expand Foucault's concept of power exercised through disciplined routines to show that power is additionally exercised through the unpredictable interruption of these routines. Young people are trapped in a disciplined world in which the state denies them the possibility of routine. By interrupting socially constructed regimens of timeliness, policing creates deviance. The regular irregularity of police stops, which occur so frequently they are part of the everyday yet are unpredictable interrupters of routine, creates an environment of instability in which young people are disciplined into temporal routines that can be interrupted at any time by police officers seizing control of teenagers' time.

Sidewalk Sentencing

"Y'all checked us already, seen we ain't got no drugs, no guns, no nothing on us...We ain't doin' nothing but walking in the middle of the street going home."
—Michael, 18 years old

In addition to having to give up control over time in arbitrary police stops, young African American and Latino people in Chicago are forced to give up control over time as a punishment when they do not provide police with particular information, information which the youth may or may not have access to. Many police interactions begin under the pretense of police gaining information, usually about the location of drugs or weapons, from the person they stop. When police do not gain incriminating information from youth, they use the forced cession of control over time as a penalty for the young person's inability or unwillingness to provide the sought-after information. Time is "done" in different places in the criminal legal system. Inside
prisons, incarcerated people are forced to “do time,” to give their time to the state, as a consequence of criminal conviction. Outside prisons, on the streets of the South Side of Chicago, young African American and Latino men are forced to give their time to the state when they are stopped by police on their walks to school, to the store, or to their homes. In these instances of sidewalk sentencing, forced waiting is used not as a mechanism of training subordinate “patients of the state” as Auye-ro argues. Rather, police dole out minutes and hours of sidewalk lockup like judges dole out months and years of a prison sentence. The sidewalk sentencing imposed on policed youth compels us to expand our conception of “doing time” to include the ways time is used as a punishment in policing in addition to prisons.

In policing, taking time acts as a stand-in for taking information: when an interaction does not reveal information that is “useful” to police, such as evidence of criminal activity, police take time instead. However, taking time is different than taking information because in the latter instance, the police presumably serve to gain whereas in the former, youth are punished without any “gain” for police. Police often perform sidewalk sentencing in situations in which it is nearly impossible for the policed to have access to the information officers are seeking. Thus, the sidewalk sentence only punishes youth without providing clear benefit to police. For example, one night, Michael, his friend, and his brother, all of whom were teenagers at the time, were stopped by the police around 11 o’clock one night. It was not the first time the young men had been stopped that day and as the officers approached, the teenagers realized the approaching figures were the same officers who had stopped them earlier. The officers quickly recognized the teenagers too. As the police begin checking the young men for anything illegal they might be carrying (even though their searches earlier in the day had yielded nothing), a car sped in the wrong direction down the one-way street on which they were standing. The officers saw the blatant traffic violation and ignored it, continuing to search Michael and his friends. Michael described his frustrated thought process during the stop: “Y’all checked us already, seen we ain’t got no drugs, no guns, no nothing on us...So why y’all still standing here when someone just broke the law right in y’all face? Why y’all ain’t stop them? We ain’t doin’ nothing but walking in the middle of the street going home. Why y’all don’t stop them?” Despite the fact that the police had already searched the three young men that same day, found nothing incriminating on them, and probably would not find anything incriminating on them only hours after the previous search, the police search the youth again.

Thus, this search was conducted although it was highly unlikely it would yield physical evidence against the young men and impossible that it would allow the police to extract new personal information from anyone, as the young men had already given their names, addresses, and dates of birth earlier in the day. In fact, the police could do little with the search other than control the time and movement of Michael, his friend, and his brother and potentially violate the boys’ bodies. When police cannot take incriminating evidence or information, they take time. Taking time when information is not available allows police to stop people they otherwise might not stop as in the case of Michael and the young men he was with. Without being able to extract information from the young men, the police sentenced Michael and his friends to “do time” outside of prison on the streets of their own neighborhood. While this interaction does not serve the police to “fight crime,” it might function for the police to assert their power over time and movements of the young people they stop. Sidewalk sentencing is about control, not crime, although it is legally permissible under the pretext of the latter.

The concept of “serving time,” that a person convicted of a crime has to give up a certain number of months or years behind bars, is ubiquitous in the United States. Giving up time is a fundamental dimension of punishment. While an incarcerated person might work while imprisoned (and many do), it is not labor that is named as the consequence of criminal conviction. Instead, the consequence of conviction is a sentence to an amount of time to be served. In short, we have no problem conceptualizing giving up time as such as a state-mandated consequence of criminal activity. I argue that the same should be true in instances of mundane police stops. The obligation to cede time to police in these instances, just like in instances of incarceration, is itself a state-sanctioned punishment.

This forced waiting in police interaction is not a
training apparatus, as Auyero finds, but a penalty. Rather than “binding the destitute to the state,” as forced waiting does in the case of welfare recipients in Argentina, in interactions with Chicago police, forced waiting is a variation of the nightstick (Auyero 2012, 156). Young people waiting on Chicago street corners do not have the promise of a welfare check at the end of their waiting time and are not bound to the hope of waiting for something. They cannot step out of line at the end of the day and go home. Instead, they live in an environment where they can be punished with a sentence to wait whenever they step outside. These experiences of waiting may well influence young people’s relation to the state and conception of themselves as citizens, but I do not find evidence that it trains them to be submissive. On the contrary, Michael and the other young people in my study do not submit and provide officers with “useful” information. They do not comply with the (often impossible to meet) demands of officers. Instead, they face the undeserved punishment of waiting not as “patients of the state” but as prisoners, sentenced to do time on the street corner.

Thus, the state is sentencing young people to doing time without so much as a charge against them, let alone legal representation or trial. The implications of this argument are weighty. My data suggest that young people are being sentenced to do time outside the judicial system. Despite the deep problems in the American criminal justice system, people convicted of a crime generally are not sentenced to prison time without prerequisite legal proceedings intended to determine guilt. Following the logical extrapolation of this finding within the conceptual confines of the existing penal system, officers should afford the policed presumption of innocence and the right to legal representation, and the law should require of police a courtroom-level burden of proof to justify foot stops on the streets.

Extended Emergencies

“Pizza will come faster than police.”
—Cecelia, 17 years old

By keeping youth under constant police surveillance, the state destroys systems that should support young people, even young people who are not frequently stopped by police. The state also forces civilians to cede control over time when they call the police. While many of the young people I spoke to had never called the police and vowed they never would, several teenagers had dialed 911 and were forced to wait like the teenagers who had been stopped on the street. Over-policed and under-protected, the youth in this section are suspended in time, sometimes for hours and with potentially grave consequences, as they wait for police to respond to emergency calls. Already dangerous situations and the emotional experiences that accompany crisis are elongated, a process I call “extended emergencies.” Like in unwelcome interventions in daily activities, police also control the time of civilians who want police intervention. Being policed on the South Side of Chicago means giving up control over time, whether the police will not leave you alone or you cannot get them to pay attention to you.

This is as much a function of the tears in the “penal dragnet” as it is of the metaphorical mesh of the net itself. Policing on the South Side of Chicago does not keep people safe. In fact, allocation of resources towards frequent street stops rather than emergency responses endangers South Side residents. Wacquant uses the metaphor of a rollout of a “penal dragnet” to describe the expansion of mechanisms by which the state criminalizes poverty and “catches” growing numbers of people in the penal system at the same time as the social safety net atrophies (Wacquant 2009, 8). I argue that the rollout of the “penal dragnet” is not only concurrent with the evisceration of the social safety net, but the so-called dragnet actually destroys parts of the social safety net by preventing resource allocation for supportive state programs. While allocating resources towards tens of thousands of monthly stop-and-frisks, the police department and the city of Chicago do not allocate enough resources for police to respond quickly to 911 calls. The “penal dragnet” is selectively (and not coincidentally) torn in areas where it overlaps with the social safety net, the areas of the penal system with which some youth want to interact. The youth who appear not to be caught in the penal net face the same forced waiting and imposed instability as the youth who are ensnared in the net each time they walk outside.

Many of the youth with whom I spoke express that it
feels like the police are almost always around, patrolling the neighborhood and stopping and frisking young people going about their daily activities. The one time it seems like the police are never around is when an emergency happens and the police are called. Angela and Cecelia explain how it seems like the police have a sixth sense that warns when something dangerous is going to happen so they can leave before the event occurs:

Angela: They [the police] are always around but…
Cecelia: They never do anything.
Angela: ...they're never there when stuff actually happens.
Cecelia: I feel like they feel it. They know it's gonna happen so they leave and they don't see it and they come back when it's over.

Christina, Jose, and Tiana join the conversation and respond with biting humor that reveals just how long it can take police to respond to calls. The teenagers jokingly list all of the delivery services that arrive faster than the police:

Christina: I feel like it's best for everybody to get Life Alert. They come faster than the police.
Cecelia: Pizza will come faster than police.
Jose: Jimmy Johns will come faster than the police.
Tiana: Jimmy Johns is quick. We talking about Chinese food. They slow. They take about thirty-five minutes. Police take two hours.

Despite the humor of these jokes, the implications that lurk beneath are anything but funny. By forcing 911 callers to wait for hours at a time, often in emergencies, police control the time of the people who desire their services. Whether police intervention is unwanted on a walk to school or a trip to the store or desired and not provided in an emergency, civilians are forced to cede control over their time as they wait, sometimes for hours, for police to arrive. Cecelia recounts, “this happened at the beginning of [the afterschool program] and the police didn’t come until near the end. [The afterschool program] used to start at 2:15 and we got out at 6:30,” so it took approximately four hours for police to respond to gunshots at a school.

This forced waiting time can have dire, sometimes deadly consequences as time sensitive situations are elongated into extended emergencies. “Why [does] it take forty five minutes or an hour for the ambulance to show up?” Michael asks. He explains that the forced wait for services “basically show[s] they [the police] want them [the people who called for help] to die.” When those who call the police in emergencies are forced to give up control over their time as they wait, sometimes for hours, for police to arrive, the callers are left to their own devices to handle the dangerous situation, unaided by the training and resources police would bring. Slow response times are not necessarily intentional on the part of police and are likely the result of limited availability of resources. Regardless of intentionality, in cases of gunshot wounds or other serious injury, the time police take from 911-callers is crucial, potentially even fatal.

The critical tears in the “penal dragnet” that cause police to “miss” emergencies create an unstable, unaccountable, and invalidating relation to the state in which young people are forced to wait, suspended in time in yet another way. Youth who are missed by the “dragnet” are still implicated in its effects. The dragnet not only expands as the safety net shrinks. The “penal dragnet” inhibits the social safety net. Thus, in addition to criminalizing and penalizing, Chicago policing injures support systems.

**Conclusion**

While the motto inscribed on the side of Chicago police cars reads, “We serve and protect,” young people in some of the most highly policed neighborhoods in the city tell another story. Many of the teenagers with whom I spoke interact with police involuntarily on what feels
to them like a daily basis. The critical question for this paper is not who is criminalized by police, for it is alarmingly evident that young African American and Latino people offer one answer to that question, but rather, how policing criminalizes. The answer to the “how” question of criminalization undoubtedly has many dimensions, of which a crucial one, thus far unexplored in sociological literature, is the forced cession to police of control over time. A discursive analysis of the experiences of teenagers on the South Side of Chicago shows that, for many, mundane activities are policed so often that being policed becomes a routine activity itself. In these frequent interactions with police, young people are forced to give up control over time during street stops and as a penalty for not providing information sought by police. Even young people who do not interact frequently with police are forced to give up control over their time when they call the police and response times are long, sometimes hours.

Young people’s experiences of being policed demonstrate that the state manipulates time through policing which creates deviance by upsetting routine (sidewalk lockup), punishes young people for things outside of the youth’s control (sidewalk sentencing), and undercuts social safety nets through an expansion of the penal system (extended emergencies). These processes compel us to modify Foucault and Auyero’s theories of state control over people through control over time. Rather than disciplining through the imposition of routine, the state interrupts routine by frequently but unpredictably keeping teenagers locked up on the sidewalk for up to an hour at a time and preventing them from following socially regulated schedules. My research demonstrates that on the South Side of Chicago, state power depends on dictated temporal routines, as in Foucault’s formulation, but is exercised in everyday life by inflicting instability rather than regimen, a dimension of power that Foucault does not discuss. This instability is inflicted in the lives of policed youth through forced waiting. Unlike in Auyero’s work, where forced waiting is a training apparatus, for the young people in my study the imposed precarity of forced cession of control over time is a punishment to which they do not acquiesce. The instability infused by the state into the everyday lives of young people through policing corroborates Wacquant’s argument that the American penal system has expanded and ensnared entire populations while the social safety net has simultaneously diminished. In addition to the simultaneous respective augmentation and atrophy of the penal dragnet and social safety net, the expansion of the penal dragnet has actually removed the social safety net by forcing people who call the police to wait hours for assistance. Black and brown South Side Chicago youth are swept up in instability, forced by the state to wait, whether they call to the station for police or are called to the cruiser by police.

Ultimately, the processes of sidewalk lockup, sidewalk sentencing, and extended emergencies impose a climate of precarity in which teenagers on Chicago’s South Side are policed, punished, and unsupported at unpredictable intervals. African American and Latino youth are forced to “do time” outside of prison, suspended in fragmentary temporal segments of incarceration, when they walk home with friends, cannot provide information to officers, or dial 911. These moments of incarceration are constant potentialities that, while frequent, arrive erratically. They reveal that the state works through time not only as a disciplining body but as an imposing, punishing body that leaves teenagers hanging in time, handcuffed on the curb or phone-in-hand in emergencies. Rather than understanding policing as simply a force for neighborhood order, we are provoked to re-conceptualize it as a means of state control in everyday life. Like the lives of imprisoned people are controlled as a punishment for being convicted of a crime, the lives of young African American and Latino people are controlled on the streets of Chicago neighborhoods as a punishment for being criminalized faces in criminalized places. These young people “do time” not as a consequence of criminal conviction but as a consequence of being young, poor, and African American or Latino on Chicago’s heavily policed South Side.

If we do indeed understand the young people with whom I spoke to be policed such that they are sentenced to “do time” outside prison, as their experiences suggest we should, then we should afford the policed the same presumption of innocence and require of police the same burden of proof on the streets that we afford to defendants and prosecutors in a courtroom. As policing operates now, it creates a climate of precarity in which
youth are forced to wait, suspended in time, made deviant, and abandoned by the institution that claims “We serve and protect.”

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Modeling Transit Deserts: A Case Study of Chicago

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Research over the last twenty years has sought to understand how increased suburban sprawl throughout the latter half of the 20th century may have given rise to food deserts across the U.S., resulting in the development and application of rigorous spatial analysis methods towards the study of these urban deserts. Current research has largely been limited to the study of food deserts. However, the effects of an increased urban sprawl—changing distribution of goods and services and simultaneous failure of public transit systems to reach newly urbanized areas—have given rise to another phenomenon: transit deserts. Little is known today about the impact of limited access to urban public transit services upon urban residents. This paper seeks to apply the rigorous methods employed by food desert research to study the related topic of transit deserts—areas with limited to no access to quality public transit. Using the city of Chicago, IL as a case study and data from the Chicago Data Portal and American Community Survey 2013 5-Year Estimates, this paper presents two methodologies for identifying transit deserts and assessing the degree to which these deserts may be problematic for communities who inhabit them.

Introduction

For nearly 183,000 Chicagoans dependent on public transit service for their mobility needs, a lack of access to convenient service limits their everyday ability to reach necessary goods and services that directly affect their quality of life (U.S. Census Bureau ACS 2013 Estimates). According to Nathaniel Hendren, a Harvard economist, “the relationship between transportation and social mobility is stronger than that between mobility and several other factors, like crime, elementary-school test scores or the percentage of two-parent families in a community” (cited in Bouchard 2015). Despite these facts, however, little is known today about the distribution of access to quality public transit service in major U.S. cities and how this access may affect the economic vitality of local communities.

In recent years, there has been a push within transit research to extend the concept of food deserts, i.e., “areas where there is little or no access to healthy and affordable food,” to the study of transportation in order to better understand the relationship between low levels of transportation access and negative social and economic outcomes (Treuhaft and Karpyn 2010, 7). Researchers believe that by studying transportation using the framework employed in food desert research, spatial patterns will emerge that can improve the evaluation of transit access and equity in localities across the United States (Jiao and Dillivan 2013, 23-24). As of today, howev-
er, only two transit desert studies have been conducted, neither of which adheres closely methodologically to how food deserts have been modeled, resulting in an incomplete extension of the food desert framework to the study of transit.

This paper, as a result, seeks for the first time to fully apply such a framework to the study of transportation using the Chicago public transit system as a case study. Departing from earlier work, this paper appropriates common food desert methodologies and definitional structure to study the prevalence and severity of transit deserts, defined here as areas with limited or no access to quality public transit services, in order to simplify the process for identifying geographic areas that experience low levels of access to public transit service.

In particular, the following analysis assesses whether and to what degree transit deserts pose a problem to residents in Chicago, IL. Using American Community Survey (ACS) 2013 5-Year Estimates and data from the Chicago Data Portal, this paper uses a buffer and network analysis of fixed-route public transit service, the two most common methods applied in food desert research, to determine whether geographic areas should be identified as transit deserts. An equity of access analysis is also performed in order to evaluate whether the populations located within identified transit deserts are disproportionately transit-dependent in comparison to populations with convenient access to quality transit services.

These analyses are conducted at both the census tract level, a geographic unit roughly the size of a neighborhood consisting of “a population size between 1,200 and 8,000 people,”(U.S. Census Bureau 2015) and the block level, the smallest geographic unit similar in size to a city block, in order to determine the degree to which the methodology presented is sensitive to the geographic unit of analysis (From U.S. Census Bureau cited in Morris 2013, 7). By performing these analyses using the transit desert definition and framework outlined above, it is argued that a more accurate identification of transit deserts will be possible, leading to a greater understanding of the role transit plays in determining equitable outcomes for urban populations.

Literature Review

Despite strides towards greater transit equity over the last twenty years, it remains unclear to what extent inadequate access to public transit service still poses a problem for communities across the country. This paper argues that without such knowledge, (1) it is impossible to know the role, if any, that a lack of access to transit service plays with regards to economic instability and social inequity found within and across metropolitan areas today, and (2) it is more difficult to target limited transportation funding and expansion towards those areas most in need of additional services. As such, it is vitally important to develop a framework capable of accurately identifying transit deserts and assessing to what degree these deserts may be problematic for individuals residing in them.

In order to develop such a framework, I review the food desert literature to assess its applicability to the study of transit deserts. In the following section, I first recap the major methodological debates that have taken place over the past two decades in food desert modeling, and then transition into a brief discussion as to how these debates can motivate the study and advancement of transit desert research. I then assess the relative merits and weaknesses presented in the two published transit desert studies conducted to date, and explain how they inform the methodological choices made in this research.

Food Deserts

In the early 1990s, a group of Scottish researchers first coined the term “food desert” to describe a phenomenon where people experience “poor access to an affordable and healthy diet”(Beaulac et al 2009, 4). These researchers believed a direct connection existed between access to nutritious food and the reporting of better health outcomes. Despite mixed results from their early analysis, the concept of food deserts later gained traction in the U.S., where researchers from a multitude of disciplines attempted to model access to food using this framework (Morris 2013, 5). Differences regarding how to define and model access quickly arose, leading to large discrepancies in the identification of food deserts within and across localities. Below is an overview of the three major debates within the food desert literature,
regarding how access to nutritious and affordable food should be defined, modeled, and understood.

Definitions of Access

While there is widespread agreement amongst researchers that “food deserts, by definition, are a matter of spatial accessibility,” differences persist as to how best to define spatial accessibility (Bader et al. 2010, 412). Within the food desert literature, spatial accessibility has been most commonly defined in two ways: in terms of distance or time.

Analyses that use distance as the basis for determining access, known as a spatial-definition of access, consider areas as accessible if they are located within a reasonable distance to a person’s home (Al Mamum and Lownes 2011, 70). For instance, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) use a spatial-definition of access to identify food deserts in the U.S. According to their definition, a food desert is an area that experiences “the lack of a healthier food retailer within a census tract or a half-mile outside of the tract” (Liese et al 2014, 20). Leete et al. (2012) also use a spatial-definition of access to identify food deserts in Edmonton, Canada, using a radial distance of 1 kilometer (2012, 210).

Food desert researchers have also used time to define spatial accessibility—what is known as a temporal-definition of access. A temporal definition of access attempts to capture the time-constraints faced by individuals when it comes to making mobility decisions. This definition considers a location accessible if the travel-time required for a trip falls within a maximal time frame, usually 30 minutes to an hour depending on the study (Al Mamun and Lownes 2011, 70). Richards (2012), for instance, uses a temporal-definition of access to determine whether food deserts in rural Appalachia are underrepresented as a result of traditional distance-based food desert analysis (2012: 3-4). Using a network analysis of drive time to grocery stores with a threshold of 20 minutes, Richards identifies 63 rural counties that contain food deserts, more than three times the number identified using the USDA spatial-definition. These stark differences suggest that properly defining accessibility is key to accurately identifying urban deserts.

Modeling Access

Discrepancies in the literature exist not only with regards to how to define food deserts but also as to how best to model these deserts. While food desert researchers have chosen to use software programs called geographic information systems (GIS) to map deserts in both urban and rural areas across the U.S., there is no consensus, particularly amongst researchers using a spatial-definition of access, as to which model should be the standard.

The most common model used within food desert research, especially in early analyses, is a buffer analysis. A buffer analysis is a type of simple proximity tool common in GIS, which identifies areas within a given radius of a point based on Euclidean distance, i.e. the shortest path between two points (Longley et al. 2011, 368). As Adams et al. (2010) observe, “Euclidian is one of the most commonly used methods for locating distance between two points…[however] there are limitations to using Euclidian geometry to map the shortest distance between neighborhoods and food stores” (59). One of these limitations is the assumption that individuals can move throughout space in all directions emanating from a point regardless of structural impediments. As such buffer analyses tend to overestimate access and therefore underreport or misidentify food deserts in a locality. Despite this limitation, however, buffer analysis is widely used in modeling food deserts, because it requires a simpler data structure and allows for faster processing, making analysis more convenient and easier for novice researchers to perform.

The second most common method used for modeling access is called a network analysis. Recently, network analysis has become widely used for food desert modeling, since it is believed to measure distance more realistically. Unlike a buffer analysis, a network analysis measures distance along predetermined networks such as sidewalks or roadways, more accurately reflecting how preexisting networks constrain movement throughout a city (Longley et al. 2011, 218-219). However, it is largely unclear to what degree network analysis may be more precise than buffer analysis in identifying food deserts. As Bitler and Haider (2011) underscore, while “network methods approximate actual travel time better than radial methods [such as a buffer method]…network methods…diverge from radial methods very little.
when streets follow a regular gridded pattern as in urban areas” (cited in Bitler and Haider 2011, 164). As such, it is possible that in some locations a buffer analysis may not differ significantly from a network analysis in terms of identifying food deserts.

**Differentiation of Suppliers**

The final major debate in the food desert literature regards how best to determine which establishments should qualify as suppliers of nutritious food. Identifying these suppliers is key to presenting accurate food desert maps, since both network and buffer analyses rely on access to a specific point.

The focus of much of the food desert literature, particularly early studies, is on determining access to chain supermarket stores, such as Whole Foods, Trader Joe's, Costco, etc. According to Morris (2013:7), using the presence of these large chain grocery stores is considered “the easiest method for defining nutritious food”. The reason for this is twofold. First and foremost, these chain supermarkets are found to “provide access to healthy food in greater variety and of high[er] quality,” than other locations, making them a reliable heuristic for having access to quality food (From Franco et al. 2008; Block and Kouba 2006, cited in Bader et al. 2010, 411). Second, since data on the location of these chain supermarkets is more readily available, using access to chain supermarkets as the sole criterion for identifying food deserts saves both time and data processing for researchers. However, like using the faster buffer analysis to map deserts, mapping access only to chain supermarkets has been determined by some researchers within the field to be inadequate.

Specifically, Morris (2013) argues that failing to account for alternative suppliers of healthy food, such as farmer’s markets and convenience stores, may lead to an overestimation of food deserts (7). While few studies have yet to highly differentiate between suppliers in their analyses, one study has shown that it is not only possible to do so, but also results in a more realistic depiction of food access within a region. Raja et al.’s (2008) study categorizes food retail stores into six domains (supermarkets, grocery stores, fruit and vegetable markets, meat and fish markets, convenience stores, and restaurants) in order to assess access to healthy food in Erie County, New York, producing a more complete analysis of the county’s food landscape than other analyses (cited in Morris 2013, 7).

**Learning from the Food Desert Debate**

In sum, the primary debates within the food desert literature have revolved around three topics: (1) how best to define and (2) model access and (3) identify suppliers of affordable nutritious food. While definitive answers with respect to all three of these debates arguably have not been determined, it is worth reviewing some major takeaways that have resulted from these debates, particularly with regards to their application to transit desert study.

Firstly, almost all food desert literature to date has used spatial accessibility to identify food deserts. This suggests that modeling urban deserts lends itself well to proximity analysis. It would then seem appropriate to continue to apply this spatial accessibility framework to the study of transit deserts, which like the study of food deserts, seeks to identify areas with limited access to a specific location.

Secondly, while disagreement persists as to how best to classify nutritious food suppliers, there is consensus that differences between these suppliers exist. Attempts within the literature to categorize suppliers based on quantity, quality, and affordability of healthy food items imply that having access to certain suppliers is better than having access to others. With respect to the study of transit deserts, this suggests that care should be taken to classify transit service in a similar manner. It is well known within the transit literature that not all transit is created equal. For instance, bus service is more limited in its mobility offerings and service hours than mass rail, which also has the added benefit of serving more passengers at one time (Sanchez et al 2003, vii). For this reason, care should be taken to differentiate between the quality of transit services accessible to residents when mapping transit deserts.

**Transit Desert Studies**

Having now reviewed the dominant debates within food desert literature, it is worthwhile to consider how these methodological problems have thus far been addressed in the two transit desert studies completed as of
Jiao and Dillivan’s Transit Desert Analysis

In 2011, Jiao and Dillivan became the first researchers to broadly apply the food desert framework to transportation. Understanding how similar factors, particularly urban sprawl, contribute to the development of both food and transit deserts across the U.S., Jiao and Dillivan argue that “…taking the concept of food deserts and applying it to public transportation enables spatial patterns to emerge regarding service provision and service need” (2013: 23-24). These spatial patterns, in turn, allow for a deeper understanding of how transit access may impact economic and other outcomes. However, despite their intentions to apply a food desert analysis to mass transit, Jiao and Dillivan’s work significantly departs from the methodologies advanced within the food desert literature. Rather than using a spatial definition of access, Jiao and Dillivan define transit deserts based on a supply and demand framework, using a gap-analysis approach to identify these deserts (Ibid, 26). Specifically, Jiao and Dillivan’s analysis compares the “the level of transit dependency for an area…against the amount of transit supply” in four U.S. cities in an attempt to understand what role, if any, city size may play in the development of transit deserts (Ibid).

With regards to the city of Chicago, Jiao and Dillivan’s analysis finds that the city in general has a very high transit dependency, which tends to be “well-served by high levels of transportation services” (Ibid, 35). While they discover a small number of transit deserts within the city, most of these deserts are largely situated in neighborhoods on the far North Side as well as areas just outside of the Loop, which are not commonly associated with having poor access (Ibid). Jiao and Dillivan speculate that the level of analysis used in their study may be too fine-grained of a measurement for identifying transit deserts, resulting in “certain areas that, in reality, are served well by transit, [to be] shown as bereft of service” (Ibid, 37).

From the above summary of Jiao and Dillivan’s work, it is evident that their analysis of transit deserts strays significantly from how food desert mapping has traditionally been performed and results in an inaccurate depiction of transit access with regards to the city of Chicago. Firstly, Jiao and Dillivan develop a definition based on supply and demand rather than on spatial accessibility, the definitional standard in food desert literature, and subsequently fail to perform any proximity analysis in GIS, opting instead to calculate excess or lack of supply statistically. Secondly, Jiao and Dillivan’s research does not attempt to differentiate between mass rail and bus service, despite inherent differences between the two with regards to service area, fare-structures, hours of operation, and capacity. For these reasons, it is evident that despite their intention to extend the study of food deserts to transportation, Jiao and Dillivan’s extension largely ignores the major methodological advancements and considerations central to the development of food desert research.

CNT’s Transit Desert Analysis

Only one other report of transit deserts currently exists: the Center for Neighborhood Technology’s (CNT) report on transit deserts in the Chicago region. According to CNT, a “transit desert is an area that has high demand for transit but lacks access to high-quality transit, meaning that it is more than a half-mile from a rail transit stop and a quarter-mile from high-quality bus service” (Transit Futures 2014, 1). Although this transit definition relies partially on a supply and demand framework, it also involves a spatial accessibility component with regards to access to high-quality transit service. Hence, in terms of creating greater cohesion between food and transit desert analysis, CNT’s report is an advancement from Jiao and Dillivan’s work. CNT’s study further advances Jiao and Dillivan’s work in two other specific ways.

First, CNT’s definition of a transit desert classifies certain forms of transit service as being high-quality. Specifically they define high-quality service as “rail, bus rapid transit (BRT), arterial rapid transit (ART), or bus routes with frequent service (average headways of 15 minutes or less.” By creating this quality standard for transit, CNT’s report better captures the differences between various forms of public transit service, just as food desert researchers have begun to differentiate between types of nutritious food suppliers.

The second advancement made by CNT is their use of a network analysis, conducted at the block group lev-
el, to identify transit deserts within the Chicago Region. In their report, CNT identified block groups that were “more than a half-mile from a rail transit stop and a quarter-mile from high-quality bus service” using a network analysis based on distance—a methodology regularly used in food desert studies (Transit Futures 2014, 1). In these ways CNT’s report not only builds upon Jiao and Dillivan’s research, but also addresses the three major debates that have taken place within food desert research in the context of transportation.

This paper seeks to continue the work started by Jiao and Dillivan and CNT to further bridge the gap between food and transit desert studies by appropriating the most common food desert techniques, buffer and network analysis, for the study of transit deserts. The following section provides greater detail as to how food desert methodologies will be applied in this analysis, in order to identify transit deserts within Chicago, IL.

Methodology

Since transit desert research is still in a nascent stage, it is important to compare how different methodologies may affect the identification of these deserts, both in terms of the total number and location of these deserts. As such, this analysis seeks to apply two separate methodologies, a buffer and a network analysis, which are widely used in food desert research to model transit deserts within the city of Chicago at both the census tract and the block level. By analyzing these methodologies at the tract and block level, it will be possible to further assess the sensitivity of each model to the geographic unit of analysis as Bader et al. (2010) did with respect to the identification of food deserts in New York City.

The following analysis uses data from the City of Chicago Data Portal and The American Community Survey (ACS) 2013 5-Year Estimates to model access to quality public transit service using a definition of access based exclusively on distance. Both models use identical parameters for determining access to quality transit service: Any area located within one-quarter mile of frequent bus service, or one-half mile of high-speed rail service, is considered as ‘within access’ to quality transit service. Similarly, any area that is neither located within a one-quarter mile of frequent bus service nor within a half-mile of mass rail service is considered to be a transit desert. These distances were selected because they conform to the United States’ walkability standards for transit access (HUD et al 2014). Included in this paper’s definition of quality public transit service is all mass rail service, i.e. Metra and L stations within Chicago, as well as frequent bus service, which includes all CTA buses with scheduled average headways less than 15 minutes from 7AM to 10PM on weekdays. This definition for quality transit service is consistent with that used by CNT in their preliminary report on transit deserts. Furthermore, this timeframe encompasses the peak-travel times for CTA bus riders (CTA 2012, 10). Future research, however, should consider alternative methods for differentiating quality bus transit, taking into consideration not only frequency but also other characteristics such as connectivity, i.e. the degree to which a transit stop is connected to the larger network, bus congestion, and hours of operation (Jin 2005, 38).

Once the location of transit deserts has been identified using the two methods described above, Mann-Whitney U tests will be performed in order to assess the equity of transit access across various demographic and socioeconomic factors with an eye towards assessing whether populations within transit deserts are significantly more transit-dependent than populations within access to quality public transit. Transit-dependent areas, i.e. areas “with lower incomes and a higher percentage of non-Caucasian residents” (Pucher 1982 cited in Wells 2009, 59) is of particular concern with regards to assessing the severity of transit deserts, since significantly higher levels of transit-dependency within transit deserts would suggest that residing within a desert may negatively affect one’s mobility. As such, the following variables, amongst others, will be used to assess the equity of transit deserts: median income, access to vehicles, percent African American, percent Hispanic, average household size, in the labor force, eligible for food stamps, receiving Medicaid, and average commute times. These variables were selected, because they are regularly used as indicators for transit-dependency within transit equity research (Litman n.d., 50-65). As such, if significant demographic differences are found between the populations within transit deserts and those within access to quality transit service, it would suggest that there is unequal access to transit service with regards
to those variables found to be significant. This would further suggest that not only do transit deserts exist but that they represent areas of inequity within the city.

As a result of how distance is measured, there are inherent limitations to the methods used in this analysis. As mentioned earlier, buffer analyses tend to overestimate access. However, despite this limitation, the purpose for running a buffer analysis in this study is twofold. First, since a buffer analysis has never been performed for the purposes of modeling transit deserts, it is unclear whether such a method will significantly distort the estimated level of access to quality transit service. Second, and relatedly, it remains unknown as to what extent a buffer analysis may distort the identification of transit deserts. Furthermore, since the buffer analysis requires significantly less data and a simpler data format, if using a buffer method does not result in significant differences in the number and location of transit deserts identified in comparison to the network analysis, then buffer methods should continue to be assessed for their validity moving forward.

While a network analysis tends to be a more realistic method for modeling access, it too is limited by the accuracy of the network’s underlying data. A major limitation of the underlying network dataset in this analysis is that it assumes that an individual can cross major roads, like the Dan Ryan Expressway or Lakeshore Drive, leading to a slightly overestimated level of access for transit stops located along or nearby these major thoroughfares. Although time did not permit me to correct these dataset flaws, future research should seek to correct such errors.

Data Analysis

The following data analysis section is divided in two parts. The first part examines the results found by using a buffering technique to identify transit deserts, including a review of the findings at both the tract and block levels as well as the results of the equity analysis performed at the tract level. The second part examines the results found by using a network analysis, and similarly is divided into three subsections regarding the findings at the tract and block levels as well as a review of the equity analysis results at the tract level. A discussion of the findings from this research in concert with those found by Jiao and Dillivan and by CNT in their respective analyses then follows.

Buffer Analysis: Tract Level Main Findings

A buffer analysis at the tract level identified 125 tracts in the city of Chicago as transit deserts, meaning these areas either are not within walking distance of any form of public transit service or have limited access to transit service. In other words, individuals residing in these tracts are within walking distance exclusively to infrequent bus services. Tracts with limited access are represented in pale pink, while those with no access are represented in red in Figure 2 below. Areas in green represent tracts with access to quality transit service. Specifically, those areas in the darkest green represent census tracts that have access to quality bus, L, and Metra services. The second darkest green represents census tracts that have access to two of the three types of quality transit service. The lightest green shows the census tracts that have access to only one type of quality transit service.
Since the focus of this analysis is on those areas experiencing limited to no access to quality transit, I decided not to differentiate between tracts with access to one or more types of quality transit based on service type.

From Figure 1, it appears that most transit deserts are located along the periphery of the city limits, particularly concentrated in the southeast and far north sides of the city. Not surprisingly, many of the areas with the greatest level of access to quality transit are located within the Loop. These findings, specifically with regards to high levels of access in the center of the city and lower access radiating out from the center, are consistent with the spoke and wheel urban design of the Chicago transit system, which was built up around commuter rail lines (Jiao and Dillivan 2013, 35).

Looking more closely at only those tracts identified as transit deserts, shown in Figure 2, it was determined that in total there are 82 census tracts with limited access to public transit and an additional 43 with no access to public transit, representing 15.6% of the total geographic area of the city of Chicago.

An estimated 183,052 households in Chicago were identified as currently residing in transit deserts (U.S. Census Bureau ACS 2013). It is further estimated that within transit deserts, the average percent of individuals living below the poverty line is 21.5% with an average unemployment rate of 16.6. Moreover, 23,228 people are estimated to both live in a transit desert and have no access to a private vehicle, severely constraining their mobility and access to necessary goods and services within and outside city limits.

**Buffer Analysis: Equity Results**

Mann-Whitney U Tests were performed to assess whether these demographic and socioeconomic differences between transit deserts and areas within access to

### Table 1: Significant Effects of Buffer Tract Level Analysis, by p value

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Higher rank if...</th>
<th>p value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Median Age</td>
<td>In Transit Desert</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>In Transit Desert</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eligible for Medicaid</td>
<td>In Transit Desert</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Households</td>
<td>In Transit Desert</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not On Food Stamps</td>
<td>In Transit Desert</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the Labor Force</td>
<td>Not In Transit Desert</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Access to Vehicle</td>
<td>Not In Transit Desert</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commute to Work 0 to 30 Minutes</td>
<td>In Transit Desert</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commute to Work Greater than 90 minutes</td>
<td>In Transit Desert</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to One or More Vehicles</td>
<td>In Transit Desert</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Not in Transit Desert</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Population Living Under Poverty Line</td>
<td>Not in Transit Desert</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commute to Work 60 to 90 minutes</td>
<td>In Transit Desert</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
quality public transit service are statistically significant. A Mann-Whitney U Test compares “differences between two independent groups when the dependent variable is either ordinal or continuous, but not normally distributed,” (Laerd Statistics 2013) which is particularly appropriate for transit equity tests “due to the lack of normality, equal variances, and independence typical of spatial data” (Nicholls 2001, 211). The significant results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests in order of p value are summarized in the following table with a traditional alpha level set at 0.05.

From Table 1, it is clear that significant differences with regards to race, commute time, and socio-economic variables are present. In particular, transit deserts are found to have disproportionately high numbers of Hispanics, individuals eligible for Medicaid, and workers with both very long and very short commute times. While a difference with regards to having no access to a vehicle is found to be significant between the two populations, having no access to a vehicle is associated with not living in a transit desert.

This finding suggests that the existence of transit deserts within Chicago may not necessarily be as problematic as the absolute number of deserts may lead one to believe. Since access to a private vehicle is higher than expected for populations living within transit deserts, it is possible that while these individuals lack convenient access to quality public transit service, a larger number of them can compensate for this loss through access to private vehicles.

While being Hispanic is significantly associated with being in a transit desert, being African American was not found to be significant. Neither were indicators regarding median earnings, average household size, or being recipients of food stamps.

From the Mann-Whitney U test results, it is obvious that significant differences persist between populations within and outside of transit deserts, meaning...
there are substantial inequities of access in the city of Chicago. However, the results are ambiguous at best in terms of determining whether a lack of access to quality transit service poses a severe problem to residents within transit deserts. While some of the findings are consistent with the claim that populations within transit deserts are more transit-dependent, such as this population being more likely to be Hispanic, having lower levels of employment, and having an older population, others contradict these findings, specifically the finding that no access to private vehicles is associated with not residing in a transit desert (Litman n.d., 50-65). One explanation for this seemingly contradictory outcome is that populations within access to quality public transit willingly choose to forgo owning private vehicles, since their mobility needs are well met by public services. This may lead to disproportionately fewer people within access to high quality public transit having access to private vehicles. Conversely, because populations within transit deserts have less convenient access to public transit, they may be forced, if financially able, to own or have access to a private vehicle. Regardless, these findings suggest that more analysis is needed before definitive recommendations can be made.

**Buffer Analysis: Block Level Sensitivity Training**

In order to assess how dependent the initial findings are on the geographic unit of analysis, the buffer analysis was repeated at the block level. Figure 3 on the next page shows a side-by-side comparison of the tract and block level findings. As is evident from Figure 3, there are significant visual similarities between the block level and tract level buffer analyses.

Indeed, 84.8% of the locations identified as transit deserts at the tract level were identified as such at the block level. Specifically, the block level analysis identified 2,242 blocks as having no access to public transit service with an additional 5,943 blocks that experienced...
limited access; this represents 17.7% of the total geographic area of the city of Chicago, just two percentage points higher than what was found in the tract level analysis. These findings suggest that the buffer analysis methodology is not very sensitive to the geographic unit of analysis, and give greater confidence to the findings determined at the tract level.

**Network Analysis: Tract Level Main Findings**

Because buffer analysis has the potential to overestimate access and thus underreport transit deserts, the same analysis was repeated using a network analysis. The findings from the network analysis at the tract level told a much more dire story than those from the buffer analysis. As Figure 5 shows, large portions of the city are identified as transit deserts using the network analysis.

In total, the network analysis at the tract level identified 317 tracts as being transit deserts. This figure is more than double the number found by using a buffer analysis, which identified 125 tracts as transit deserts. Furthermore, an estimated 425,840 households were identified as currently residing within transit deserts in Chicago with 60,945 people estimated to not have access to a private vehicle or quality public transit service (U.S. Census Bureau ACS 2013). Similar to the buffer tract analysis, the average percent of people living below the poverty line in a transit desert is estimated to be 22.7% with an average unemployment rate of 16.9 (Ibid).

**Network Analysis: Equity Results**

Mann-Whitney U Tests were repeated using the results from the network analysis at the tract level. Once again, the significant results are reported in the table below in order of p-value, with a traditional alpha level set at 0.05.

The results from the Mann-Whitney tests are largely consistent with those found earlier from the buffer analysis (Table 2). Socioeconomic and demographic differences were found between populations living in transit deserts and those within access to quality transit service. Having no access to a vehicle, while significant,
was once again associated with not living in a transit desert, whereas access to at least one vehicle was associated with being in a transit desert. These findings suggest that populations in transit deserts may have their mobility needs met by private vehicles and are therefore not dependent upon public transit. Consistent with the Mann-Whitney results from the buffer analysis, long commute times, not being employed or in the labor force, and being eligible for Medicaid were all associated with being in a transit desert.

Because the Mann-Whitney results from the network analysis at the tract level are consistent with the results found from the buffer analysis at the tract level, the same ambiguities within the equity analysis are present. Again, many variables commonly associated with higher transit-dependency, such as having a higher average median age, being disproportionately Hispanic, and having a higher than expected number of people eligible for Medicaid, are found to be significant (Litman n.d., 50-65). However, other variables associated with lower levels of transit-dependency, most importantly having access to at least one vehicle, are also found to be significant (Ibid). As a result, the findings from the Mann-Whitney test suggest that more testing is needed before conclusive recommendations can be made. From the analysis presented above it appears that while there are distinct and significant differences between the populations within and outside of transit deserts, meaning there is inequity of access to quality transit service for certain groups in the city of Chicago, it is also possible that access to private vehicles compensates to an extent for this inequity.

**Network Analysis: Block Level Sensitivity Training**

The network analysis was repeated at the block level to assess how dependent the initial findings are on the geographic unit of analysis. Figure 5 shows a side-by-side comparison of the tract and block level findings. The findings at the block level again are quite similar to what was found at the tract level. In total 18,622 blocks were identified as transit deserts, this is approximately 40.3% of the total geographic area of Chicago and only...
0.8 percentage points higher than what was found from the network analysis at the tract level. In terms of overlap between the block and tract level findings, it was determined that 97.1% of locations identified as transit deserts at the tract level were identified as such at the block level. These findings suggest that the network analysis methodology is not very sensitive to the geographic unit of analysis, and give greater confidence to the findings determined at the tract level.

Comparison of Findings with Existing Transit Desert Maps

Although it is difficult to accurately compare the findings from the analysis presented above with those found by Jiao and Dillivan and the Center for Neighborhood Technology, because of significant methodological and definitional differences, it is still worthwhile to consider these findings in the context of those already presented.

From Jiao and Dillivan’s analysis it was determined that few transit deserts existed in Chicago. Of those identified by Jiao and Dillivan, the majority were located “…particularly in the farthest north neighborhoods of the city within the Edgewater neighborhood as well as a few block groups just outside of the city’s ‘Loop’” (Jiao and Dillivan 2013, 35). Figure 6 presents Jiao and Dillivan’s analysis.

In Jiao and Dillivan’s map of transit deserts, the darkest colors within the boundary of the city of Chicago signify deserts, whereas lighter grays signify non-deserts. There exist minor similarities between Jiao and Dillivan’s results and those found in this analysis, particularly with regards to the results from the buffer analysis. Both Jiao and Dillivan’s analysis and mine find transit deserts in areas just outside the Loop and along the far north side. However, it is quite evident that the access analysis approach used in this analysis results in the identification of significantly more transit deserts, especially using a network analysis, than Jiao and Dillivan were able to find using their statistical methods.

A similar result is found when comparing CNT’s transit desert map, which includes not only the city of Chicago but the six major surrounding suburbs, with the results from this analysis. Figure 7 depicts the CNT’s transit desert map. Compared with my results (Figure 3), there are greater similarities than were found when looking at Jiao and Dillivan’s results. Specifically both CNT’s analysis and mine identified transit deserts in the Garfield Ridge, Clearing, and far South Side neighborhoods. However, once again far more deserts were identified in this paper’s analysis than were found by CNT. While CNT’s report estimates that within the Chicago region 161,763 households currently live in a transit desert, representing 17% of Cook County’s total number of households, from their map, it is clear that the vast majority of these households are located outside of the city of Chicago boundaries (Ibid, 2).

The differences in these results are not surprising, however, considering that both CNT’s and Jiao and Dillivan’s analyses controlled for public transit demand. Rather than looking at all areas bereft of transit service, each of their analyses only reported those areas that were both lacking in transit service and had a high demand for those services. The analysis presented in this paper on the other hand reported all areas that had limited or no walking access to quality transit service regardless of demand. By excluding demand in this analysis, it was possible to identify all areas that are inconvenient or impossible to reach by public transit service alone, allowing for a better understanding of how limited access to public transit service, rather than limited mobility, potentially results in socio-economic inequities.

Findings

It is clear from the analysis presented in this paper and from the previous discussion that the method and definition used for determining transit deserts has profound effects on their identification. As such, this paper seeks to present recommendations as to how the field of transit desert research can be grown. It does so with an eye towards the definition and modeling of deserts in future, areas of improvements on the analysis presented above, and suggestions for incorporating equity analyses to better understand the difficulty of identifying deserts. Only by improving upon the methodology used for modeling transit deserts will it be possible to understand the implications of transportation policy on the equity of public transit access.

Transit Desert Definition and Methodology

Moving forward, transit desert studies should continue using a spatial accessibility definition and meth-
odology to identify deserts in other metropolitan areas in the United States. Not only does using access as the defining feature of transit deserts create greater consistency and cohesion between transit desert and food desert research, but as this analysis has shown, using a definition of access allows for ease of modeling and provides a better basis for understanding how limited access, rather than mobility, impacts economic opportunities and outcomes than Jiao and Dillivan’s and CNT’s frameworks allow. But while it is recommended that transit deserts continue to be defined based on access, additional research should seek to use both spatial and temporal definitions of access in order to assess which is more appropriate.

In terms of modeling these deserts in a GIS, the findings from this analysis suggest that network analyses rather than buffer analyses should be used. One of the purposes for running the buffer analysis despite its tendency to overestimate access was to determine whether an analysis of this type would significantly distort the identification of deserts in Chicago, something that was found to be true. Since the buffer analysis produced significantly different results than the network analysis, it is important moving forward that transit desert analyses be conducted using a network analysis, which is a more accurate process for measuring access.

Because the results from the tract and block level analyses using the same method were highly consistent both in terms of the number and location of transit deserts identified, it is recommended that transit desert analysis continue to be conducted at both geographic units in other localities to determine if this finding is generalizable or is simply anomalous to the city of Chicago. If the geographic unit of analysis is found, as in this analysis, to not result in any major differences with regards to the identification of transit deserts, it is recommended that tract level rather than block level analysis become standard. Not only is tract level analysis the most common unit of analysis used in food desert literature, but the degree of data available with respect to equity analyses is more abundant and more readily available (Morris 2013, 6).

Improvements to Transit Desert Analyses

While this paper makes important contributions to the field of transit desert research by providing the first buffer and equity analyses on the topic of transit deserts, it provides at most a preliminary attempt at the study of this social and structural phenomenon. The framework, both in terms of definition and methodology, presented here should be used as a guide for directing future research. Specifically, this analysis can be strengthened by better defining what quality transit service is, determining alternative methods for defining access aside from walkability to stations based exclusively on distance, and using a more refined network dataset for network analysis.

It is recommended that future definitions of quality transit service take into consideration issues regarding connectivity and time of service. Furthermore, since bus routes are highly variable both in terms of days in service, average headways, and hours of operation, future analyses should seek to perform transit desert analyses at different times and days to assess how the number and distribution of transit deserts change based on variability of service. Alternatively, aspects regarding number of days in service and hours of operation should be incorporated in determining which routes and stops qualify as providing quality service.

Because this analysis used only one definition of access based on distance, it is recommended that research consider alternative definitions in order to better understand what role the definition of access plays in determining transit deserts. While this analysis uses industry standards for walkability to bus and mass rail service, other research has shown that these figures grossly misrepresent actual levels of walkability observed (Xu 2014, 10-12). Therefore if accuracy is of the greatest concern with identifying deserts, future research should seek to use the most realistic walkability figures for analysis based on distance.

Finally, as was mentioned in the methodology section, the network dataset used in this analysis had a few errors that with more time could be improved upon to provide an even more realistic identification of transit deserts. For the sake of this analysis, these errors at most resulted in an underestimation of transit deserts in Chicago using a network analysis, since the model assumed pedestrian access across and along major thoroughfares.
Recommendations for Equity Analysis

The results from the Mann-Whitney U Tests suggest that there is unequal access to quality public transit service within Chicago, IL. However, the results further suggest that a disproportionate number of individuals living with limited to no access to quality transit service also have access to at least one vehicle, possibly compensating for this inequity. As a result, it is recommended that future research seek to continue analyzing the equity of access to quality transit service in other localities. Only by better understanding underlying differences between populations within and outside of transit deserts, is it possible to make informed decisions about whether and how to extend access to incorporate these deserts within the transit system. Since the costs of building new transit infrastructure can be enormous, it is necessary to understand how problematic the existence of transit deserts is for populations living within them.

Importantly, future analyses are encouraged to use alternative tests to determine equity of access. While Mann-Whitney U Tests are commonly employed for transit equity analyses, spatial statistics including quadrat analysis should be employed for greater accuracy because they standardize the area boundaries and resample the census data accordingly (Mitchell 2005, 84). It may also be important to incorporate cost as a function of access to transit service, as food desert researchers have begun to do. Since transportation, particularly for individuals living in major urban areas, is quickly becoming the second largest monthly cost, in some places even rivaling the cost of housing, future research should seek to compare how pricing of different transit services in addition to temporal and spatial access to services affects the identification of transit deserts (CNT 2012, 7).

Conclusion

While the study of transit deserts is still in its beginning stages, properly identifying these areas has real implications, of which both researchers and metropolitan planning organizations responsible for making transit planning decisions should be mindful. The analysis presented in this paper has shown that not only do transit deserts exist in one of the United State’s largest metropolitan areas, but that these transit deserts are further representative of an inequitable access to quality transit service that still persists despite massive overhauls in federal transportation policies. Identifying transit deserts—or areas that lack access to quality transportation services—makes possible better prioritization of limited transportation resources towards serving desert regions, which would provide greater opportunity and equity to these communities in the future. In order to achieve transit equity, it is necessary to understand what public transit access looks like in America today, which can only be accomplished through better modeling of transit deserts.

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The Effect of Social Capital on Neighborhood Collective Efficacy

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B.A. Sociology and Public Policy

My research attempts to identify which form of social capital production (informal or formal ties) is more strongly associated with neighborhood collective efficacy on a macro and micro-level. I conducted multivariate linear regressions on the 2006 Social Capital Community Survey, and 12 qualitative interviews with South Chicago community organizations and neighborhood residents. The results are mixed and inconclusive. While the statistical analysis illustrates that informal social ties is the main predictor of neighborhood collective efficacy, my interviews demonstrate that racial heterogeneity and concerns about safety impede the development of informal social ties. In contrast, formal organizations function as safe spaces and organize programming that facilitates trustworthy relationships between neighbors. More research is needed to understand the varying roles of informal social ties and formal social ties in generating social capital and neighborhood collective efficacy in different contexts.

Introduction

Social capital is the value derived from trusting relationships and networks with family members, friends, neighbors, acquaintances, and even organizations. Social capital has been associated with many positive economic and social outcomes such as increased economic mobility, tolerance, happiness, and fewer instances/lower rates of crime. I explore how neighborhood collective efficacy is affected by formal social ties (those created in formal organizations) and informal social ties (those created in casual interactions with neighbors). Neighborhood collective efficacy represents the willingness of a community to mobilize around collective neighborhood issues. While social capital represents a social resource or value, neighborhood collective efficacy represents the willingness of neighbors to convert that resource into collective action.

Neighborhood collective efficacy can mitigate negative consequences of structural disadvantages in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty. Strong neighborhood collective efficacy is strongly associated with lower crime and violence in poor communities. Therefore, these concepts should be a pivotal consideration when crafting policy interventions for concentrated poverty neighbor-
hoods. However, there are still many gaps in research on neighborhood collective efficacy and its relationship to social capital.

Current research fails to clearly distinguish the effects of formal and informal ties and and neighborhood collective efficacy. This gap in knowledge limits the accuracy of policy interventions in building neighborhood collective efficacy. Moreover, current research also fails to clearly contextualize how the concepts of social capital and neighborhood collective efficacy can be applied to and utilized in poor minority communities.

Therefore, my research aims to address how formal and informal social ties as dimensions of social capital translate into neighborhood collective efficacy. I study this using a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods on a national level, and also in the specific context of a low-income community in Chicago.

This paper proceeds in two parts. In the first part of my study, I test behavioral, attitudinal, and demographic variables on neighborhood collective efficacy, in addition to the dimensions of formal or informal social ties on neighborhood collective efficacy. My quantitative findings, which are drawn from nation-wide U.S. data, suggest that informal social ties are the strongest predictors of neighborhood collective efficacy, while formal social ties do not have a statistically significant relationship with neighborhood collective efficacy. This hypothesis, that informal more so than formal social ties predict neighborhood collective efficacy, is tested in the second part of my study. I interviewed neighborhood residents and community organizers in the predominantly low-income and minority neighborhood of South Chicago. In this context, formal ties seemed more effective than informal ties in generating neighborhood collective efficacy.

I begin with an overview of current literature on social capital and neighborhood collective efficacy and its limitations. Then I’ll describe my quantitative and qualitative research methodology, results, and analysis. I conduct another regression analysis in the penultimate section in order to reconcile the discrepancies between my quantitative and qualitative findings. Finally, I conclude and offer recommendations for future research.

**Literature Review**

This review will (1) define and explain the importance of social capital, neighborhood context, and neighborhood collective efficacy; (2) analyze the relationship between forms of social capital production and neighborhood collective efficacy; and (3) discuss applications of social capital and neighborhood collective efficacy to low-income minority neighborhoods.

**Social Capital and the Neighborhood**

Social capital is based on the premise that “networks and the associated norms of reciprocity have value.” Social capital is derived from social ties and trusting relationships among individuals in networks, such as family members, friends, neighbors, community members, or individuals across communities (Putnam 2001). As a resource, social capital exists on a community level and cannot be owned by a single individual, even though individuals can contribute to it. If utilized effectively, social capital allows community members to come together and work towards collective goals (Putnam 1995; Putnam 2001; Warren et al. 2001). Central to the concept of social capital is the development of trust in interpersonal relationships and the belief that one’s investments will be reciprocated (Brisson and Usher 2007, 62). Without trust, collaborative relationships could not effectively mobilize resources in order to achieve collective community goals.

Academic theorists such as Bourdieu and DeFilippis emphasize how social capital must be analyzed in conjunction with other forms of capital, particularly the reproduction of economic capital (DeFilippis 2001, 791). While a powerful factor, social capital is related interdependently with other types of capital such as human, economic, and physical capital and cannot act as a substitute for these resources. Social capital facilitates increased access to and more effective utilization of these types of capital, but its reach is limited. It can only partially mitigate the detrimental outcomes associated with impoverished communities who have limited human or physical capital (Warren et al. 2001).

I use neighborhoods, or “geographically bounded groupings of households and institutions connected through structures and processes” as the unit of analysis for social capital (Foster and Hipp 2011, 25). A
neighborhood is not just a physical space but also the interweaving networks of social relationships within this delineated space; as such, numerous social problems are concentrated on the neighborhood level. Concentrated poverty within neighborhoods has far-reaching consequences for individuals, including detrimental outcomes in health, safety, child development, and academic and economic success (Brisson and Altschul, 2011, 544; Forrest and Kearns, 2012, 2133). Sampson found that violent crimes are geographically concentrated in certain disadvantaged neighborhoods instead of being randomly distributed (Saegaert 2001, 91). Researchers have not fully explored how social capital and neighborhood collective efficacy can mitigate these negative neighborhood effects.

Why choose the neighborhood as the locus of social interaction? The neighborhood has been declining as a social unit, largely due to technological advances. Communication and network technology liberate social relations from geographical proximity, and can span across neighborhoods, cities, and nations. Accordingly, it has become increasingly commonplace for neighbors to have frequent but superficial weak ties with each other. However, it is precisely these weak ties among neighbors that can result in beneficial social outcomes.

A study of 1996 Swedish neighborhoods showed that weak ties occurred three times more frequent than strong ties, and were associated with a “feeling of home,” “security,” and “practical as well as social support” to neighborhood residents (Forrest and Kearns, 2001, 2133). In a study on the benefits of weak neighborhood ties and economic mobility, Granovetter found that weak ties facilitate information exchange across separate social groups and were more useful than strong ties in spreading information about new jobs (Granovetter 1983, 6). Repeated casual interactions through weak ties may serve as the foundation for stronger connections (Curley, 2010:38). Hence, weak social ties in a neighborhood can contribute greatly to generating social capital and building neighborhood collective efficacy.

**Neighborhood Collective Efficacy**

Social capital can generate collective good in neighborhood settings through neighborhood collective efficacy (Sampson and Grail 2009, 1587). Neighborhood collective efficacy is defined as “social cohesion among neighbors combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good” (Sampson 1997, 918). While social capital consists of social resources, collective efficacy is the conversion of these social resources to achieve common goals (Burchfield 2005, 34; Sampson Raudenbush, and Earls 1997, 635). Sampson measures neighborhood collective efficacy by assessing the level of informal social control and social cohesion within a neighborhood (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997, 920). Neighborhood social cohesion is framed as trust and unity among neighbors and is measured by assessing the similarity of values, level of trust, and level of closeness among neighbors (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997, 919). Informal social control is framed as the likelihood of neighbor intervention in preventing socially unacceptable behaviors on behalf of the community good. It is measured by assessing how much control neighbors believe they, as a whole, have over the neighborhood environment (Brisson and Altschul, 2011, 547; Morenoff 2002, 519; Kleinhans 2013, 423). Social cohesion acts as the precursor to informal social control, because a lack of trust among neighbors will prevent collective interventions that maintain public order.

**Consequences of Social Capital and Neighborhood Collective Efficacy**

Multivariate analyses of social capital by Putnam on aggregated state level data have found robust relationships between increased social capital and many positive economic and social outcomes. Social capital is positively correlated with altruism, economic mobility, educational performance, child welfare, tolerance, happiness, and is negatively correlated with crime (Putnam 1995; Putnam 2001). However, high existing levels of social capital are a necessary precursor to creating high levels of collective efficacy within a neighborhood.

Neighborhood collective efficacy is pivotal in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty because it has the ability to mitigate concentrated disadvantage and residential instability. Academic research has primarily focused on the role of neighborhood collective efficacy in reducing violence within disadvantaged neighborhoods. Sampson’s study of 8,782 residents in Chicago neighborhoods showed that collective efficacy is strongly associated with
increased safety and decreased violence within neighbor-
hoods (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997). Various other studies have found robust relationships between increased neighborhood collective efficacy and decreased violent victimization, homicide, and intimate partner homicide, and nonlethal violence (Morenoff et al. 2001; Beck, Ohmer, and Warner 2012, 228). In addition to its effect on violence, increased neighborhood collective efficacy has also been linked to decreased material hardship, positive peer attachments, and increased confidence when approaching future neighborhood problems (Brisson and Altschul 2011, Ohmer 2010, 8; Ohmer 2006, 181).

Despite the multitude of benefits associated with social capital and neighborhood collective efficacy, it would be inappropriate to conceptualize social capital as a purely beneficial concept. Examples of negative social capital could include pressure by insiders to conform to certain detrimental norms, or the perpetuation of negative stereotypes about ‘outsiders’ (Putnam 2001; Furbey et al. 2006, 17). While strong social ties within a group may give members access to certain resources, these ties may also exclude non-members from these resources (Hepworth 2007, 8). Perhaps the most poignant criticism of social capital was articulated as follows: “If social capital as a set of networks means anything, it means that some people will be connected and others will not” (DeFilippis 2001, 793). Therefore, a clearer understanding of the various dimensions of social capital will provide further insight into the types of social capital that are beneficial to particular sets of social networks.

Dimensions of Social Capital

Social capital is a multidimensional concept. Research by Putnam, Sampson, and others has begun to establish that different forms of social capital, while interrelated, are independent (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997, Putnam 2001). Social capital can exist in many different forms, including strong or weak ties, formal or informal ties, and bonding or bridging ties. Additionally, social capital can be analyzed on a neighborhood, city, or state level. Strong social ties represent a dense network of close friends while weak ties represent a network of acquaintances (Grannovetter 1983, 204). Strong ties tend to be bonding social ties that connect members within a community, while weak ties tend to be bridging social ties that connect members across different communities. “Bonding social capital, which is the close-knit ties among similar individuals or groups, is said to be good for ‘getting by,’ whereas the bridging form, representing ‘weaker’ ties among heterogeneous individual or groups, connects one to new resources, and is needed to ‘get ahead’” (Agnitsch, Flora, and Ryan 2006, 39).

Particularly important is the distinction between formal and informal social ties, because these are both processes that generate social capital. Formal social ties are created through involvement in established organizations or institutions while informal social ties are created casually through interactions with neighbors, kin, work colleagues, and friends. Informal social ties provide social support and increased opportunities for social resources for neighborhood residents, with ethnographic studies showing that low-income residents rely on informal ties for emergency childcare and to share limited physical resources (Barnes 2003, 470). Informal social ties generate trust among neighbors and greater possibilities for informal control. Formal institutions provide resources and support to help residents achieve their collective goals (Sampson and Graif 2009, 1582). Additionally, increased organizational involvement may play a pivotal role in facilitating face-to-face interactions, which can create trust and develop social capital (Putnam 1997, Stolle and Rochon 1998, 3). The trust developed in the organization’s members is not insular, but “include[s] values such as tolerance and cooperation toward citizens in general” (Stolle and Rochon 1998, 3). One can visualize a continuous spectrum of informal strong bonding ties at one extreme and formal weak bridging ties at another extreme, with all the other varied combinations of social capital falling in between. This paper will expand on research analyzing the multi-dimensionality of social capital by focusing on how various dimensions of social capital translate into perceptions of collective efficacy at the neighborhood level.

Formal versus Informal Social Ties and Neighborhood Collective Efficacy

Previous research has indicated mixed results in showing whether formal or informal ties are most closely re-
lated to increased collective efficacy. Ross’s study of Illinois residents showed that increased informal ties have significant buffering effects on fear and mistrust caused by perceived neighborhood disorder. In comparison, formal organizational involvement had a limited effect on mistrust (Ross and Jang 2000, 409). Given that trust is such a central element to both social capital and collective efficacy, the effects of organizational involvement on collective efficacy could be questioned. Contrary to Ross’s research, research by Sampson has shown that organizational involvement is much more important predictor of neighborhood collective efficacy than informal social ties in impoverished neighborhoods (Sampson and Graif 2009, 1600). Additionally Wollebaek finds that there is a clear increase in social trust for those who participate in organizations compared to those who aren’t involved in any organizations, regardless of intensity of involvement (Wollebaek and Selle 2002, 13). In this paper, I contribute to this debate by exploring whether informal social ties or formal social ties are more pivotal in generating neighborhood collective efficacy.

In addition to addressing this theoretical debate, I hope to uncover which types of formal or informal ties would be most conducive to generating collective efficacy on a neighborhood level. For example, with regards to organizational involvement, I am particularly concerned with analyzing intensity of involvement and type of organization involved. Previous research by Wollebaek has shown that intensity of involvement does not affect social capital, but a greater number of organizational affiliations does. This is particularly true when these organizations have different purposes, such as cultural organizations versus sports organizations (Wollebaek and Selle 2002). Stolle found that members of cultural organizations are more likely to have higher social capital, while social or leisure organizations are more likely to have lower levels of social capital (Stolle 2008, 57). With regard to informal participation, I will examine whether a correlation exists between increased neighborhood collective efficacy and certain types of informal social ties, such as bridging and bonding capital. For example, do informal bridging relationships, as indicated by friendships with community leaders, contribute to higher levels of neighborhood collective efficacy than informal bonding relationships, as indicated by friendships with family members?

Social Capital and Neighborhood Collective Efficacy in Poor Communities

For a more comprehensive understanding of social capital, researchers must explore the dynamics of social capital production in a variety of communities. The discussion around social capital has previously concentrated on the American white middle class, while ignoring the applicability of these trends and theories to poor and minority communities (DeFilippis 2001, 796; Portney and Berry 1997). Despite this limited knowledge about applicability, social capital theories provide the theoretical foundation for many community development strategies, such as mixed-income housing and consensus organizing in low-income communities (DeFilippis 2001, 788).

The limited academic literature on social capital emphasizes the challenges of producing and utilizing social capital in disadvantaged communities because of the social disorganization in these neighborhoods and deficit of other human, physical, and financial capital. In Shaw and McKay’s theory of social disorganization, structural problems with low-income neighborhoods such as socioeconomic status, ethnic heterogeneity and residential instability lead to the inability of low-income residents to generate social capital and correspondingly, neighborhood collective efficacy. Social capital is pivotal to social stability, and the inability of community residents to maintain informal social controls is in turn responsible for neighborhood variation in crime (Sampson and Groves 1989, 777; Middleton 2005, 1).

In addition to structural problems that impede the development of social capital, “social assets [in poor communities] have greater obstacles to overcome and are constantly under assault” (Warren et al. 2001, 4). As an interdependent resource, social capital’s strength lies in its ability to mobilize other resources such as physical, financial, and human capital. The lack of other resources in low-income communities severely constrains the beneficial effects of social capital, which also limits the effectiveness of neighborhood collective efficacy. Social capital and neighborhood collective efficacy only have ‘mitigating’ qualities, and high levels of social capital cannot compensate for a dearth of physical, financial,
and human capital in low-income minority neighborhoods. For example, informal social ties with neighbors in a poor community may not provide the same access to job opportunities that informal social ties with neighbors in a more affluent community may provide (Warren et al. 2001, 3).

Given the multi-dimensionality of social capital, the crux of my research question is analyzing which behavioral, attitudinal, and demographic indicators of social capital, with a particular focus on informal and formal social ties, are most strongly associated with perceived neighborhood collective efficacy. Additionally, my paper identifies opportunities to produce social capital and neighborhood collective efficacy in the specific context of the low-income minority South Chicago neighborhood given the aforementioned challenges of social capital production in disadvantaged communities.

**Quantitative Methods**

*Survey Selection*

I used the 2006 Social Capital Community Survey by Harvard University in order to discover the relationship between formal and informal social ties, and perceived neighborhood collective efficacy. This survey was conducted by the Saguaro Seminar at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and asked 12,000 randomly chosen respondents about multiple dimensions of social capital, such as involvement in formal organizations, types of informal social interactions, trust in specific institutions or groups, and civic engagement.

*Constructing the Outcome Variable*

I constructed a new cumulative outcome variable to represent neighborhood collective efficacy by combining equally weighted z-scores of social cohesion and informal social control questions to gauge the willingness of a community to act toward collective goals. I asked study participants about their degree of trust in other neighbors and neighborhood public officials to measure neighborhood social cohesion, and questions about the likelihood of neighbors coming together and intervening to maintain public order to measure informal social control. I modeled this unified variable from Sampson’s foundational analysis of neighborhood collective efficacy, in which Sampson combined multiple equally weighted survey questions to create the summary measure of neighborhood collective efficacy (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997).

**Analysis Methodology**

I explored the strength and direction of the relationships between indicator variables and my outcome variable of neighborhood collective efficacy with multivariate linear regressions. Neighborhood collective efficacy is measured using a combination of 6 different Likert-type scale survey questions. I utilize a more stringent alpha level of 0.01, instead of 0.05 or 0.1, to interpret whether my regression model is statistically significant because there is some difficulty in assuming Likert-type questions can be utilized as interval variables. Likert-type questions gauge the study participant’s degree of agreement with the given survey statement in order to measure various participant attitudes. They are typically measured on a 5-point scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree.’ However, the distance between ‘strongly disagree’ and ‘disagree’ may not be the same as the distance between ‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree.’

I first performed a multivariate linear regression analysis on a 60% sample of the data set and then validated it on the remaining 40% sample. Then I performed 4 comparative multivariate linear regressions: a regression with only the main predictor of ‘frequency of neighbor interaction’, a regression controlling for demographic variables in addition to the main predictor, a regression controlling for demographic variables, the main predictor, and ‘number of organizations participated in’, and the full regression with all predictor variables. These comparative regressions contrast the baseline socio-economic model with more complex models that include demographic, behavioral, and attitudinal indicators of formal and informal social capital. I evaluated whether these relationships were statistically significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level and accounted for the associated betas, or standardized effect size.

**Quantitative Results**

Table 1 includes descriptive statistics of the main predictor variables - frequency of neighbor interaction, number of organizations participated in, and neighbor-
hood collective efficacy. My outcome variable of neighborhood collective efficacy is on a standardized scale from -2.459 to 1.352, ranging from low to high levels of neighborhood collective efficacy.

My full linear regression model (Table 2) has an adjusted r-squared value of 0.248, meaning that the model accounts for ~24.8% of the variability within the outcome variable. It also has a p-value of 0.000, making the model significant on the 0.01 significance level. Additionally, my 60/40 cross validation test, in which I ran the regression model against a 40% random subsample, indicated that most indicator variables retained statistically significant relationships with neighborhood collective efficacy. These tests indicate that this regression model is an adequate predictor of the variability within the outcome variable, rather than a result of a random sampling error.

The regression coefficient illustrates the effect sizes of various predictor variables in relation to the outcome variable of neighborhood collective efficacy. For example, the regression coefficient for interacting with neighbors ‘once a year or less’ is 0.151, which means increasing interactions between neighbors from the reference value of ‘never’ to ‘once a year or less’ will increase expected neighborhood collective efficacy by 0.151 points. Asterisks indicate if the correlational relationship between the predictor variable and neighborhood collective efficacy is significant on the 0.1, 0.05, or 0.01 level.

Table 2 sorts the main predictor variables and their corresponding standardized betas. Standardized betas are scaled in the same standardized metric so that the effect sizes of various indicator variables on the outcome variable can be compared. While regression coefficients compare the effect sizes of various predictor variables in relation to the outcome variable, beta coefficients demonstrate effect sizes of different predictor variables in relation to each other. Beta coefficients help to prioritize policy interventions that target the indicator variable with the largest relative effect size.

### Analysis of Quantitative Findings

As shown in the above chart, the regression model predicts that the social capital variables with the largest relative effect sizes on neighborhood collective efficacy are frequency of interactions with neighbors, the number of close friends, and expectations about staying in the community for the next 5 years, after controlling for other variables. The demographic variables that are

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>No. of Observations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood Collective Efficacy</td>
<td>12100</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.526</td>
<td>0.277</td>
<td>-2.459</td>
<td>1.352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Organizations Participated in</td>
<td>12100</td>
<td>2.322</td>
<td>2.814</td>
<td>7.916</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of Neighbor Interaction</td>
<td>12034</td>
<td>5.063</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12034</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*Table 1: Main predictor variables of neighborhood collective efficacy*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constant</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>Betas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency of interactions with neighbors: Reference is Never</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Once a year or less</td>
<td>0.151***</td>
<td>0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Several times a year</td>
<td>0.207***</td>
<td>0.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Once a month</td>
<td>0.127***</td>
<td>0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Several times a month</td>
<td>0.259***</td>
<td>0.201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Several times a week</td>
<td>0.295***</td>
<td>0.259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Just about every day</td>
<td>0.3***</td>
<td>0.219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$20,000 to $30,000</td>
<td>0.067*</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less than $30,000 unspecified</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$30,000 to $50,000</td>
<td>0.117***</td>
<td>0.092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$50,000 to $75,000</td>
<td>0.117***</td>
<td>0.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$75,000 to $100,000</td>
<td>0.129***</td>
<td>0.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$100,000 or more</td>
<td>0.166***</td>
<td>0.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Over $30,000 unspecified</td>
<td>0.165***</td>
<td>0.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.005***</td>
<td>0.159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Census Division: Reference is Northeast</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>-0.039**</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South</td>
<td>-0.056***</td>
<td>-0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>West</td>
<td>-0.072***</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education: Reference is Less than High school</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High school diploma</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some College</td>
<td>0.089*</td>
<td>0.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Associate Degree</td>
<td>0.153***</td>
<td>0.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bachelor's Degree</td>
<td>0.16***</td>
<td>0.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some Graduate Training</td>
<td>0.096*</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Graduate or Professional Degree</td>
<td>0.152***</td>
<td>0.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Race: Reference is White</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>-0.087***</td>
<td>-0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>-0.057</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Native American</td>
<td>-0.147**</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party Id: Reference is Republican</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>-0.032*</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>-0.04**</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others/ No Preference</td>
<td>-0.105***</td>
<td>-0.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religion: Reference is no religion</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-0.061**</td>
<td>-0.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender: Reference is male</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.049***</td>
<td>0.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marital Status: Reference is Single</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.049*</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How often do you attend religious services?: Reference is Rarely</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A few times a year</td>
<td>-0.0116</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Once or Twice a month</td>
<td>0.00245</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Almost every week</td>
<td>-0.0633***</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Every week or more</td>
<td>-0.0789***</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2:** Full Regression including beta values (continued on the next page)
most strongly associated with neighborhood collective efficacy are age, income, and education. Additionally, increased frequency of neighborhood interaction, increased income level, increased education, and increased age remain significant predictors across all regression models, indicating the regression findings are robust rather than a result of random error in the data.

Most notably, frequency of neighbor interactions is the main predictor of neighborhood collective efficacy with the largest beta coefficient. All increases in the frequency of neighbor interactions beyond the reference value of ‘never’ are significant at the 0.01 significance level. In other words, any frequency of social interaction with neighbors contributes to increased levels of neighborhood collective efficacy. Talking to or visiting neighbors several times a week has the largest effect size, with the model predicting a 0.295 point increase in neighborhood collective efficacy when the frequency of interactions increases from ‘never’ to ‘several times a week.’

Frequent interactions between neighborhood residents would increase exposure between neighbors and increase the potential that neighbors would develop trusting relationships and neighborhood collective efficacy.

Furthermore, the model predicts that the type of informal social ties affects the level of neighborhood collective efficacy. Having strong social ties, such as having a greater number of ‘close friends,’ is correlated with higher levels of neighborhood collective efficacy. An increase in the number of close friends from the reference level of ‘no close friends’ to ‘more than 10 close friends’ is associated with a 0.219 point increase in neighborhood collective efficacy. Additionally, ‘having a community leader that’s a friend,’ or having bridging social ties, is also a significant predictor, with a regression effect size of 0.067. This would suggest that strong ties and bridging ties are associated with increased neighborhood collective efficacy. However, because the 2006 Social Capital Community Survey does not include questions that would accurately measure the correlational relationship between weak or bonding social ties and neighborhood collective efficacy, I was not able to compare the effects of weak versus strong or bridging versus bonding social ties. Perhaps an increase of any type of informal social tie would contribute to increased neighborhood collective efficacy, but more research is needed to clarify the relationship between bridging, bonding, weak, and strong social ties and neighborhood collective efficacy.

Interestingly enough, although frequency of informal interactions with neighborhoods is the main single predictor of neighborhood collective efficacy, the model predicts that participation in most formal organizations within the past 12 months, including charity organizations, service or public interest organizations, and ethnic organizations, do not have a statistically significant relationship with neighborhood collective efficacy. Neither ‘intensity of organizational involvement’ nor ‘number of organizations involved in’ are significant predictor variables. However, predicted neighborhood collective efficacy fluctuate depending on ‘the type of formal organization.’ The only type of formal organization with a significant and positive effect size with neighborhood collective efficacy is ‘participating in a neighborhood association in the last 12 months’. Participating in a neighborhood association is associated with an increase of neighborhood collective efficacy by 0.068 points. Why might increased involvement in organizations not translate into increased neighborhood collective efficacy? Perhaps those who frequently participated in formal organizations would have limited time and energy to be involved in neighborhood activities. In comparison, the main function of neighborhood associations is for neighbors to work together to address a collective need in the community, and therefore, it is easy to understand the strong correlational relationship between participation in neighborhood associations and neighborhood collective efficacy.

This analysis indicates that policy interventions to build social capital should prioritize the development of informal social ties over formal social ties. Contrary to most literature, greater numbers of formal social ties through increased involvement in formal organizations do not have a statistically significant relationship with increased neighborhood collective efficacy based on this national dataset.

**Qualitative Methods**

In order to fill in the gaps of my quantitative research, I conducted a qualitative case study of the neighborhood South Chicago to explore the underlying social processes behind these macro-level correlational relationships.
The Effect of Social Capital on Neighborhood Collective Efficacy

### Table 2 (cont.): Full Regression including beta values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>Betas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.04*</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in a self-help program</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-0.105***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in labor union</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-0.048**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in service club or fraternal organization</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.068***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in neighborhood association</td>
<td>Less than 100</td>
<td>0.0629**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100 to 500</td>
<td>0.0858***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>500 to 1000</td>
<td>0.079***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1000 to 5000</td>
<td>0.086***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More than 5000</td>
<td>0.085*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Give to non-religious activities:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference is Never</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of close friends: Reference is No</td>
<td>1-2 close friends</td>
<td>0.107**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3-5 close friends</td>
<td>0.178***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>6-10 close friends</td>
<td>0.19***</td>
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<td>More than 10 close friends</td>
<td>0.219***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How many times in the past 12 months have you been in the home of a neighbor?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community leader that's a friend: Reference is No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.067***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you participated in any demonstrations, protests, boycotts, or marches in the past 12 months? Reference is No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.044***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you worked on a community project in the past 12 months? Reference is No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.065***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you expect to stay in your community for the next 5 years: Reference is No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.152***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Observations | 7904 |
| R-squared | 0.264 |
| P-Value | 0 |

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
I used community areas, or groups of census tracts that align with 'historic Chicago communities,” to delineate neighborhood boundaries in my research. Community areas are useful because they have clear geographical neighborhood demarcations, have remained consistent over time, and correspond to accessible census data, but may be an imperfect measure because neighborhood residents may conceptualize differing community boundaries (Seligman 200, Spatially Referenced Census Data for the City of Chicago).

The South Chicago neighborhood faces high levels of crime and joblessness. The 1992 closing of US Steel's South Works resulted in mass unemployment, social fragmentation and rampant economic decline of the South Chicago community (Mooney 2007). According to the most recent Census in 2010, South Chicago has a per capita income of $15,393, and 28% of its 31,198 residents are below poverty level. South Chicago also has a disproportionately minority population, with a 68% African American and 27% Latino population. Only 17.7% of its residents are employed, and 28.2% lack a high school diploma. (US Census Bureau 2010; Mooney 2007, 7).

Interviewing formal community organizations and community residents within the South Chicago neighborhood gave me insight on the challenges and opportunities in building social capital and neighborhood collective efficacy in an economically insecure neighborhood. While my quantitative analysis focuses on macro-correlational relationships between dimensions of social capital and neighborhood collective efficacy and social capital, my qualitative case study attempts to provide some context to this discussion and explore how social capital and neighborhood collective efficacy can be practically generated in predominately minority low-income neighborhoods.

In order to answer these research questions, I conducted semi-structured key informant interviews with staff from the following organizations: Alliance of the Southeast, South Chicago Learning Center, South Chicago Public Library, Metropolitan Family Services, South Chicago Chamber of Commerce, South Chicago YMCA, Pilgrim Baptist Church, Our Lady of Guadalupe, Baker College Prep, El Valor, Southeast Chicago Historical Society, and the Immaculate Conception Parish. I recruited my interview participants through snowball sampling, in which study participants recommend other possible interview subjects. Conducting key informant interviews with various neighborhood residents and community leaders allowed me to evaluate the impact of formal organizations on social capital and neighborhood collective efficacy, and in addressing the (self-identified) major challenges in South Chicago.

My research methodology has some limitations. My sample size of 12 may be too small to be representative of the entire neighborhood of South Chicago. However, comprehensive interviews from a diverse spectrum of formal organizations (community development, commercial, educational, etc.) add qualitative depth to my correlational quantitative study and shed light on how social capital is generated. Additionally, my study participants are relatively more involved in South Chicago formal organizations than the average resident. Study results may be skewed, because more involved residents may have higher levels of social capital and be more committed to the neighborhood than average residents. However, these residents also have a better understanding of how formal organizations operate, and the challenges and opportunities that these organizations face in building social capital.

**Qualitative Results**

Respondents indicated that increasing social capital and neighborhood collective efficacy is not a primary goal for community residents, but only a means to obtain economic security or address violence within the neighborhood. My interviews revealed that neighborhood-level variables, such as concerns about safety and racial heterogeneity, are major impediments to the creation of social capital, particularly informal social ties. In contrast to my quantitative results, respondents suggested that formal organizations such as churches and community development organizations were crucial to generating neighborhood collective efficacy. Formal organizations provide a safe space for neighborhood residents to create trusting social relationships, and mobilize around collective community issues to create better economic outcomes.
Economic Challenges and Opportunities in South Chicago

According to study participants, the main challenges in South Chicago are economic insecurity and joblessness, rampant crime and violence, and a general lack of resources within the area, including grocery stores and businesses. They believed that more high-quality job opportunities, along with additional job training, were the main solution to these challenges. Economic security, rather than community togetherness, was the central concern for residents. The relationship of unemployment to crime was expressed by multiple informants. CL, a staff member from the local African American church, said, “There are no jobs here, [and] when there are not enough jobs, safety becomes a problem.” In fact, 73% of study participants identified economic insecurity, such as a lack of jobs or a high poverty rate, as the primary challenge facing the South Chicago neighborhood. As longtime elderly resident KM said, “We need jobs and training for the jobs. When the steel industry was strong, jobs were hard to avoid. We need to find new industries for South Chicago. This is a working community, but finding jobs today is difficult.”

In light of these resident concerns, attempts to build social capital and neighborhood collective efficacy should be evaluated in conjunction with their ability to bring economic vitality to South Chicago.

Social Capital and Neighborhood Collective Efficacy in South Chicago

While South Chicago study participants highlighted how fear prevented neighbors from engaging in informal social interactions or routine activities such as shopping on Commercial Avenue, community institutions such as nonprofits and churches promoted a sense of community between neighbors and provided pivotal social services.

Typical informal interactions between neighbors were comprised of very casual interactions, such as saying ‘hello’ while running errands at the grocery store or the bank. While minimal and routine, these casual interactions still contributed to establishing public familiarity within the South Chicago neighborhood. However, high levels of gang violence and crime in the neighborhood impeded the development of these informal social ties. Shootings, vandalism, and theft were not uncommon in the neighborhood, given that 5-6 major gangs claimed ownership of various territories in South Chicago. Gangs, as a negative form of social capital, undermined feelings of trust toward any neighbors and hindered the development of positive social capital. Additionally, some study participants noted that the media played a major role in overemphasizing this violent activity and sensationalizing the negative aspects of the neighborhood, further perpetuating concerns about resident safety.

As a result, residents were scared to shop or eat on Commercial Avenue, and did not informally interact with each other. Concerns about safety created a general sense of mistrust toward unknown neighbors. As staff member CF said,

This is a violent community, so people don’t trust each other very much. Hearing from parents, there are gang members in the community, and people fight with guns. Our building has had three incidents where people have broken our windows, and also 2 to 3 shootings in the area.

Study participants were very cautious about informally interacting with strangers, and would only engage with people that they already knew. When asked about the level of trust between residents in the South Chicago neighborhood, a local church leader RC said, “[There is] trust with people they know, yes, but not a lot of trust with people they don’t know. Have to be careful about going to new places, because residents were killed around this neighborhood.”

In contrast, faith-based formal organizations, especially churches, were particularly pivotal in generating social capital and facilitating more substantial social interactions between neighbors. Involvement in formal institutions, through church services, exercise classes, or day-care services, allowed for face-to-face neighborhood interactions. In an often dangerous neighborhood, these institutions created safe spaces where trusting relationships could be developed and social capital could be built. As another church leader SM said, “Residents trust each other from the church, but you cannot trust anyone if you don’t know them on the street. Lots of violence, many shootings happen around the school, lots of police activity.”

With hundreds of residents per service, churches at-
tracted more resident involvement than any other formal institution. Many community residents were not interested in engaging in neighborhood activities or shopping on Commercial Avenue, but they remained loyal to the church and would attend weekly services. SM said that in order to get neighbors to start working together, “A good start is from the churches, we in the churches trust each other. If you say someone on the street is from the church, you can say hi. The Church takes care of people and builds community; develop connections from the church so there is protection on the street.”

Formal organizations, particularly community development organizations, were also vital to generating neighborhood collective efficacy in South Chicago. Formal organizations don’t only serve as safe spaces to facilitate interaction; they also organized programming that encouraged collaboration and interaction between neighbors. They were responsible for creating various neighborhood coalitions that spread awareness of community issues and mobilized residents to achieve economic gains for their neighborhood. For example, the Alliance of the Southeast mobilized formal social ties to generate neighborhood collective efficacy when they led a united coalition of community residents in an attempt to secure a Community Benefit Agreement with Lakeside developers. The new Lakeside developments - the massive redevelopment of the US Steel site into housing and retail developments - represented a huge potential influx of new job opportunities for the South Chicago residents. However, residents feared that these developments could also bring gentrification and displace long-time residents. KM emphasized, “We love improvements to the community, but we wouldn’t want these improvements to break us.”

My case study of South Chicago has demonstrated that trusting relationships can be difficult to establish, especially in neighborhoods with high levels of crime and safety concerns. However, religious institutions and community organizations were particularly effective in facilitating trust between members, even if these members hadn’t previously interacted. Many sociologists theorize that religious organizations produce trusting relationships between group members through collective religious rituals, such as regularly attending church or participating in prayer (Sosis 2005, 8). The capability of churches to generate trust among members is central to understanding how social capital and neighborhood collective efficacy are produced in disadvantaged communities, and will be further addressed in my recommendations.

Challenges to Building Formal Social Ties

Although formal organizations such as churches generated social capital between typically racially homogenous church members, they failed to generate a more generalized trust between church members and other neighborhood residents and increase neighborhood collective efficacy. DL noted that residents that attended church services weren’t staying in the community to shop, eat, or interact with other residents. Churches failed to bridge different racial groups in the racial heterogeneous South Chicago neighborhood. The different racial groups in South Chicago - African Americans, Polish, and Latinos - rarely interacted and did not trust each other. Resident concerns about violence in the neighborhood created mistrust between and perpetuated negative stereotypes about different racial groups. Since each church catered to a particular ethnic group, they lacked substantial relationships with each other. RC stated, “Different races don’t trust each other, because there are stereotypes of different races... Because of violence
in the community, there are stereotypes that all African Americans are bad and shouldn't be trusted.” CL stated, “Our community, we have many different nationalities in the neighborhood and we don't get together enough as much as we should. I don't think our community is whole, our community is fragmented, we don't get together unless we have to.” The inability of formal organizations, especially churches, to create bridging social relationships between different ethnicities was one of the main challenges to building a sense of community in South Chicago.

This result is in accordance with current social interaction literature which has persistently demonstrated that racial and ethnic divides are two of the biggest cleavages in American society. A 2001 study by McPherson illustrates that people chose to interact more frequently with those of the same race when developing both strong and weak relationships (McPherson, Smith-Loving, and Cook 2001, 420). Furthermore, according to the social disorganization theory, racial heterogeneity is a structural barrier responsible for hindering the development of social capital in disadvantaged neighborhoods, with mistrust between different racial groups contributing to segmentation and limited communication (Sampson and Groves 1998, 781). Therefore, attempts to generate social capital within a neighborhood context must account for these stark racial divides in racially heterogeneous neighborhoods.

Looking Forward

Despite concerns about safety, many South Chicago residents demonstrated a sense of pride in their community. As long-time residents of South Chicago, study participants were committed to making their community as successful as it had been in the steel mill days. The majority of the study participants had high hopes about South Chicago’s future; they believed that collaboration between community organizations and residents would improve the neighborhood. For example, nonprofit staff member VS emphasized that “the main solution [to the major challenges in the community] is for organizations to work together, push to collaborate between agencies...gone is the day that individual organizations can do it on their own.” Creating trusting relationships between neighborhood residents would help address community goals such as economic security and a safer neighborhood.

AN, a staff member from a community development nonprofit, stated, “Relationships are important because if we can't create the relationships, we can't address any of the issues like violence in the neighborhood.”

Conclusion to Qualitative Study

The academic literature on social disorganization provided an accurate descriptive analysis of social capital in South. In accordance with the literature, racial segmentation and neighborhood crime greatly impeded the development of social capital, particularly informal social ties. With limited economic capital, resident coalitions attempted to leverage their social capital to improve the economic vitality of South Chicago and bring jobs to the region. Notably, formal organizations served as an effective method of generating social capital and neighborhood collective efficacy in South Chicago. Formal community organizations and churches in South Chicago provided a space free from violence and crime in which social connections between strangers could be developed and nurtured. They also organized and mobilized community residents around collective neighborhood issues. My research indicates that subsequent efforts to build social capital and neighborhood collective efficacy in poor minority neighborhoods can benefit strongly from coalitions of community organizations and faith-based institutions.

This case study of South Chicago shed insight on social capital production and its conversion to neighborhood collective efficacy by exploring the underlying social processes behind these macro-correlational relationships. This exploration highlighted limitations in my quantitative research which only explored social capital and neighborhood collective efficacy in the aggregate. While informal ties are pivotal to neighborhood collective efficacy in the aggregate, my qualitative research indicates that some disadvantaged neighborhoods may have trouble forming these types of ties. Therefore, theories about social capital on an aggregate level may not be transferable to disadvantaged communities, and future research should explore the relationship between social capital production and neighborhood collective efficacy within differing contexts. This case study illustrates some of the unique challenges in generating and utilizing social capital in disproportionately poor and
minority neighborhoods. In the context of a disadvantaged neighborhood, safety and racial heterogeneity are pivotal concern that may prevent the development of social connections in informal spaces.

**Regression Results on Perception of Neighborhood Safety**

In light of these qualitative results, including the predictive variable of ‘perception of safety’ to the previously developed regression model makes the model a more accurate predictor of the variability of the outcome variable (full results not shown). This is in line with past studies that demonstrate the importance of neighborhood perception of safety in developing neighborhood collective efficacy (Duncan et al. 2003, 6). Given that my qualitative research stresses the importance of perception of neighborhood safety, I conducted a final regression on the 2006 Social Capital Community Survey controlling for this predictor variable. I utilize the following survey question: “How likely do you think it is that you may be the victim of a crime in the next 12 months?” This question was asked of all Baton Rouge, Houston, and Arkansas respondents, and a random 50% of all other respondents. The r-squared value of 0.279, when controlling for perception of crime, is higher than the r-squared value of 0.254 when not controlling for perception of crime. Additionally, the beta coefficients demonstrate that perception of safety is the predictor variable with the third largest effect size, after number of close friends, and frequency of informal social interactions. In other words, in alignment with my qualitative interviews, the model predicts that feeling very unsafe is strongly associated with lower levels of neighborhood collective efficacy. In disadvantaged communities, poor perceptions of safety may contribute to a social environment that inhibits informal ties from positively affecting neighborhood collective efficacy.

**Conclusion**

Welfare policy that builds social capital and neighborhood collective efficacy empowers the poor and strengthens their ability to mobilize pre-existing community resources (Warren et al. 2001, 3). To improve the effectiveness of these policies, I’ve explored the relationships between various dimensions of social capital, particularly formal or informal social ties, and neighborhood collective efficacy. I’ve contextualized social capital and neighborhood collective efficacy research within the low-income minority neighborhood of South Chicago.

My quantitative and qualitative analysis found disparate results. My analysis of the 2006 Social Capital Community survey found that social capital increased neighborhood collective efficacy the most when people had greater rates of informal social interactions with neighbors, having more close friends, and having optimism about staying in the community for the next 5 years. The relationship between number of formal social ties and neighborhood collective efficacy was not statistically significant. However, my interviews in South Chicago indicated that safety concerns and racial heterogeneity impeded the development of informal social ties. In this community, formal organizations such as churches and community organizations were paramount to creating a sense of community in South Chicago and mobilizing residents around common neighborhood goals.

More research is needed to understand the varying roles of informal social ties and formal social ties in generating social capital and neighborhood collective efficacy in different contexts. Aggregate level analyses are insufficient because neighborhood level demographics including specifically crime and racial heterogeneity impact social capital production and neighborhood collective efficacy by impeding the development of trusting social ties between unfamiliar neighborhood residents. While the importance of social ties to the vitality of a neighborhood has been previously established, future research should explore the inverse relationship of neighborhood-level variation on social relationships. Future research should also compare neighborhoods with varying levels of crime and racial heterogeneity.

Social capital is multidimensional, and its multiple dimensions vary tremendously in different neighborhood contexts. Accounting for this variation in the behavior of social capital is crucial to crafting effective policies for disadvantaged communities. Disadvantaged neighborhoods face structural challenges, such as racial heterogeneity and low socioeconomic status, which undermine their ability to produce social capital and neighborhood collective efficacy. Furthermore, the stark shortage of economic, physical, and human capital in these communities means that social capital cannot ef-
fectively leverage these resources to achieve community goals. While it is clear that building social capital cannot singlehandedly improve individual outcomes for poor residents, social capital and neighborhood collective efficacy must be strengthened so these residents can advocate for themselves and come together to collectively address problems within their neighborhoods.

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Appendix

2006 Social Capital Community Analysis Guide

The Social Capital Community Survey was conducted by the Saguaro Seminar. 2 waves of 32 minute phone interviews were conducted from January to April in 2006, and from May to August in 2006. 12100 respondents were randomly chosen for interviews from the following community areas and states: Baton Rouge LA, Duluth MN, Superior WI, Greensboro NC, Houston TX, Kalamazoo MI, Rochester NY, San Diego CA, Winston Salem NC, Yakima WA, Arkansas, Lewiston-Auburn ME, Sarasota FL, and the states of New Hampshire and Kansas, along with a national sample.

Variable construction

I used the following survey questions to construct the outcome variable of neighborhood collective efficacy, which is a combination of informal social control and social cohesion. Specifics about how I constructed this variable are detailed in the Quantitative Methodology section. My measure of informal social control consists of the following questions:

- If officials asked everyone in your local community to conserve water or electricity because of some emergency, how likely is it that people in your community would cooperate?
- In the past two years, have you worked with others to get people in your immediate neighborhood to work together to fix or improve something?

My measure of social cohesion consists of the following questions:

- How much do you trust people in your neighborhood?
- How much do you trust the police in your local community?
- If you lost a wallet or a purse that contained 200 dollars and it was found by a neighbor, how likely is it to be returned with money in it?
- How much do you agree with the following statement: The people running my community don’t really care what happens to me?

I also constructed a cumulative scale to measure formal social ties combining equally weighted z-scores to sum up the number of organizations each survey respondent is involved in. My scale is comprised of survey questions that ask if the survey respondent has had any kind of involvement in various groups within the past 12 months. This scale measures organizational involvement regardless of the level of involvement, and assumes that involvement in a greater number of organizations is representative of increased formal social ties. To account for missing data within my scales, I replaced missing data with the mean of the other available data. Mean imputation maintains the mean of this data so that the data is not biased for the regression analysis.

I have included the survey questions I used to measure any dimension of formal or informal social ties below:

- Intensity of involvement in formal organizations: In the past twelve months, did you serve as an officer of any local club or organization?
- Informal social ties with neighbors: How often do you talk or visit with your neighbors?
- Bridging social ties: Thinking now about everyone that you would count as a personal friend, not just your closest friends -- do you have a personal friend you would describe as a community leader?
- Strong social ties: About how many close friends do you have these days? These are people you feel at ease with, can talk to about private matters, or call on for help.
The Effect of Social Capital on Neighborhood Collective Efficacy
Narrative Strategies of Stigma Management and Panethnic Mobilization: A Case Study Examination of the Arab American National Museum

Andrea Haidar

B.A. Sociology

Recent research on race and ethnicity has begun to examine the construction of panethnic categories such as Hispanic and Latin American. Yet much of this research focuses on the structural conditions that give rise to institutional panethnicity, or the individual factors that may contribute to a person’s panethnic identification. In this paper, I examine the narrative strategies of tour guides at the Arab American National Museum in order to explore how leaders at a panethnic organization “tell the story” of their collective to different audiences. I show how Museum staff narrate the Arab American experience with the intentions of mobilizing panethnic identification from within the community, and creating empathetic allies from outside the community. I conceptualize this narrative as a process of three sequential tasks throughout the tour: 1) drawing boundaries to define the community, 2) maintaining cohesion of an internally diverse group, and 3) combatting stereotypes about Arabs and Arabs Americans. I argue that through this process, tour guides intend for Arab Americans and non-Arab Americans alike to view the Arab American community as cohesive and worthy of celebration, not stigmatization.

Arab Americans have a long history of ambiguous standing within the discourse of race and ethnicity in the U.S., beginning with their immigration in large numbers during the late 1800s (Samhan 1999, Nader 2008). Yet, political events and U.S. policy decisions since 2001 have recast Arab and Muslim Americans as highly visible “others” in popular discourse (Alsultany 2006). Following the 2001 bombing of the World Trade Center and Pentagon by Al-Qaeda, the Bush administration declared a War on Terror that has involved open and covert military operations in the Middle East as well as new security legislation targeting Arabs and Muslims within the U.S. (Schmitt & Shanker 2011). These shifts in policy and public attitudes have created an environment of distrust and discrimination toward Arab and Muslim Americans. Further, they have resulted in the conflation of Arab and Muslims as one group, as well as hatred toward people who may look like they are Arab or Muslim—as has been the case with recent hate crimes committed against members of the American Sikh community (Singh & Singh 2013). Bias crimes against Arabs, Muslims, and those perceived to be Arab or Muslim spiked 1,700 percent within the first six months following 9/11, and have not yet returned to pre-2001 levels (U.S. Department of Justice 2011, Bayoumi 2008).

Given the magnitude of the geopolitical events spurred by the War on Terror and their marginalizing consequences for certain groups in the US, some schol-
ars argue that the aftermath of 9/11 has consolidated the racialization of the category “Arab/Middle-Eastern/Muslim” (Moallem 2002, Cainkar 2008). Other scholars argue that historical context and the sheer heterogeneity within each of these communities precludes their consolidation into a single collective (Bozorgmehr 2013). Meanwhile, the boundaries for who counts as “Arab American” are blurred as popular representations conflate Arabs with Muslims and Middle Easterners, and some Arab Americans distance themselves from the stigmatized label of “Arab” by rejecting it altogether and invoking other primary identities (Shryock 2008).

My research in this paper is informed by such concerns over categorization, but I take a panethnic rather than racial approach to understanding the boundaries that construct “Arab American” in a post-9/11 context. In other words, rather than looking at the consolidation of labels imposed upon Arabs, Muslims, and Middle Easterners in the U.S., I examine the narrative strategies that leaders in a leading Arab American cultural organization use to mobilize their community and distinguish it from other groups. This examination considers the story that is told about Arab Americans to people from within and outside of the community, as well as its implications for a group that is often stigmatized by outsiders and contested by insiders.

Using the Arab American National Museum as my research site, I show how staff members narrate the Arab American experience with the intentions of mobilizing panethnic identification from within the community, and creating empathetic allies from outside the community. I conceptualize this narrative as a process of three sequential tasks throughout the tour: 1) drawing boundaries to define the community, 2) maintaining cohesion of an internally diverse group, and 3) combatting stereotypes about Arabs and Arab Americans. I argue that through this process, tour guides intend for Arab Americans and non-Arab Americans alike to view the Arab American community as cohesive and worthy of celebration, not stigmatization.

Literature Review

Race, Ethnicity, and Panethnicity

Scholars of race and ethnic studies have been building a theory of panethnicity over the past several decades by piecing together observations from case studies of multi-ethnic groups (Okamoto 2003: 812). Consolidating this research into a working concept, Okamoto and Mora argue that panethnicity is a form of boundary construction that consolidates diverse “ethnic, tribal, religious, or national groups” to create a new and larger category (2014: 221). While ethnicity and race function by homogenizing differences between individuals to create a group identity, panethnicity functions by expression of diversity across subgroups.

Sustainable panethnic identities require an inherent tension between maintaining subgroup diversity “while generating a broader sense of solidarity” (Okamoto & Mora 2014: 219). Ethnic identities often remain meaningful for the sub-groups contained within larger panethnic categories. For example, Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Cuban Americans may identify with each other as “Latin Americans” while still maintaining their more specific national and ethnic identities (Ramos 2003, Ramos 2005). In this way, ethnicity and panethnicity often overlap with each other (Waters 1990, Itzigsohn and Dore-Cabral 2000, Kibria 2002).

Race and ethnicity are similarly interwined rather than mutually exclusive. Yet, as Kim and White point out, “the link between ethnicity and race or panethnicity is lacking theoretically” (2010: 1564). In the U.S., conceptions of race and ethnicity have been largely driven by census categorization schemes that have continuously evolved over the past 200 years (Snipp 2003). Categories such as black, white, Asian, Latino, and Native American can represent both racial identities and panethnic identities (Kim & White 2010: 1560). The distinction between race and panethnicity thus seems to inhere more in the orientation toward that group, with race focusing on the group’s homogeneity and panethnicity focusing on its internal diversity.

Panethnic Constructions and Community Organizations

Panethnic leaders provide narratives that obscure the classifying role of the state and maintain intergroup harmony within the panethnic whole. While state actors institutionalize panethnic categories, community leaders encourage and legitimate these categories as viable identities for their constituents (Mora 2014a). Researchers of social movements have long cited narrative as a
key catalyst for collective identity (Carr 1997, Ginsburg 1989, Sewell 1992). As Poletta (1998: 141) notes: “Narratives may be employed strategically to strengthen a collective identity but they also may precede and make possible the development of a coherent community, or nation, or collective actor.” Here, narrative is a strategy that is utilized for interrelated purposes of creating and reinforcing cohesion among socially constructed groups.

Community leaders in panethnic movements recognize that individuals usually hold their national identity primary to panethnicity (Fraga et al. 2009, Jones-Correa & Leal 1996). For instance, successful panethnic leaders in the Hispanic movement do not force individuals to choose between Mexican and Hispanic identities. Instead, “they exalt diversity and claim that panethnic identities are complementary to subgroup ones” (Okamoto & Mora 2014: 221, Mora 2014b). Thus, the narratives panethnic leaders tell about their collectives accommodate the internal diversity of their constituents and highlight the multiplicity of their identities.

Panethnic leaders and their organizations are critical players in the construction of collective identities, both for their constituent groups and outside audiences. Fred and Farrell argue that “ethnic cultural organizations seek to control their own cultural representations” (2008: 144). By doing so, they can present themselves in a way they consider truly representative of their community and challenge stereotypical views from outside their community. Further, some ethnic cultural organizations seek to challenge dominant stereotypes about their community by representing themselves as diverse and irreducible to a single identity or mode of representation (Fred and Farrell 2008: 145).

Panethnic identification is on the rise across immigrant and ethnic groups within the U.S.: Nearly eighty percent of Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Cuban Americans also identify as Latino, while sixty percent of Asian Americans accept the panethnic term as part of their identification (Fraga et al., 2012, Lien et. al 2003). While the literature on panethnicity has drawn attention to the factors that contribute to individual panethnic identification, we still know little about the micro-level narrative processes through which community leaders mobilize panethnic identification. Further, the literature lacks a clear conceptualization of how panethnic organizations reconcile the challenges of presenting their narrative to people from both within and outside of the pan ethnic community. Understanding how panethnic organizations “tell the story” of their collective is particularly important when the collective is often stigmatized by outsiders and contested by insiders, as is the case with the category of Arab American.

**Arab, Middle Eastern, and Muslim Panethnicities**

Most studies of panethnicity have examined the consolidation of immigrant groups in the construction of Hispanic and Asian American identities. Recent research, however, is beginning to illuminate panethnicity in the case of Arabs, Middle Easterners, Muslims, and their hyphenated American counterparts (see Jamal 2005, Albizu 2007, Rinnawi 2012). While Latino and Asian American identities emerged from the civil rights era and became official census categories, Middle Eastern and Arab American identities remain only partially institutionalized in the U.S. classification system despite the work of panethnic leaders (Bozorgmehr et al. 2013, Mora 2014a).

Although often conflated, Middle Eastern, Arab, and Muslim identities represent different (yet often overlapping) categories of identity. The complex logics governing these identities are dynamic and often contested by both insiders and outsiders, making it difficult to provide clear categorical definitions. Historical conventions and the sociological literature on these terms provide guidelines for understandings the differences between these categories, though they are not definitive. Middle Eastern identity is tied to geography—it implies a heritage background from one of the countries considered part of the Middle East (Kayyali 2013). Meanwhile, Arab identity is more closely tied to ethnicity, language, and political affiliation (Ibid.). The interrelationships between the categories are not always mutually exclusive. Thus, one could simultaneously identify with all three categories of Muslim, Middle Eastern, or Arab; or just one or two of the categories. The heterogeneity within categories of Middle Eastern, Muslim, and Arab identity allow for analysis from a panethnic perspective.

Cultural anthropologist Andrew Shryock critiques the Arab American panethnic movement for its assimilationist tendencies, preference for success stories, and
exclusion of ethnic minorities (2008). Since before the
events of 9/11 and particularly after, Arab American
identities have been “negotiated and understood within
the geopolitical context of US-Arab relations” (Okamoto & Mora 2014: 231). Within this context, Arab Amer-
icans must deal with public prejudices and discrimina-
tory practices, such as hate crimes and racial profiling
geopolitics and transnational processes also shape how
Arab, Muslim, and South Asian Americans construct
and present their identities (Bakalian & Bozorgmehr

The examination of the Arab American community
in this study provides a useful perspective on paneth-
nic mobilization for a group that does not experience
marginalization in the same ways as Latino, Asian, and
African Americans (Shryock 2008: 106). Shared dis-
crimination in terms of economic and racial exclusion
often serve as strong mobilizing factors for panethnic
groups (Schachter 2014). Yet, Arab Americans represent
a group that is often racially and economically included
within the American mainstream: Official categoriza-
tion schemas in the U.S. classify Arabs as white, and
many Arab Americans are able to pass as white and
avoid discrimination in their everyday interactions with
others. Further, Arab Americans represent “one of few
minority groups that are mostly well educated and pro-
fessionally successful” (Skuratowicz, 2010: 9). Due to
these conditions, analysts of panethnic Arab American
identity must carefully evaluate claims to community
cohesion based on economic and racial marginalization
in the U.S.

However, these racial and economic conditions of the
Arab American community are complicated by its inter-
nal heterogeneity. Some Arab Americans are more readily identified as “non-white” or “other” by the American
mainstream because of their names, clothing, or physical
appearance (Cainkar 2008). Even Arab Americans that
“pass” as white may face discrimination or be viewed as
“non-white” if their Arab heritage is exposed to others
(Shryock 2008: 93). While seventy percent of Arab
Americans are Christian, many others are Muslim and
face discrimination because of their religion (Shryock
2008). Further, the conflation of Arabs and Muslims
in popular media representations subjects many Arab
Americans to the stigma of being Muslim despite their
actual religious affiliation (Bayoumi 2008).

Finally, as Skuratowicz notes, Arab Americans “face
social closure when it comes to access to politics, pres-
ence in the media, and reception of their heritage as
acceptable and compatible with being an American”
(2010: 10). Here, Skuratowicz indicates that “Arab” and
“American” may be invoked as mutually exclusive terms
within the social and political discourse of the U.S. In
other words, the term “Arab American” becomes prob-
lematic to those that question the loyalty of Arabs to
America in light of recent geopolitical events and histor-
ical prejudices. Conditions of social exclusion may thus
serve as strong claims for shared identity among Arab
Americans, given that panethnic leaders often utilize
structural claims of discrimination to generate cohesion
among their constituents.

Any examination of Arab American panethnicity re-
quires historical consideration of pan-Arab nationalism
and its subsequent spread to people of Arab heritage
living in the U.S. Pan-Arabism, or Arab nationalism,
emerged as a popular ideology in the Middle East during
the 1940s: Political leaders in Arab nations maintained
that the borders between their countries were false and
imposed upon them by colonial powers to divide the
Arab population (Kayyali 2006). Meanwhile, people
of Arab heritage in the U.S. who had long established
themselves in the country did not often refer to them-
selves as “Arab Americans” (Ibid.). Rather, these Arab
Americans focused on assimilation to the U.S. and iden-
tified themselves mainly by their “country, village, city,
town, or country of origin and by their religion affilia-
tion” (Kayyali 2006: 105).

Ironically, it was not until pan-Arabism declined with
the Six-Day War of 1967 that panethnic Arab Amer-
ican identification began to flourish (Lesh 2003). As
the alignment of U.S. foreign policy in support of Is-
rael during the Six-Day War produced negative images
of Arabs in the U.S. media, Arab Americans began to
feel a shared sense of marginalization and identification
with each other (Samhan 1987, Naber 2000, Orfalea
2006). Panethnic Arab American organizations emerged
in the decades following these events, providing services
to immigrant communities and encouraging cohesion
across generations, national heritage ties, and religious
affiliations (Kayyali 2006). These organizations also work to combat stigma about Arab Americans by mobilizing members of the community to find support in each other, as well as producing and disseminating information that addresses stereotypes about Arab Americans (Shryock 2008). Despite the important work of panethnic organizations throughout the decades, Arabs remain an ethnic group marked by stigma in the U.S.

Stigma, Ethnic Stigma, and Panethnic Mobilization

Stigma became an analytically useful and prolific sociological term with Goffman’s seminal work on the concept in the 1960s. Goffman defines stigma as “an attribute that is deeply discrediting” and that reduces the bearer “from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one” (1963: 3). Since Goffman’s development of stigma as an analytical concept, various researchers have used it to explain a wide range of social phenomena (Stafford & Scott 1986). Yet, much of this research has focused on individual perceptions of stigma and their consequences for micro-level interactions (Oliver 1990). Further, Fine and Asch point out that local practices of identity work have transformed stigma to inherent qualities of a person rather than a label others attach to a person (Sayce 1988). The implication is that when studying stigma, researchers may not focus on the discriminatory producers of rejection and exclusion. These critiques point to a need for researchers to also consider the strategies by which stigmatizing categories are produced and deployed by discriminating individuals.

To account for the productive processes that engender stigmatized identities, Link and Phelan conceptualize stigma as the co-occurrence of “labeling, stereotyping, separation, status loss, and discrimination.” These processes are facilitated by disparities of social, economic, and political power “that allow the identification of differentness, the construction of stereotypes, the separation of labeled persons into distinct categories, and the full execution of disapproval, rejection, exclusion and discrimination “ (2001: 367). This robust conceptualization of stigma, which accounts for relations of power, proves useful in examinations of identity negotiation within the context of ethnic and racial discrimination.

Recent research has connected Goffman’s work on stigma and its management with the coping strategies of discredited immigrant groups (Marvasti 2005, Portes and Rumbaut 2006). Stigma management plays a large role in the identity negotiations of discredited immigrant groups, who may suffer varying levels of discrimination on the basis of their race, ethnicity, religion, and national origin (Valenta 2009, Eidheim 1969). While studies of self-identification provide important insight to stigma management at the level of the individual, researchers are increasingly examining collective responses to dealing with negatively marked identities (Kaya 2004, O’Brien 2011, Khalid 2007, Barksdull et al. 2011). These scholars consider the management of stigma from the perspective of communities, neighborhoods, and organizations. Such an orientation toward stigma management facilitates connections between the concepts of stigma and panethnicity.

Panethnicity often emerges as a result of and response to the shared discrimination a group may face (Espiritu 1992, Massey & Sánchez 2010, Gause 2011). Purkayastha describes how second-generation South-Asian Americans construct panethnic identities as a strategy to challenge and balance racial and ethnic marginalization (2009). Meanwhile, several case studies reveal that immigrant groups combat ethnic stigma by defining themselves in positive terms of local belonging. Examples of these self-identifications include “Muslims of Britain” and “Turks of Frankfurt” (Madood 2003, Sackman et al 2003). This localized sense of belonging is also evident in the identity constructions of immigrant groups in America. Kibria’s study of Asian Americans (2002) shows how they negotiate identity in interactions to emphasize their dual affiliation to America and their country of heritage origin.

Case Study: Arab American National Museum

To explore how panethnic identities are created—particularly for stigmatized minority groups—I conducted research at the Arab American National Museum (AANM) in Dearborn, Michigan. Dearborn is a southwest suburb of Detroit that contains the country’s largest proportion of Arab Americans, at nearly forty percent of its population (Immigration Policy Center 2013). This research site proves theoretically rich in opportunities to explore gaps within the sociological literature on panethnicity. Scholars of identity construc-
tion argue that panethnic organizations play a critical role in mobilizing their respective communities through service provision and advocacy under a unifying framework (Haddad 2004, Okamoto 2014, Okamoto & Gast 2013, Mora 14b, Shiao 1998). Further, these scholars note that the activities of these panethnic organizations create new cultural and political identities. Yet, much of this research provides broad meta-analyses of various panethnic organizations rather than focusing narrowly on any single organization and its specific identity narratives. By applying a broad lens, these scholars gain comparative perspective but may miss the micro-level processes through which these institutions “tell the story” of their community to both insiders and outsiders. This single-case study provides a preliminary corrective to this lens and contributes a perspective on micro-level narrative processes to the broader picture of panethnic organizational strategies.

The AANM is the only ethnic museum in the nation that aims to represent Arab Americans as a whole. Indeed, the director of the museum stated in the 2012-2013 annual report that “we are positioning the Museum as the primary resource for accurate, timely, and reliable information on Arab Americans” (AANM 2013). The AANM is a community-based institution with national scope, official recognition as a Smithsonian affiliate, and 38,500 square feet of space to display its many exhibitions. There are few museums in the nation of such scope that represent panethnic groups comprised of many national identities. For instance, there are no official Latino, Hispanic, or Asian American museums of culture and history. In fact, a 2013 legislative proposal to create “The National Museum of the American Latino” in Washington DC stalled for lack of support in Congress (Castro 2013).

The AANM is also unique because of its specific relationship to community organizing. The AANM is a subsidiary project of ACCESS (Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services), a panethnic social service agency in the Dearborn and Detroit area that provides bi-lingual support to surrounding members of the Arab American community (Kayyali 2006). As several staff members told me during individual interview sessions, the AANM has its origins in ACCESS efforts to promote cross-cultural dialogue and ease ethnic tensions in the metropolitan Detroit area. ACCESS established a cultural arts program in 1987 that grew into a cultural arts department. Members of the cultural arts department gave presentations to Arab and non-Arabs alike to educate them about Arab American culture and history. As the department grew and external service organizations began turning to ACCESS for accurate information about Arab Americans, ACCESS staff began to consider the possibility of creating an institution that would, as one staff member put it, “tell the Arab American” story.

Planning and mobilizing support for the Museum began in 2000, a process that the CEO of ACCESS describes as a challenge of bringing together many different subgroups to create a unified vision:

Many said the [Arab American] community was too diverse to cooperate or that we could not raise the $16.8 million needed to build a museum. Still others said we would never agree on a single story. Today, the Museum stands as a shining example that Arab Americans can collaborate to launch these important institutions that are so necessary for our survival in America (Ahmed 2007).

Given its roots in community organizing and panethnic mobilization, the AANM now dedicates much of its effort to engaging the surrounding community through regular public programming and interactive projects. These programs include hosting local musicians of Arab and non-Arab descent, collecting Arab American oral histories for an audio archive, developing walking tours from the Museum to neighboring Arab restaurants for anyone to attend, and organizing community gatherings for holidays ranging from Eid to Halloween. With its connection to an organization that has mobilized the Arab American community since the 1970s, the Arab American National Museum presents itself as an excellent site to examine narrative strategies of panethnic leaders.

Moreover, my selection of the Arab American National Museum as a research site provides an opportunity to engage and integrate concepts from theories of panethnicity and stigma management. The AANM presents itself as the premier institutional resource for information about Arab Americans, as well as a “home” for Arab Americans across the nation to celebrate their culture and preserve their history. In the pursuit of this
dual mission, staff members at the Museum concern themselves with issues of managing stigma about the Arab American community and defending its cohesion to various audiences. Throughout my examination of the stories that staff members of the AANM tell about Arab Americans, I consider their intentions and narrative strategies for audiences from both within and outside of the community.

Finally, my selection of the AANM as a research site is informed by my exposure to the museum and the city of Dearborn while living in Michigan. As a Lebanese-American growing up in a non-Arab suburb of Detroit, I often visited relatives and family friends in Dearborn. As I grew older, I came to understand that many people of Arab heritage lived in the southeast Michigan area—and they were not all Lebanese like me. However, it seemed to mean something to the community and to outsiders that we were all “Arab.” While studying Arabic in college, I also learned about the different countries that comprised the Arabic-speaking world. After studying Arabic in Morocco and Oman, I became interested in the idea that these very different countries “shared” a common Arab culture. The choice to study panethnic identity construction in the Arab American community of Dearborn seemed like an excellent opportunity to engage intellectually with an issue which I had been surrounded by throughout my life.

Research, Methods, Context, and Reflexivity

This study draws on my in-depth interviews, participant observation and content analysis data from the Arab American National Museum. Over a six week period during the summer of 2014, I served as an intern at the Museum while also setting aside significant portions of time to observe and record guided group tours and conducting semi-structured interviews with eight Museum staff members. The qualitative methods I used allow for richer exploration of the processes through which the Arab American National Museum constructs and presents the category of Arab American. Further, these methods provide excellent tools to capture the emergent and variable meanings surrounding such terms as culture, ethnicity, and diversity at the Museum (Lofland et al, 2006).

Participant Observation Context

I tape-recorded and transcribed one tour with an adult group, one tour with a high-school group, one tour with a higher elementary and middle school group, and one tour with a lower elementary school group. I also transcribed a docent training, which consisted of a tour guide showing four adult docents-in-training how to navigate the Museum and conduct a tour. The lower elementary group and the higher elementary and middle school group consisted largely of Arab Americans. The other tours consisted mostly of non-Arab Americans. The docent training included three Arab American volunteers and one non-Arab American who had previous experience studying Arabic in several Arab countries. All of these tours took place at the Arab American National Museum.

Additionally, I attended an off-site presentation for non-Arab American students at Wayne County Community College, where a higher elementary school group participated in an interactive discussion regarding Arab Americans. A tour guide from the Museum led this presentation. Tours and presentations ranged from thirty to ninety minutes, and lasted an hour on average. These tours were representative of the typical AANM audience to the extent that the majority of visitors come in organized groups for an explicitly stated educational purpose, rather than coming individually and of their own accord. Though museum staff do not keep official records for the demographics of visiting groups, many offered estimations of “fifty-fifty” or “sixty-forty, Arab and non-Arab American” when prompted during interviews.

Interview Context

In order to better understand how people felt about their role in the production of Arab American culture, I conducted and semi-structured interviews with eight full-time staff members from the Museum. These interviews ranged from 20 to 105 minutes in length, and the average interview length was 45 minutes. All interviews were conducted and tape-recorded at office spaces in the Museum. I interviewed three Educators, who along with planning public educational programming also serve the primary role of tour guides. I also interviewed the Museum’s Director, Deputy Director, Researcher & Content
Manager, Curator of Education and Public Programming, and Manager of Curatorial Affairs. I chose these staff members because of their commitments to producing Museum content and programming that promotes Arab American unity.

Of the three main tour guides at the Museum, two were Arab American (one lived in an Arab country before coming to the Museum, and the other is a U.S. born Lebanese- and Italian-American with a graduate degree in Middle Eastern studies). Though the third tour guide is not Arab American, she has studied Arab culture and the Arabic language extensively, and has a graduate degree in Middle Eastern studies. Five of the staff members I interviewed were Arab American, and spoke of their heritage background and personal experiences with identity and discrimination as reasons for coming to work at the Museum. The sixth staff member I interviewed was not Arab American, and knew little of the community before joining the Museum. Yet, her role as Manager of Curatorial Affairs required knowledge of curating museum exhibits rather than deep understanding of the Arab American community.

At the Museum, all staff members are trained to give tours. As such, every staff member I interviewed had their own thoughts and methods for conducting tours. Though the interview schedules I used for educators/tour guides, directors, and curators were very similar, there were a few differences. The questions for tour guides centered on experiences of giving tours and the strategies they use to navigate tours with different audiences. Meanwhile, the interviews with directors, managers, and curators focused more on organizational aspects of the Museum and its programming and institutional collaborations. To all interviewees, I also asked questions regarding their personal identification as Arab American or not, their opinion on the term Arab American as a category of identity, and their reflections on community engagement at the Museum (see Appendix A for a general interview schedule that encompasses the questions asked to staff members across departments).

Data Analysis Methods

Drawing upon a grounded theory approach (Anselm & Corbin 1990), I used open coding to generate preliminary analytic categories. I followed open coding with more focused coding using a fixed set of analytic categories. I began with line-by-line open coding on the interview and tour transcriptions. The goal of this open coding was to “entertain all analytic possibilities” and create analytic categories “that reflect the significance of events and experiences” (Emerson et al. 2011: 175) to those in the Museum setting. From this open coding, I examined the most common themes to generate a focused set of analytic categories. These included cohesion/diversity, moral analogy, separation of religion and culture, the Arabic language, unifying factors of 22 Arab nations, immigrant narrative, American stories, and stereotypes. I then used these categories to re-code my data more narrowly and draw thematic connections across the various tours and interviews.

Reflexivity and Self-Positioning in the Study

Reflexivity has become a critical concept for researchers utilizing qualitative methods (Banister et al. 1994). In engaging reflexivity, researchers attempt to make explicit how their social positioning may have impacted data collection and analysis. Thus, reflexivity involves the researcher’s awareness of their role in the co-creation of knowledge with their interlocutors (Finlay 2002). The aim of reflexivity is to enhance trustworthiness, transparency and accountability of inter-subjective research (Ibid.). In the previous section, I disclosed my Lebanese-American identity as one of the motivating factors for selection of the AANM as my research site. Here, I further my reflections to consider the ways in which my identity may have shaped my interactions with tour guides and staff at the AANM.

Though tour guides and museum staff did not express this to me directly, I believe that my connection to the Arab American community and Dearborn may have helped me build rapport and trust while conducting interviews and recording tours. For instance, many interviews began with brief conversations about shared experiences from Arab American culture, growing up in southeast Michigan, or studying Arabic language. Tour guides would also often include me in tours, asking me to tell the group about some of my own experiences as a Lebanese American. My status as an intern also facilitated my access to information and inclusion in daily happenings at the AANM.
In interviews, staff members would often tell me about the difficulty of combatting stereotypes that seemed ridiculous to them, and would follow those stories with “you know what I mean.” Moments like these indicate that the researcher’s social positioning as an “insider” can sometimes cause interlocutors to take their own knowledge for granted. Rather than fully explicate the details of their experience as they might for a researcher from “outside” the community, interlocutors may assume that the researcher already understands their position (Shami & Herera 1999). Conversely, I may have taken my insider status for granted by not pushing back and asking my interlocutors for more information when they assumed I would “already know” what they meant. To the extent possible, I attempted to remain critically aware of my own previous understandings of Arab American identity, and remain curious and open to the interpretations of AANM staff members.

Limitations of the Research Design

Though my methods provide for a unique examination of micro-level narrative strategies at a large cultural institution, there are potential limitations to my data collection strategy. I conducted research throughout a continuous six-week period during the summer, a time of the year that does not bring in as many student groups from high school and college. Though I asked questions during interviews to better understand how tour guides present tours to audiences across age groups, interests, and backgrounds, I would have preferred to see even more of these presentations in action myself. Further, my study may have benefitted from quantitative data that more clearly defined the demographics of audience members that have come to the Museum since its opening in 2005. Additionally, interviews with or surveys of audience members before and after tours may have allowed me to evaluate the actual impact of tours on audience perceptions of the Arab American community. Finally, I recognize that my single-case study design allows me to better generate hypotheses for future research rather than generalize my findings across panethnic institutions regarding narrative strategies.

Analysis

This study argues that tour guides and program leaders have two goals for the Museum that transcend the official mission statement of “documenting, preserving, and presenting the history, culture and contributions of Arab Americans” (AANM 2015). Through their presentation of Arab American identity, the Museum staff strives to both mobilize panethnic identification from within the Arab American community and create empathetic allies from outside the community. As strategies to accomplish these dual goals for its Arab and non-Arab American audiences, tour guides and program leaders present a tour narrative that interweaves elements of panethnic identity construction and stigma management for a “marked” ethnic group. I conceptualize this narrative as a process of three sequential tasks throughout the tour: 1) drawing boundaries to define the community, 2) maintaining cohesion of an internally diverse group, and 3) combatting stereotypes about Arabs and Arabs Americans (see Appendix B for a visual representation of this process). Through this process, tour guides intend for Arab Americans and non-Arab Americans alike to view the Arab American community as cohesive and worthy of celebration, not stigmatization.

Making a Museum Tour

While every tour is a unique product of the interaction between tour guide and audience group, tour guides follow a general structure in their presentation of the Museum. Each tour draws upon the physical space and content of Museum exhibits to tell a story about Arab Americans and where they come from. Tours generally begin in the courtyard, where the tour guide briefly explains the history of the Museum and its connection to ACCESS, the social service agency that founded the Museum in 2005. During this introductory portion of the tour, guides also tell their audiences that Arab Americans from around the country donated nearly ninety percent of the objects and personal stories in the Museum. Tour guides go on to explain that the Museum built exhibits around those donations and stories, rather than “guessing what their experience was like and what actually happened for them,” as one staff member put it. By invoking the contributions of Arab Americans to the creation of the exhibits, tour guides consolidate
their authority to present the Arab American experience and assure their audiences of the Museum’s legitimacy. The authority of tour guides to speak on behalf of Arab Americans is also at least partly located in their identity as Arab Americans or extensive experiences studying Arabic language and culture.

Tour guides also use topical showcases on culture and ancient civilizations to talk about Arab heritage. The tour then progresses to the second floor, where tour guides show their groups a large Arab World map. Tour guides use the map to explain the three unifying factors of Arab countries, which they claim are shared language, culture, and membership in the Arab League. From there, the tour guide leads audience groups through the three main exhibits of the Museum: Coming to America, Living in America, and Making an Impact. In Coming to America, tour guides trace the history of Arab immigration to the US and explain the factors that led Arabs to leave their countries in each wave of immigration. In Living in America, tour guides present the everyday lives of Arab Americans through exhibitions on food, employment, education, religious practice, culture, entrepreneurship, and stereotypes about the community. Finally, in Making an Impact, tour guides highlight the achievements of a select group of successful Arab Americans in the fields of art, sports, politics, community, academics, science, and entertainment.

To conclude the tour, guides usually lead their groups through rotating temporary exhibits. During my time at the Museum, there were two exhibitions featuring a group of musicians at Morocco and a collection of photographs depicting everyday lives from the perspective of one artist in Lebanon. At the end of their tours, groups often visit the Museum shop to buy objects made by Arab artists, or sit in a classroom of the Museum to eat Lebanese food catered by a nearby restaurant.

Drawing Boundaries to Define the Community

For Arab and non-Arab American audiences alike, tour guides must first establish the boundaries that define the Arab world. Tour guides explain that Arab Americans are people living in the U.S. who also have heritage ties to an Arab country. In turn, tour guides argue that understanding the Arab American community requires a clear conception of the qualities that make a country “Arab.” They explain that there are 22 Arab countries spread throughout Africa and Asia, and they can be identified by the three unifying factors of Arab culture, Arabic language, and membership in the Arab League. These countries include Egypt, Algeria, Sudan, Iraq, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, Tunisia, Somalia, United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Libya, Palestine, Lebanon, Oman, Kuwait, Mauritania, Qatar, Bahrain, Djibouti, and Comoros.

In tours and interviews, tour guides and museum staff repeatedly invoked the critical importance of defining the boundaries of the Arab world for all of the Museum’s audiences. For non-Arab American audiences, tour guides strive to combat popular misinformation about who counts as “Arab.” As one tour guide explained during a docent training: “Never assume that your group knows much about Arabs. As bad as that is to say, a lot of people have misconceptions about Arabs.” Another tour guide expressed during an interview that explaining the criteria of Arab countries to her audiences helps destabilize “the constant conflation of Arabs with Muslims and the Middle East” in the media. Several tour guides cite the three unifying factors of Arab nations as a key message they hope for audiences to remember from tours, especially those who know little about Arabs except for what they see on television. Here, the three unifying factors serve to explain the boundaries of a panethnic group while also managing negative stereotypes that result in the conflation of Arab, Muslim, and Middle Eastern identities.

Meanwhile, tour guides use the three unifying factors to encourage audience members of Arab heritage to consider Arab identity beyond their own country of origin. In other words, tour guides strive to teach Americans with heritage ties to one Arab nation that they are also connected to people of the other 21 Arab nations. One staff member explains the specific challenge of teaching pan-Arab unity to Arab American audience groups at the Museum:
I think it is more of a challenge teaching Arab Americans. Because you grow up in a household where your parents might be of a certain nationality, and you think that’s all there is... You use yourself sort of as the representative of all Arabs. If you are Moroccan and eating kuskusy, then all Arabs must eat kuskusy. For other Arabs not to eat kuskusy, it’s weird... So I think that is where it is difficult, to say there are others who are not like you in the Arab world.

This staff member hints at the tension between panethnic identities and the national subgroups of which they are comprised; someone of Moroccan origin may come from a country that is considered Arab, but may not understand the vast internal diversity of the Arab world. The notion that Arab Americans must be “taught” broader Arab culture so that they see beyond their nation-specific traditions points to the social construction of panethnicity. By defining boundaries for the Arab world, tour guides intend for Arab American audience members to reflect on their relationship to people of other national heritage groups.

While tour guides invoke language, culture, and political alliance as boundaries of inclusion for Arab countries, they exclude religion as a unifying factor. More specifically, tour guides reject Islam as a defining feature of the Arab world and persistently explain to their groups that “not all Arabs are Muslim and not all Muslims are Arab.” While tour guides recognize that most Arabs globally are Muslim, they expressed in interviews that separating religion from Arab identity helps accomplish two goals: dispelling popular misinformation, and making Arab American a term that is inclusive for people of all faith backgrounds. Tour guides explained that many Christian or non-religious people might feel excluded from Arab identity if Islam is invoked as a unifying factor among Arabs. Further, outsiders of the community may often believe that all Arabs are Muslim due to the frequent association between these two terms in the media. Tour guides also explain that many Christian Americans with heritage backgrounds from Arab countries may feel uncomfortable calling themselves Arab because of its frequent association with Islam.

Further, tour guides reject the term “Middle East” to describe the Arab world because of its “imperialistic connotations.” They explain that the term “Middle East” often lumps together unrelated ethnic and linguistic groups, and that the term was developed by Western imperialists to describe the region’s location in relation to Europe. Tour guides also point out that the term Middle East encompasses many countries that are not Arab, such as Iran, Israel, and Turkey. This fact often surprises non-Arab American audiences, and sometimes even Arab American audiences as well, as tour guides noted in interviews. The following excerpt from a middle school tour with students from Detroit public schools illustrates how tour guides deal with questions of boundaries for the Arab world:

**Participant:** What about Turkey? I thought that was part of the Arab countries.

**Tour Guide:** Right, so Turkey is not considered Arab because they do not possess those three things. So in Turkey they speak Turkish, which is different from Arabic. They also have their separate history and cultural characteristics. And they are also not members of the Arab league. Turkey may be a very Muslim country, but it is not Arab. There is a difference. So the three reasons that these 22 countries are Arab, they are the exact reasons why every other country on earth, theoretically, is not Arab. Because they don’t possess those three factors. Does that all make sense? I know it’s a lot, it’s a kind of heavy topic.

By correcting audience members when they ask about the absence of Middle Eastern and Muslim-majority non-Arab countries, tour guides exclude religion and popular geopolitical classification as markers of Arab identity. Tour guides explain the exclusion of countries like Turkey from the Arab world by invoking the three unifying factors, and pointing out how the country in question fails to match each of those criteria. In this way, tour guides present the three unifying factors as inherent features that Arab countries “possess,” rather than social products of collective negotiation and contestation. As such, tour guides prioritize the presentation of a cohesive panethnic group over problematizing the notion of unity by offering their audience groups a concrete set of boundaries to define the Arab world.

**Maintaining Cohesion of an Internally Diverse Group**

After drawing boundaries to define the community, tour guides engage in discussion of diversity within the Arab world while maintaining the overall cohesion of the group. As one tour guide explains to volunteers during a docent training: “You always want to highlight the diversity within the Arab world, but you also want...
to say that there are more similarities than differences.” Indeed, tour guides often use the line “there are more similarities than differences” when discussing Arab culture and Arabic language as unifying factors. Usually, tour guides discuss the various foods and clothing and dialects spoken in different countries of the Arab world. One tour guide, for instance, enjoys telling an anecdote about how his Moroccan friends refuse to eat kibeenayee and meanwhile he can hardly understand those Moroccan friends when they speak their local dialect of Arabic. Yet, this tour guide concludes the story by insisting that Arab culture overall shares more similarities than differences—and does not necessarily specify the particular meaning of this overarching Arab culture. In this way, the tour guide sets up the larger, amorphous “Arab culture” as a mediator of tensions between different national subgroup cultures.

While most tour guides present Arab culture as a unifier of Arab countries, others reject this presentation style. Indeed, one staff member feels that the claim of “more similarities than differences” with respect to Arab culture “undoes the work we are trying to do at the Museum.” This staff member disagrees with the notion that Arab countries share a common culture, and that Arab culture can be used as a proper defining boundary for the region. Instead, this tour guide prefers to talk solely about the internal diversity within the region. While all tour guides emphasize diversity of the Arab world in their presentations, they discuss differences between countries while maintaining the three unifying factors as legitimate boundaries and agents of cohesion for the Arab world. These tour guides feel that it is more important to give their outside audiences easily understood take-away points about Arab American identity before challenging audiences to think even more critically about the contradictions inherent to such a heterogeneous collective. Further, many of these tour guides work with younger generations of people who are coming from multiple places of origin who are religiously diverse. We are not a monolithic block! I think a lot of us have particular ways of which we reflect our identity. Maybe we are Lebanese more than Arab American, or Palestinian. Or maybe they identify more by their tribe or religion. Are we talking about multiple different places of origin who are religiously diverse. We are not a monolithic block! I think a lot of us have particular ways of which we reflect our identity. Maybe we are Lebanese more than Arab American, or Palestinian. Or maybe they identify more by their tribe or religion. So everybody kind of identifies a little different, but at the end of the day, we share something culturally. And we find that there are these threads of commonality that tie us together.

Here, the director of the Museum employs a technique that is common among leaders of panethnic or-
ganizations: invoking the cohesion of the community without threatening the particular identities of its individuals.

When pressed in interviews to specify points of cultural commonality that bring together Arab Americans, both the director and museum staff tended to cite immigration as a crucial shared experience. Indeed, tour guides often spend a large portion of their tours discussing Arab American immigration, the waves in which it occurred, and the social, political, and economic factors that motivated Arabs to leave their countries and come to the U.S. During an interview, the staff member who rejects Arab culture as “more similar than different” also offered shared immigration history as a reason for creating an institution centered around the diverse panethnic group of Arab Americans:

I mean, you could have a Lebanese museum, a Jordanian museum, an Iraqi museum. But they are all gonna look exactly the same. They are gonna have a different flag on the outside. But they are all going to have similar stories about why they came here and what they did once they got here. Because within the U.S., all of these different groups have gone through similar immigration histories. And most importantly, they are all seen as the same by outsiders. Whatever they call themselves, everyone else sees them as Arab here in America.

Here, the shared experience of immigration to the U.S. becomes a mechanism to reconcile differences of national identity across the Arab world. The staff member pointed further that the experience of being perceived in America as a homogenous group of Arabs rather than as individuals from specific countries of origin also brings together the Arab American community. As such, this staff member also believes that the Museum plays a critical role in rallying around the somewhat imposed category of Arab and showing outsiders of the community its immense diversity. Regardless of the various articulations that staff members provide for their presentation styles and motivations for the Museum, all of them reconcile tensions of diversity within the Arab American community by invoking overall cohesion.

**Combatting Stereotypes about Arabs and Arab Americans**

Although tour guides implicitly address misconceptions about Arabs and Arab Americans throughout the tour by discussing boundaries and invoking diversity within the community, the final stage of the narrative process involves explicitly combatting negative stereotypes. Here, tour guides challenge their audience group to reflect on negative portrayals of Arabs in the media and movies, consider their own similarity with Americans, and witness the achievements of Arab Americans who have made an impact in the U.S. As one tour guide states: “What I am really trying to do is get kids—really, anyone from middle school on up—to take away is that it’s everyone’s responsibility to combat all stereotypes, not just the ones that affect your or whatever group you may be associated with.” By explicitly addressing stereotypes, tour guides strive to mobilize non-Arab American audience members as empathetic allies for Arab Americans and other minority groups.

Further, tour guides also intend to create a space for audience members of Arab heritage to proudly identify as Arab American—especially for those who may reject the category because of its stigma in the 21st century geopolitical climate. During an interview, the director spoke of the Museum’s role in reaching individuals that may “back away” from identifying as Arab, perhaps because “of their time of immigration, or unfortunately part of Islamophobia.” With these individuals, the director tries to create exhibits that make them proud of their background and see similarities in their narratives as people of Arab heritage:

I tell them, ‘I am just like, you, we aren’t so different, right? I represent this institution, and I think it is important that you consider being part of it because we are about building this greater bigger thing.’ And some people are receptive to that, and others, their decision is made. But we don’t give up. We are trying to connect with people and make them proud of who they are, but we are not here to impose identity on people.

The director expresses his concern with mobilizing the panethnic community as a “greater bigger thing,” while still allowing people to maintain their own primary identifications. Indeed, he recognizes and accepts that some will even reject Arab as a category of identity for themselves. Yet, the director still strives to combat resistance to panethnic identification for people of the community by dispelling negative stereotypes, presenting positive images of Arab Americans, and managing the stigma that surrounds the community.

Much of this stigma management work occurs in one exhibit of the Museum that tour guides refer to as the
“stereotypes room.” This exhibit features one wall with portrayals of Arabs and Arab Americans from movies before 9/11, and another wall with media representations of Arabs and Arab Americans post-9/11. Once audience members have had the time to examine each wall, tour guides ask them to comment on what they see—and audience responses often include violence, terrorists, war, fighting, and submissive covered women. The tour guide then prompts group to discuss representations of their own communities in movies. As one tour guide instructed docents during training: “If you have a group that is all African American or all Hispanic, you can relate it back to them and say hey, how are African Americans portrayed in movies?” This tour guide also trains docents to use analogy to help audience members understand that negative representations on the news may be “real” but do not encompass the entire “reality” of the Arab world:

You can bring this back to Detroit. You can ask kids—what does the news say about Detroit? Obviously very negative, very terrible stories, murders and kidnappings and robberies and all of that. But that’s not how Detroit always is. There are some really good parts, but you don’t always get to see that in the news. Again, you want to relate it back to your groups.

Here, the tour guide implies to his audience that the view from the news may not encompass the positive aspects of living in the Arab world and being part of the Arab community. By likening this situation to the experiences of discrimination among audience members, the tour guide strives to legitimate his claims about skewed media representations and generate empathy among the group.

In addition to the stereotypes room, tour guides return to the themes of immigration and acclimation to life in America to help audience members view themselves in likeness to Arab Americans. Tour guides draw upon exhibits such as a replica immigration desk at Ellis Island and a display case of luggage with the items Arab immigrants packed along their journey to America. They use these items to tell stories about Arabs coming to America, and then ask audience members if they have similar experiences in their family history. For tour guides, prompting audience reflection on family immigration history “gives people the opportunity to say, well that is interesting, but that’s my story—even though they might not be Arab American.” In this way, tour guides try to highlight “what it means to be an American, the greater American story” by pointing to common themes across immigration stories for seemingly very different ethnic groups in the U.S.

Tour guides also use exhibits such as the Arab American living room or kitchen to “show people we are like everyone else.” By pointing to items in these rooms, one tour guide shows the audience that “Arab Americans have all kinds of stuff like everyone else. But we may have a little extra flavor that makes us who we are. So we may have a kuffiyah in our rooms somewhere or an obnoxiously large Egyptian tapestry.” This presentation style reflects the director’s vision of the Museum as a space to “celebrate our humanity, our collective, the things that make us collectively unique” and to see that “in the end we are really all one, and not that different.” Both tour guides and museum staff use immigration and acculturation as guiding orientations for narrating the Arab American experience, and connect these themes to the American experience for their audiences.

Finally, tour guides often conclude their tours by discussing the impact that Arab Americans have made in the fields of activism, sports, entertainment, academics, creative arts, community, politics, and society. With younger groups, tour guides ask the audience what it means to “make an impact,” and then invite them to explore the exhibit and look for an Arab American they find interesting. During interviews, several staff members commented on the significance of the Making an Impact exhibit, with one tour guide stating that “it is extremely important because you are showing that not all Arabs are terrorists, gas station owners, have accents, whatever other stereotypes that there are about Arabs.” Another tour guide argues that the exhibit celebrates and preserves the contributions of a people that may not be included in American history textbooks. These different articulations for the goal of Making an Impact point to a similar concern for circulating positive representations of Arab Americans—as a means to both combat stereotypes and create allies from outside the community, and generate pride in identifying as Arab from within the community.
Conclusion

In my analysis, I have argued that AANM staff members strive to accomplish institutional goals of mobilizing panethnic identification from within the Arab American community and creating empathetic allies from outside the community. I have examined the structure of museum tours to show how guides construct their narrative of the Arab American community through a three-step process of drawing boundaries, maintaining cohesion, and combatting stereotypes. I have also used interview content with staff members and tour guides to illuminate their intentions of helping Arab Americans and non-Arab Americans alike view the community as cohesive and worthy of celebration, not stigmatization.

Underlying these narrative processes and institutional objectives, I have identified several mechanisms that tour guides use to tell the Arab American story. These include the presentation of language, culture, and political affiliation as unifying factors; rejection of Islam and the Middle East as categories to define the Arab world; reconciling differences of culture by invoking overall similarities; celebrating rather than imposing panethnic identity; focusing on narratives of immigration; initiating explicit discussion of stereotypes; drawing moral analogies to other marginalized ethnic and racial groups; and highlighting Arab American achievements and contributions.

Few studies have brought strategies of panethnic mobilization and stigma management together to examine interaction between these two processes. Nor have many studies provided an in-depth analysis of micro-level narrative mechanisms of large panethnic institutions. I have conducted this study as a preliminary corrective to address these gaps in the sociological literature. My findings show that in the case of the Arab American community, leaders of a leading panethnic institution contend with challenges that go beyond bringing together an internally diverse group. These panethnic leaders must also actively combat stereotypes about Arab Americans for both insiders and outsiders of the community. Tour guides and staff members intend to create a space for Arab Americans to proudly identify with not only their nation or origin, but also the larger panethnic collective. At the same time, they prompt non-Arab American audiences to consider their likeness to a community that the news and media often construct as “the other.” In pursuing both of these intended objectives, staff members invoke the importance of destabilizing misconceptions and negative representations of Arabs and Arab Americans for all audiences.

Though my findings cannot necessarily be generalized to all panethnic institutions, they can be used to generate hypotheses and suggest future directions for research. I propose that scholars of panethnicity consider the effect of stigma in the narratives that organizations tell about the collectives they aim to represent. Previous research has shown that panethnic organizations face the challenges of managing relations between subgroups of the larger collective (Epiritu 1992, De Genova & Ramos-Zayas 2003) and providing cultural narratives that minimize the state’s role in creating categories of identity (Hanson 1997). Yet, researchers have not closely examined institutional challenges of presenting a narrative that reaches a wide variety of audiences and addresses issues of stigma. Future research should focus on the role of stigma management in both the mobilization of panethnic identification from within the community of study, as well as the creation of empathetic allies from outside the community. Further, scholars examining the intersection of panethnic mobilization and stigma management could engage with concepts from social movement theory. The concept of audience effect in particular would help illuminate how panethnic leaders “appeal to multiple audience who vary in terms of their relative interests, values, beliefs, and knowledge” (Bedford & Snow 2000: 624).

The limitations of this study also provide points of departure for future research. My selection of a cultural museum as a research site allowed for examination of narratives that an institution tells to multiple audiences. Yet, these audiences either came into the museum voluntarily, by their own initiative or through participation in a school field trip. Regardless of their status as insiders or outsiders of the community, or their prior knowledge of Arab American culture and history, these audiences came to the Museum most likely willing to hear the story that tour guides would tell. In other words, this study examines the presentation of Arab American for a very specific group of amenable audiences. Future research could take up the presentation of stigmatized panethnic
identities for less cooperative audience groups outside of a protected museum setting.

**Acknowledgements**

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The Effects of 9/11 on the Arab American Vote

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Course Paper, Political Science

This paper analyzes the impact of September 11th on Arab American voting patterns. Given that demographic level data is not available for the Arab American community, certain precincts in Dearborn City are used as a proxy measurement. According to the demographics of the area, certain precincts are labeled as “Arab American” and others as “white,” and only top-level (President or Governor) votes are considered for each election year. The data shows that before 2001, Arab Americans in Dearborn City tended to split fairly evenly between Democratic and Republican candidates, with a slight preference for Democrats. After 2001, Arab American support for Democrats increased dramatically, from approximately 50% to over 80%, while white precincts remained relatively constant. This result suggests that Arab American party preferences were dramatically affected by the civil rights violations and discrimination which increased after September 11th, prioritizing civil rights over economic and social policies.

Introduction

Little empirical literature exists on the Arab American vote in the United States, either before or after 9/11. Survey data, commissioned by the Arab American Institute, exist for most election years, including 2012 (The Arab American Vote, 2012). However, survey data is fraught with complications and insufficiently examines the Arab American case. In this paper, I will use a case study focusing on Dearborn City, Michigan, to complement and improve upon the survey data currently available to provide a more complete picture of the way Arab American voting habits have changed over time.

The lack of focus on Arab American voters is surprising, given the overall national focus on the behavior of Muslims and Arabs domestic and abroad. Arab American voting trends further provide a case study for the influence of civil rights concerns on the voting behavior of a population. Because of the congruence between Arab American demographics and the demographics of the American population in general, factors such as socio-economic status and moral preference are less likely to influence and shift the Arab American vote strongly towards one party or another. In fact, Arab Americans tend towards the Republican Party, independent of civil rights issues.

While Arab American political organizations tend to make a concerted effort to track Arab voting patterns and preferences, the general public and academic circles tend to ignore Arab American votes. This could be because the data is hard to come by. This is because Arab Americans are considered “white” in most Census data, making it impossible to use the traditional method of ‘sorting by race’ to understand the voting patterns of Arab Americans.

In this paper, I compare the voting behavior of different precincts within Dearborn City, Michigan in or-
order to estimate Arab American voting trends. I chose Dearborn City because it has the largest Arab American population in the United States, reaching about 1/3rd of the overall composition of the city (Brittingham, 2013). In Dearborn City, some precincts are by majority Arab American, and they can serve as a rough metric for the overall Arab American vote within the city. Unfortunately, pulling the Arab American vote from public record directly is extremely difficult, as “Middle-Eastern or Arab” as race is conflated with “white” in most census information, so a rough metric through precincts is necessary. The metric is obviously still slightly problematic due to shifts in precincts over time and a general growth in Dearborn City’s Arab population over time, from 19,000 in 1985 to over 3,400 today, as well as growth in the numbers of registered voters from 1,100 to 1/3rd of the registered voters in Dearborn City. However, the pressure to increase the Arab American voting presence can, and usually does, act in response to a perceived threat, so it may in fact be useful in our analysis (Zogby, 2012).

A Note on the Arab American and Muslim Populations

“Arab American” refers to an individual who can trace their ethnic background to any of the twenty-two countries in the Middle East or North Africa, commonly considered the “Arab world.” The majority of Arab Americans are of Lebanese descent, according to the United States Census (Brittingham, 2013). Arab American and Muslims do not compose the same group. Arab American and Muslim-American experiences the United States are often conflated, because of Islamophobia, which will be discussed later as a racialized problem as much as a religious one.

The Muslim population in the United States includes a wide range of racial groups. According to a Pew Research Study published in 2011, approximately 30% of the Muslim population is white (which includes Arab Americans), 23% black, 21% Asian, and 9% Hispanic, which the remainder mixed race and other (Arab American Institute, 2011). The majority of Muslims are non-Arab, and the majority of Arabs are non-Muslim. However, after 9/11, Americans began to fear Islam, which has also led to anti-Arab. Since 9/11 was carried out by Arab and Muslim terrorists, the two terms have come to be conflated in various ways.

In American foreign and domestic policy, the distinction between policies that affect Arab Americans and Muslim-Americans become blurred. Given that American policy cannot explicitly discriminate against members of a certain religion, most laws affect Arab American Muslims and Christians equally. For example, H.R. 3525, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, passed in 2002, bars non-immigrant travel for individuals coming from countries considered “state sponsors of terrorism.” It raised requirements for documenting refugees and asylum seekers, and introduced a monitoring system for individuals visiting on student or exchange visas. While these changes may have been introduced as a response to the “Islamic terrorism” of 9/11, the “state sponsors of terrorism” listed were Iran, Sudan, and Syria – two of which are Arab countries (State Department, 2016). Regardless of whether they are Muslim or Christian, Syrian-American citizen cannot have family visit from Syria. By increasing investigations of refugees and documenting individuals on student and exchange visas, the U.S. imposes restrictions on all immigrant Americans, regardless of religion.

Outside the realm of policy, public opinion and discrimination against Arab Americans and Muslims go hand-in-hand. In the weeks following 9/11, over 700 confirmed violent attacks were reported to the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC). In the six months following 9/11, the ADC received four times the typical level of complaints of discrimination; in the following year, there was a 400% increase in complaints of employment discrimination (Moradi & Hasan, 2004). Kaushal et al. (2007) suggested that the wages of Arab Americans and Muslims fell by 10% after September 11th. In the weeks after, 3,000 Arab American non-citizen men were contacted for “voluntary interviews” by the Justice Department — although their visas would be revoked if they chose not to cooperate. Additionally, the Patriot Act’s expanded definition of “terrorism” and reduction of judicial oversight on anti-terrorist activities lead to an explosion in racial profiling, particularly of Arab American men (Akram, 2002).
Arab Americans Population Demographics

Nationally

The Arab American population does not significantly differ from the rest of the American population on the metric of economic status. The average income of Arab American households is approximately $56,000 as compared to $51,000 on average, while individual income is 27% higher than the national average. This data would suggest that Arab Americans would be likely to lean more Republican due to economic status. However, given that a significant portion of the Arab American population are new immigrants, around 14% of the population lives below the poverty line (Arab American Institute, 2011).

Pre-9/11, Arab Americans did not overwhelmingly favor any one party, instead they split votes fairly evenly between them. In 1996, 38% of Arab Americans identified as Democrats, 36% as Republicans, and 23% as independents, splitting 43% to 44% Democrat to Republican in Congressional seat votes. The same pattern held in 2000, when 40% of Arab Americans identified themselves as Democrats and 38% as Republican, with the other 22% independent, and a nearly identical split – 43.5% to 44% - in Congressional voting behavior (Arab American Institute, 2013). Given this evidence, it seems possible to say that Arab Americans before 9/11 did not strongly favor either party.

Arab Americans in Dearborn, MI

The demographics of Arab Americans in Dearborn City reflect a similar mix of Muslims and non-Muslims as the national population. There is a significant Christian presence; the earliest Lebanese immigrants to Dearborn City were Christian, while the future waves of immigrants tended to be Muslim. Additionally, there is a Chaldean (Catholic) Arab immigrant community, making up 17% of the Iraqi-American population in Michigan, though the percentage living in Dearborn City is unknown. Though the Chaldean population does not identify as Arab, they are included in Iraqi and Arab refugee and immigrant statistics (Crain’s Detroit Business, 2014).

Additionally, discrimination against Arab Americans in Dearborn City has deep roots. In 1981, then-governor of Michigan William Milliken blamed the “damn Arabs” for economic problems within the state, and mayoral candidate Michael Guido campaigned within Dearborn on an anti-Arab platform, mailing out pamphlets titled, “Let’s Talk About... the Arab Problem” (Akram, 2002). These statements both came from Republican candidates during the 1980s, and both won their elections. Following the 1986 election of Guido, the Dearborn City Arab American community mobilized. In 1985, there were only 1,100 registered Arab American voters out of the population of approximately 20,000. In the following 10 years, due to concentrated organizing efforts by the Arab American community, the number of registered voters swelled to 8,000. In 1996, Guido opened a speech by speaking Arabic at an event sponsored by the Arab American Institute in Dearborn City. Currently, Arab Americans compose 1/3rd of the population of Dearborn City, as well as 1/3rd of registered voters (Arab American Institute, 1996).

Within the metropolitan Detroit area, 15% of the Arab American population claimed that had an experience of discrimination or harassment based on ethnicity, while 25% were either verbally harassed or had someone in their family be verbally harassed. It is worth noting that this study did not specifically focus on Dearborn City, but the general Detroit area; about 30% of the population studied lived within Dearborn (Baker et. al., 2004). A further study analyzed Arab American economic involvement in the metropolitan Detroit area, excluding the Assyrian/Chaldean/Syriac population, which effectively strips out a significant amount of Arab American Christians. This data set suggested that the majority of Arab Americans in the metropolitan Detroit area were in the retail trade, followed by manufacturing, and then professional and technical services (Center for Urban Studies, 2007). This appears similar to the national Arab American population, in which 64% work in managerial, professional, technical, or sales related fields (Arab American Institute, 2010).

The Expected Effects of 9/11

September 11, 2011 was a watershed moment for both the American population and the Arab American population. Reeling from the impact of the first foreign attacks on American soil since Pearl Harbor, the American public and American government reacted strongly, in
ways that negatively impacted Arab and Muslim-Americans. Revealingly enough, in an Arab American Institute survey, the number of Arab Americans saying they felt reassured by President George W. Bush’s behavior towards Arab Americans dropped from 90% in October 2001 – just after 9/11 – to 54% in May 2002, after the policies enacted in response to 9/11 began to take effect (Arab American Institute, 2013).

Between 2001 and 2004, Arab American approval of the Bush administration dropped by 40%. In fact, since 2002 the Republican Party has lost the Arab American community’s support. In the 2004 election, 53 percent specified civil liberties and treatment of immigrants as important issues, and nearly 60% of respondents indicated that they were concerned about long term Arab American discrimination, and over one-third saying that they were worried about being profiled in airports. These were direct consequences of programs put in place by the Bush administration. Around half of Arab American voters who supported Kerry in the 2004 election were motivated by anti-Bush sentiments moreso than strong support for the Massachusetts senator (Kreideter and Baldino: 2015).

After 9/11, the Arab American and Muslim communities experienced prejudice and violations of their civil rights, including widespread vandalism of mosques, the NYPD investigating and labeling all mosques in the city “terrorist enterprises” to the widespread vandalism of mosques following 9/11 (Lean, 2013). The change in voting behavior is concurrent with changes in other forms of behavior. In an ethnographic study, Caniker (2013) showed that Arab and Muslim communities after 9/11 perceived themselves as being under significant threat. Arab-Muslims living in the southwest suburbs of Chicago “reported being treated as foreigners in their own neighborhoods and felt as if they were ‘de-Americanized’” (Caniker, 2013). Many women who wore the hijab stopped doing so, while women who did not wear the hijab prior began to in a show of solidarity (Caniker, 2013 These experiences of prejudice, some of which were directed by the government, may have led them to prioritize civil rights issues over economic issues, pushing the population as a whole much closer to the Democratic party, which was perceived to be less prejudiced against Arab Americans than the Republican party.

Republican Associations with Islamophobia and Anti-Arab Sentiment

The Republican Party suffers from the perception that they are more Islamophobic than their Democratic counterparts, and, by extension, more anti-Arab, given that Islam, the Middle East, and Arabs are frequently conflated. I will begin with a discussion of Islamophobia and the Republican Party, given that a significant amount of Arab Americans are Muslim, and that non-Muslim Arabs are often affected by Islamophobia. Most articles tended to mention anti-Arab and anti-Muslim sentiment in the same breath - occasionally, even in the same headline—and it can be difficult, if not impossible, to cleanly parse out the two effects, especially when they are conflated in hate speech. Islamophobia has a spill-over effect, and as discussed above, frequently affects non-Muslims. Islamophobia is a religious fear, but it is also a racialized one; Muslims are thought to look a certain way (men with dark skin and beards), and those who fall into that description, however inaccurate, can become targeted. This phenomenon works concurrently with the previously mentioned policy attacks. Even the ‘anti-Sharia law’ laws could not explicitly target Sharia law, but instead targeted ‘foreign law’, which could conceivably affect non-Muslims with similarly foreign backgrounds.

Polls conducted by Gallup support the notion that the Republican party may be more associated with Islamophobia than the Democratic Party; data from 2007 and 2008 show that 50% of those who supported a “great deal of prejudice” against Muslim-Americans identified as Republicans, while 17% identified as Democrats (Gallup, 2015). A 2012 poll commissioned by the Arab American Institute showed similar results: 57% of Republicans stated that they had unfavorable opinions of Muslims, while only 29% of Democrats gave the same response (Arab American Institute, 2012).

The immediate response of the Republican Party post 9/11 is slightly harder to parse; however, the Patriot Act, signed into law in 2001 by George W. Bush, seems to have been perceived as unduly affecting Muslim-Americans and Arab Americans. CAIR (Council on American-Islamic Relations) began a campaign to repeal the Patriot Act in 2005 due to these feelings, though the sentiment may have existed far beforehand. Although Is-
lamophobia and anti-Arab sentiment are distinct forms of bigotry, they interact to a significant degree in both the realm of policy and personal attacks, and must be looked at simultaneously.

**Dearborn City as a Case Study**

A typical analysis of voting behaviors would begin with an analysis of the voter file, which is a large data set consisting of the data of registered voters, usually including gender, race, and city and county. However, given that Arab Americans are identified as “white” within the voter file, it is not possible to use the voter file in order to determine Arab American voting patterns, so a new methodology was necessary. As there are no counties with majority Arab Americans, it was necessary to look at precinct level data in order to try to find the Arab American vote.

Dearborn City was chosen as it has one of the highest concentration of Arab Americans in the United States, with the most recent estimates ranging from 33% to over 40% of the population of Dearborn City. The Arab American population is also not evenly distributed throughout the city, but concentrated in certain precincts, allowing the use of precinct level data in order to track the Arab American vote. By focusing on majority Arab American precincts in Dearborn City and comparing their vote in the top race of each electoral year (so either governor or president) to that of non-Arab American precincts, it is possible to extrapolate the difference between the Arab American and non-Arab American votes over time.

Furthermore, comparing within Dearborn City and within the same years allows me to control for year effects as well as general political disposition. Although there may still be variance within Dearborn City, the variance within both the same state and city is considerably less than comparing nationwide. Dearborn City, as much of metropolitan Detroit, experienced a significant economic decline due to the fall of the automobile industry. Given the fact that a significant percentage of the Arab American population within Dearborn, MI was employed in the manufacturing sector (17.1%), as discussed above, the population was definitely affected by the economic decline, just as the white population was (Center for Urban Studies, 2007). Looking within a single city allows for a basic control on economic outcomes, as it is likely that most populations within the same city will experience somewhat uniform trends in economic growth or decline, which affect political disposition. In the case of Dearborn, MI, this seems especially likely given that the Arab American population appears to mainly be concentrated in either manufacturing work, which was directly affected by the economic decline, or service work, which is frequently harmed by declines in the overall economy (Center for Urban Studies, 2007).

However, concerns remain with this comparison. Firstly, the Arab American population grew over time, as did the numbers of registered voters. While growth in registered voters can be seen as a response to the community feeling threatened, the overall growth in the Arab American population – from around 8,000 to 40,000 – may have shifted the voting patterns of the Arab American population reasons other than growing political fear in response to 9/11. Additionally, the population of immigrants coming to the United States after 1998 may not have been politically similar to the population of immigrants before 1998; however, given that there is a significant lag time between immigration and citizenship in the United States, this problem may not be as significant as it appears to be, but is worth noting.

Even given all of these concerns, there remain considerable findings in the data. The precincts were selected based on information given privately by the Arab American Political Action Committee in Michigan, which gave a list of polling locations with majority Arab American precincts and a list of polling locations with majority non-Arab American voters. The focus on polling locations was crucial, because in 2005, Dearborn City reduced the number of precincts within the city, thus directly comparing precincts pre and post-2005 would be largely ineffective. I discussed this issue with my contact at the Arab American Political Action Committee, who stated that the geographic distribution of the Arab American population had not changed significantly from 2001 to 2012. Since, the geographical distribution of the Arab American population remained relatively constant, the polling locations remained constant, and thus mapping the polling locations to the old precincts results in a more accurate reflection of the majority Arab American precincts pre-2005.

The Effects of 9/11 on the Arab American Vote
Findings

The following data (Table 1) gives the total Arab American vote each year for both Democrats and Republicans, and the total non-Arab American vote each year for both parties. Furthermore, it shows the percentage of the vote which went to the Democratic Party in each election year.

As can be clearly seen on Figure 1, Arab American support for Democrats grew dramatically between 2000 and 2002. Unfortunately, the Michigan Secretary of State’s office does not provide precinct level data previous to 1998, so we cannot be sure if 1998 and 2000 were simply exceptions to the rule; however, the Pew survey data regarding Arab American political leanings discussed earlier suggests otherwise. The jump in support from 2000 and 2002 is non-trivial, to say the least – around 55% - and although it decreases slightly over time, support for Democrats does not drop to more than 40% higher than it was in both 1998 and 2000.

Between 2000 and 2002 Arab American support for Democrats jumped. The Arab American precincts and the non-Arab American precincts follow the same general trends, with the Arab American precincts simply 40 percentage points higher. There are similarly-sized dips in Democratic support in 2004 and 2010, and peaks in 2012 and 2002. In fact, the trend lines look nearly identical, except for a vertical shift upwards for the Arab American precincts, which is encouraging. A concern in comparing these two areas is simply the fact that there may be unobservable differences between Arab American and non-Arab American precincts that would necessarily bias one more towards the Democrats. Furthermore, perhaps some odd event occurred between 2000 and 2002 that shifted the composition of the Arab American districts to a more pro-Democrat stance.

However, given that both areas follow the same trends, this story seems a little less likely. If there was truly a dramatic difference between the preferences of non-Arab American and Arab American districts overall, we would probably expect them to follow rather different trends, or at least not mirror so perfectly. The congruence between the voting trends seems to suggest that the districts are not necessarily extraordinarily different on some unobservable level, although of course this scenario is still possible.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Arab-Republican</th>
<th>Arab-Democrat</th>
<th>Non-Arab-Republican</th>
<th>Non Arab-Democrat</th>
<th>% Arab-Democrat</th>
<th>% Non-Arab-Democrat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1868</td>
<td>1209</td>
<td>2616</td>
<td>1417</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2297</td>
<td>1348</td>
<td>2528</td>
<td>2395</td>
<td>36.9%</td>
<td>48.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>5034</td>
<td>2958</td>
<td>3960</td>
<td>91.3%</td>
<td>57.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>4262</td>
<td>2894</td>
<td>2801</td>
<td>85.9%</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>2762</td>
<td>2648</td>
<td>3317</td>
<td>86.5%</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>5034</td>
<td>2958</td>
<td>3960</td>
<td>91.3%</td>
<td>57.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>1810</td>
<td>2909</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>80.5%</td>
<td>39.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>4609</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2908</td>
<td>92.7%</td>
<td>59.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Total Arab American votes for Republicans and Democrats in Dearborn City
The findings in this paper suggest that a dramatic event happened between 2000 and 2002 which pushed the Arab American vote in Dearborn City extremely strongly towards the Democratic party, which I suggest is 9/11. September 11th, 2001 dramatically changed America, and with it, the treatment of Arab Americans. Arab Americans moved from being a mostly-ignored minority in the United States to being a subject of scrutiny, suspicion, and occasionally public attacks. While many of the attacks were individual acts of bigotry by private citizens, some of the prejudice against Arab Americans originated from or was perpetuated by governmental institutions, such as the NYPD and California police departments sending undercover cops to investigate masjids, or perceptions of heightened airport security and scrutiny by TSA officials of Arab Americans (Arkam, 2002).

Furthermore, as time went on, the Republican Party seemed more Islamophobic than the corresponding Democratic Party, potentially because of the growing attention and coverage of the more extreme trends within the party, as discussed above. Each future election seemed to push the primary candidates towards more and more anti-Arab and Islamophobic statements, reaching a point where the phenomenon gained national coverage in newspapers. Although the most extreme elements of the Republican Party probably do not represent the party as a whole, the perception of them as a spokesperson or at least members of the party clearly affects Arab Americans perceptions of the party. In fact, this may explain why despite Bush’s post-9/11 declaration that “Islam is a religion of peace,” Arab and Muslim-Americans still reported dissatisfaction with the entire administration’s treatment of Arab and Muslim-Americans. Whether the message came from the top or from fringe elements within the party that hijacked the narrative is mostly irrelevant; the perception of the Republican Party as the more prejudiced party may have pushed Arab Americans towards the Democratic party, resulting in the great increase in support for the Democratic party in Dearborn City, Michigan.

This scenario is interesting because it shows a group which historically supported the Republican Party dramatically switching away from the party, potentially in response to their behavior and perceptions of threat.

![Figure 1: Votes to Democrats, Arab American Precincts vs. Non-Arab American Precincts](image-url)
from the Republican Party post-9/11. It seems trivially obvious that vocally attacking the Arab American population would turn the Arab American population against the Republican party. However, the magnitude of the result is particularly shocking. It appears that some Arab Americans are in fact voting against their own economic interests, and they are doing so because of civil rights issues. As was seen with the survey data and the pre-2002 election data, Arab Americans generally supported the Republican party to about the same extent as the general American citizen. In fact, Arab Americans pre-9/11 supported to Republican party to a higher degree than the average American. The reasons for this support are uncertain, but could be due to the slightly above-average economic status of Arab Americans. In any case, it is clear that before September 11th, a significant amount of Arab Americans felt comfortable voting for the Republican party and their policies.

In fact, within Dearborn City specifically, there are a few news stories that suggest that the Arab American community supported the Republican party, partially due to their congruence on moral issues. A member of the community is quoted as saying, “When it comes to religious values and family and entrepreneurship, small business, we’re on the side on the Republican(s).” In the 1990s, about 1/3rd of Arab Americans supported the Republicans (Raihee, 2012). While this data is anecdotal, it is a clear that there must have been reasons for the Arab American community to vote for the Republican party before September 11th.

However, civil rights have taken priority for Arab Americans. A common assumption in electoral politics presumes that most people vote along economic lines, which is both plausible and proven, at least in comparison to moral issues amongst most voters (Gelman, 2009). However, the shift in the Arab American vote suggests that civil rights issues may outweigh economic and moral issues for voters. In other words, despite the past support for the Republican party, the perception of prejudice and political threat from the Republican party became the critical issue for Arab American voters.

This privileging of civil rights over other factors leads to interesting questions about the way in which people cast their vote. The Arab American case suggests that civil rights, and not economics, may be an overriding factor in determining the way in which people will vote, and it may be that only after these civil rights are secured, or perceived as secure, that economic factors enter the equation. This question definitely needs further investigation, firstly by expanding the investigation of the Arab American case nationwide, rather than simply within Dearborn City. Future research might pursue whether this phenomenon holds true for other minority groups, such as Latino Americans and African-Americans (on issues of mass incarceration or stop-and-frisk policy, for instance), and women (given the new pressure on limiting women’s access to abortion and birth control). Could it be that civil rights prove more important than economic issues across a range of identities, including women and minorities, and not just Arab Americans? If this proves to be the case, a new understanding of civil rights can shed light on most important factors to voters, as well as incentives that could cause voters to dramatically change their party affiliation, even against the prevailing idea that party affiliation remains relatively static. This could suggest that economic incentives are outweighed by civil rights concerns, or perhaps that economic incentives can only take priority in vote choice once basic civil rights concerns are met.

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Managing Hearts with Kim and Flo: Casual Games, Affective Labor, and the Postindustrial Work Ethic

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Casual games *Diner Dash* and *Kim Kardashian: Hollywood* are representations of workplaces—in the service and entertainment industries, respectively—that center on affective labor, the often-gendered management of the comfort and emotions of others. Considerations of affective labor, originally conceptualized in narratives of domesticity centered around the feminine provision of care—the management of feelings by the mother, the midwife, or the nurse—must now be expanded in an economy increasingly far from Fordist industrialism and its rigidly defined, economically moored gender roles. Studying what games tell us about labor and leisure can offer insight into how players wish to understand their own work at borders where the often-porous membrane between the two breaks down. Through both narrative and mechanics, *Diner Dash* and *Kim Kardashian: Hollywood* build a dissonant and sentimentalized ideology of affective labor, serving as idealized reimaginations of a fraught gendered work ethic while valorizing immaterial labor through its literal quantification.

Introduction

At the opening of the game *Kim Kardashian: Hollywood*, the player learns how to fold a shirt. You, as a bright customizable cartoon avatar, learn to tap on your smartphone’s touchscreen a few times to straighten a disheveled clothing display. Soon, fortuitously, just as you’re closing the shop at which you work, an avatar of Kim Kardashian appears. She needs a dress. The text on-screen does not offer a choice, but in-game your avatar decides to give it to her free of charge. This is the first step in your charmed journey into *Kim Kardashian: Hollywood*’s world of fashion and celebrity, where you can climb your way toward becoming an “A-List” star like Kim through a successfully managed career of modeling and maintaining social connections.

In the game *Diner Dash*, a similar tale of rags to riches is set up from the beginning—this time a pre-named avatar, Flo, is unhappy in her bureaucratic office job before deciding to make the leap into small-business entrepreneurship. She opens a diner, which, depending upon the player’s skill, can evolve into an ever-fancier diner through in-game success at serving customers. In some versions of the game, after enough accomplishment and gradually rising difficulty in gameplay, Flo is awarded transcendence in the form of a third arm: a wry bit of humor from the game allowing her to better perform her job as a business-owner-turned-waitress.

*Diner Dash* and *Kim Kardashian: Hollywood* are examples of “casual games.” Following the definition of the Game Developers Conference Summit of 2004,
casual games can be learned in less than a minute, are forgiving of mistakes, are short but highly replayable, and are inexpensive or free (Chess 2009). The form is popular and profitable: in 2010, according to the Casual Games Association, the industry had revenues of nearly $6 billion on mobile, iPhone, social networks, PC, Mac, and Xbox platforms and an estimated player base of 200 million. They’re distinguished by low time commitment, easy access, and a return of the form to mass culture and its origins in the arcades of the early 1980s. In their simplicity, casual games are also typically highly repetitive.1 Through encouraging fragmentary engagement, casual games subtly pervade the lives of their players—they’re built to fit in pauses of getting a snack at work or sitting on the bus during a commute. What makes casual games “casual” is the way they fill in the empty spaces of their players’ lives, never capturing an extended period of full attention but also never receding fully into the background of awareness.

Both Diner Dash and Kim Kardashian: Hollywood are representations of workplaces—in the service and entertainment industries, respectively—with certain aspects of the work’s drudgery, tedium, and frustrations abstracted away. They model a distinctly feminine mode of labor: media theorist Shira Chess writes that Diner Dash “re-enacts complex relationships that many women have with work, leisure, empowerment, and emotions,” (83) and, amid a flood of Kardashian think pieces coinciding with her real-world rise to celebrity,2 Brooklyn Magazine noted that “Kim Kardashian is what getting paid for ‘women’s’ work looks like” (Curry 2014). The mode of labor represented in both games centers on managing the comfort and emotions of others. Considerations of affective labor, originally conceptualized in terms of narratives of domesticity centered around the feminine provision of care—the management of feelings by the mother, the midwife, the nurse—must now be expanded in an economy increasingly far from Fordist industrialism and its rigidly defined, economically moored gender roles. According to cultural theorist Aubrey Anable (2013), casual games set in the workplace are “sentimental in that they speak to a longing for a different, less fraught, relationship to labor.” Studying what games tell us about labor and leisure—especially casual games, which often conflate the two—can offer insight into how players wish to understand their own work at moments when the often-porous membrane between work and play breaks down, as play comes to resemble work. “Our play is both incidental and taking over our lives,” Anable continues. “Casual games seem too banal and too significant to analyze.”

In this paper I offer an analysis of how the narrative and procedural rhetoric3 of Diner Dash and Kim Kardashian: Hollywood represent their players’ work, arguing that both games treat affective labor, the apex of a postindustrial and distinctly feminine work ethic, as central. Through both narrative and mechanics, Diner Dash and Kim Kardashian: Hollywood build a roman-

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1. Some argue that casual games are tedious by design. Ian Bogost (2014) compares playing these games to trying to fix a stubbornly broken drawer or playing with a badly built toy, while Sam Anderson (2012) writes of Tetris: “It is bureaucracy in pure form, busywork with no aim or end, impossible to avoid or escape. And the game’s final insult is that it annihilates free will. Despite its obvious futility, somehow we can’t make ourselves stop rotating blocks. Tetris, like all the stupid games it spawned, forces us to choose to punish ourselves.”

2. This paper will not focus on Kim Kardashian West’s rise to celebrity or public persona, and will only detail her involvement and character in the game to the extent that it influences player experience; analysis of the intersection of celebrity culture and videogames will be left to a separate project.

3. Ian Bogost coined the term “procedural rhetoric” to refer to “the practice of persuading through processes in general and computational processes in particular.” In Persuasive Games (2010), Bogost outlines his theory of how the mechanics of games can form arguments about systems and proposes a theory of “unit operations” for games grounded in a convergence of literary theory and object-oriented programming theory. The concept will be expanded on in the methods section of this paper.
ticized and sentimentalized ideology of affective labor, serving as idealized reimaginations of a fraught gendered work ethic while valorizing immaterial labor through its literal quantification. In the following sections, I argue that both *Diner Dash* and *Kim Kardashian: Hollywood*, and casual games as a category, offer their players a complex rhetorical argument for how to relate to the emotionally focused work within the games and, by extension, the work in their lives.

**Literature**

There is a robust history of scholarship regarding affective labor and its relation to postindustrial capitalist economies, which has been linked with games and media theory to a limited extent. In the following sections I will clarify definitions of games, play, leisure, and labor; sketch a history of competing narratives of immaterial and affective labor in Marxist feminist theory, sociology, and political theory; and review how these ideas have been applied to videogames in general and *Diner Dash* and *Kim Kardashian: Hollywood*, two wildly popular casual games, in particular.

**Games with and without Play**

It is a history of games as pure play that allows them to covertly blur the distinction between labor and leisure. Kathi Weeks (2011) defines work as “productive cooperation organized around, but not necessarily confined to, the privileged model of waged labor” (8). Parallel to how I am taking work to be a form of organized labor, I am considering leisure to be organized play as defined by Roger Caillois: “(1) free, (2) separate, (3) uncertain, (4) unproductive, (5) regulated, and (6) fictive” (1963: 43).

In “Games Without Play,” David Golumbia cautions against conflating the form of a game with the action of play and notes the lack of available vocabulary to place videogames that aren’t, at their surface, playful. In his analysis of *World of Warcraft*, Golumbia notes that the game encourages and necessitates behavior “as repetitive as the most mechanized sorts of employment in ‘the real world’” (190) by letting players specialize in professions such as mining or crafting. Golumbia locates the pleasure of this kind of grinding, repetitive gameplay in the satisfaction of binary task accomplishment, where goals are “well-bounded, easily attainable, and satisfying to achieve, even if the only true outcome of such attainment is the deferred pursuit of additional goals of a similar kind” (192). In an analysis of gamification’s seepage into what Golumbia considers “the real world,” Patrick Jagoda (2013) observes that to be a player of *World of Warcraft* “means to be a laborer and a manager,” citing “aspiring to a higher rank, following instructions, engaging in war making, and accumulating private property” as the first skills a player is taught to value in-game, and “team building, managing a guild, and administrating resources” as higher-level skills that a player must acquire to excel (121). Golumbia writes that these repetitive, goal-oriented games create a managerial class much in the way military simulators create soldiers, ending on a sinister note: “If they simulate anything directly, that is, games simulate our own relation to capital and to the people who must be exploited and used up for capital to do its work. But it is overly simple to call this activity simulation: a better term might be something like training” (194).

More optimistically, Jesper Juul (2013) theorizes that the feeling of working past failure—of learning new skills, solving puzzles, and accumulating resources—is central to the pleasure and redemption of playing a game. “This is what games do,” he writes. “They promise us that we can repair a personal inadequacy—an inadequacy they produce in us in the first place.” Good games are “designed such that they give us a fair chance, whereas the regular world makes no such promises” (7). By allowing their players to work through failure in a safe environment, games encourage risk-taking and experi-

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4. *World of Warcraft* is a massively multiplayer online role-playing game (MMORPG) released in 2004 by Blizzard Entertainment.
mentation, bringing them back to Callois’s definition of play.

Casual games are historically coded as feminine and have taken longer than their masculine counterpart—the subject of Columbia’s analyses, the hardcore game⁵—to garner academic attention. This is in part due to femininity’s historical link to popular and mainstream media, itself long considered unfit for close analysis (Huyssen 1986; Vanderhoef 2013). Aubrey Anable (2013) places casual games in a history of mass media specifically geared toward women and a life built around domestic labor, the soap opera being a key example—both are fragmented, repetitive, and built to “correlate with women’s work in the home.” Casual games, as a form, lend themselves easily to representations of women’s work; Anable pinpoints casual games’ interruptability, steep learning curve, and short levels as reflections of the always-working mode of the domestic laborer. Shira Chess (2011) similarly connects casual games to a distinctly feminine style of leisure, one that collapses the boundary between work and play. Chess draws on Arlie Hochschild’s concept of the second shift (1989), the double burden of mothers both working and caring for children, which casts the home as a site of both work and leisure, simultaneous and fragmented.

Affective Labor and the Work Ethic

Paralleling the mechanism through which casual games trouble the boundaries between work and play, affective labor makes the categories of labor and leisure vulnerable to confusion. Theories of affective labor grew from second-wave socialist feminist analysis, which conceptualized it as part of the “invisible labor” of women’s reproductive and domestic work (Dalla Costa and James 1975; Federici 1975; Hochschild 1989). These feminist accounts were concerned with the relevance (and lack thereof) of domestic work and motherhood to the mainstream capitalist economy, and ways in which exploitation along gendered divisions of labor became historically naturalized as part of the female character. In 1975, Silvia Federici wrote that housework had “been transformed into a natural attribute of our female physique and personality, an internal need, an aspiration, supposedly coming from the depth of our female character” (2). Federici’s Wages against Housework is a polemic,⁶ and these early conceptualizations of affective labor served as a call-to-arms for housewives to think critically and resist the economic conditions imposed upon them by the social constructions of the nuclear family under Fordist industrialism.

In The Managed Heart, sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild (1983) traces the estrangement of airline attendants from their own affective labor as an example of the commercialization of emotion in the global marketplace. Through a careful account of training processes and worker experiences, Hochschild demonstrates the ways in which these airline employees are expected to manufacture a sense of well-being and ease for their passengers while making the hospitality appear effortless and innate. To show that this warmth takes effort—to show struggle or fatigue, to let the labor “show in an unseemly way”—is to fail to do the job of promoting effortless ease, at the risk of damaging “the product: passenger contentment” (8). She describes the process of “transmutation,” when “emotion work, feeling rules, and social exchange have been removed from the private domain and placed in a public one, where they are processed, standardized, and subjected to hierarchical control” (153). Hochschild works within a Marxist framework, recalling the young wallpaper factory laborer in Capital who works for sixteen hours a day on a machine, becoming “an instrument of labor” (Marx 1977: 358) as he produces wallpaper under brutal working conditions.

The common ground between the airline attendant and the factory worker, writes Hochschild, is the requirement from their labor that they mentally detach them-

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5. The distinction between “hardcore” and “casual” games includes not just the content of the games but also modes of engagement, with “hardcore” connoting greater devotion and prolonged engagement. John Vanderhoef (2013) writes that hardcore games are linked to a “white, hegemonic masculinity” actively working to maintain a closed community: “Together, sectors of commercial culture and core gaming culture work to position casual games as first feminine and then, tacitly if not vocally, as inferior and lacking when compared to masculinized hardcore video games. As a culture established upon a vulnerable masculinity with anxieties of infantilization and illegitimacy, hardcore gaming culture perceives these feminized casual games as a threat.”

6. Following Catherine Lord’s definition: “To write a polemic is a formal challenge. It is to connect the most miniscule of details with the widest of panoramas, to walk a tightrope between rage and reason, to insist that ideas are nothing but lived emotion, and vice versa. To write a polemic is to try to dig oneself out of the grave that is the margin, that already shrill, already colored, already feminized already queered location in which words, any words, any combination of words are either symptoms of madness or proof incontrovertible of guilt by association” (135).
selves from their products: “the factory worker from his own body and physical labor, the flight attendant from her own feelings and emotional labor” (17). Once this thread is drawn, Marx’s theories of worker exploitation and alienation gain a new meaning in relation to Hochschild’s twentieth century emotional laborers, leading her to ask:

When rules about how to feel and how to express feelings are set by management, when workers have weaker rights to courtesy than customers do, when deep and surface acting7 are forms of labor to be sold, and when private capacities for empathy and warmth are put to corporate uses, what happens to the way a person relates to her feelings or to her face? When worked-up warmth becomes an instrument of service work, what can a person learn about herself from her feelings? And when a worker abandons her work smile, what kind of tie remains between her smile and her self? (89)

Hochschild does not offer simple answers to these questions, but works to bring emotional laborers at risk of becoming estranged from their own affects into the sphere of Marxist inquiry on worker alienation and liberation.

A quarter century after the initial publication of The Managed Heart, Kathi Weeks (2007) identifies in retrospect a disciplinary split in the discourse surrounding affective labor, one that can be aligned with the difference between Federici and Hochschild. The former, Weeks notes, is part of an effort to add the reproductive labor of the mother and the housewife to feminist Marxist understandings of productive labor. Hochschild’s project, more deeply embedded in sociology, seeks to add accounts of emotional labor to understandings of the burgeoning white-collar service industry. Weeks writes that efforts to integrate reproductive labor and productive labor in post-Fordist economies rely too heavily on essentialized understandings of gender “in a situation in which the binaries of productive versus reproductive, waged versus unwaged, and with them, ‘men’s work’ versus ‘women’s work’ are increasingly inadequate” (239).

Further, Weeks takes issue with Hochschild’s assumption of a pre-alienated working self, “our estrangement from which constitutes a compelling crisis.” Weeks is skeptical of the existence of an “unmanaged heart” which the socialized subject is only later taught to manage, writing that Hochschild is too reliant on “nostalgic ideals of work” and “essentialist models of the self” (244).

Michael Hardt places affective labor more explicitly in a history of capitalist development. He defines affective labor as “immaterial, even if it is corporeal and effective, in the sense that its products are intangible: a feeling of ease, well-being, satisfaction, excitement, passion—even a sense of connectedness or community” (1999: 96). In building his argument concerning the relevance of affective labor to postindustrial capitalist production, Hardt theorizes that the economic development of the dominant capitalist countries since the Middle Ages can be understood in three stages: the agricultural economy, the industrial economy centered around the production of durable goods, and our current “informational” economy, where “providing services and manipulating information are at the heart of economic production” (90). Hardt defines economic modernization as the move between the first two stages, and postmodernization as the move between the latter two. Hardt argues that in this postmodern state, immaterial labor, and particularly affective labor, is at the “very pinnacle of the hierarchy of laboring forms” (90).

In The Problem with Work (2011), Weeks traces the history of what she terms the “privatization of work,” the process of tethering work “to the figure of the individual” (3-4), making labor movements difficult in sectors requiring high levels of affective labor. Weeks draws a distinction between the industrial and postindustrial work ethic, describing both as “mechanisms of subordination” (58) through ideology from the middle class over the working class. The industrial work ethic, she writes,

7. Hochschild draws this distinction between different levels of consciously managing one’s own feelings: “In surface acting, the expression on my face or the posture of my body feels ‘put on.’ It is not ‘part of me.’ In deep acting, my conscious mental work […] keeps the feeling that I conjure up from being part of myself” (36). Kathi Weeks would later write that this concept is central to Hochschild’s argument: “The question that guides Hochschild’s investigation, and which remains critically important today, is about what happens to individuals and social relations when techniques of deep acting are harnessed by and for the purposes of capital” (2007: 241).
is predicated on the promise of upward social mobility, while the postindustrial work ethic has a “new emphasis on work as an avenue for personal development and meaning” and christens “work as a practice of self-realization” (60). This postindustrial ethic creates workers internally motivated to produce and manage affects as part of their laboring lives, a life’s work which promises a rejuvenated personhood if performed correctly. Through its troubling of the boundary between public and private life and between leisure and labor, affective labor—variously associated with domestic work, social reproduction, and the service industry, always already gendered—offers a link between practices of leisure and the work ethic, particularly in its interiority-obsessed postindustrial mode.

_Diner Dash and Kim Kardashian: Hollywood_

Both Anable and Chess discuss affective labor and use the _Diner Dash_ franchise as a case example with which to analyze the relationship between casual games and work. Chess notes that the main character, Flo, is presented within a story of entrepreneurial hope—the player of _Diner Dash_ finds their avatar sitting at an anonymous office desk at the game’s start, before she opens her own restaurant. The narrative of _Diner Dash_ is one of empowerment and self-determination, though the entire mechanics of the game involve serving others. “Through Flo, the player is constantly being forced to conflate work and play,” Chess concludes (90). Ian Bogost (2011) declares _Diner Dash_ kitschy, in the sense that it deploys “occupational sentimentalism” with its entrepreneurial rags-to-riches narrative, as protagonist Flo starts her own shabby business and builds a thriving empire. “In _Diner Dash,_” he writes, “sentimentalism is accomplished by invoking the moral fortitude of hard work. It’s a game in which a good work ethic, careful attention, and persistence always yield success. All of the other factors that make the work of a restaurateur such a thankless, risky position are abstracted” (86). The appeal of these mundane games is the promise of a resolution to the real-world stress and powerlessness of the menial and unrewarding job. Anable describes the importance of affective labor in casual games:

> Time management games, in particular, stage the affective work of being a woman worker (what it feels like) as well as the work of being a subject who longs to feel differently in relation to work during a time when affective and immaterial labor has become the model for most work regardless of gender.

Chess argues along the same lines that time management games offer training and a sense of satisfaction for workers exhausted by their emotionally managing jobs, placing _Diner Dash_ in a class of games that enact “simulated productive play,” which “are not productive in the real world, yet mimic real world productivity” (2009: 124).

_**Kim Kardashian: Hollywood** has limited scholarship linking it to the above academic discussions; Ruth Curry (2014) writes for _Brooklyn Magazine_ that Kim Kardashian “has figured out how to make a fortune on the countless hours of emotional labor most women are expected to perform for free: smiling, looking pretty, being accommodating, being charming, being a good hostess,” and while Megan Garber (2014) admires her for the way she “refuses to sell anything but the image of herself.”

Kim takes Hollywood’s basest expectations about women—its treatment of them as, essentially, walking sex dolls—and doubles down. Was this what you wanted? […] By laughing at herself, she also laughs at a system that allows for a Kim Kardashian to exist in the first place.

The full field of scholarship on _Kim Kardashian: Hollywood_, however, perhaps unsurprisingly, remains largely unwritten. In the following analysis, I will argue for a more nuanced understanding of the messages surrounding work and leisure in the game, as well as build on a sociological understanding of _Diner Dash_ begun by Anable, Chess, and Bogost.

**Methods**

My data consists of a close reading of two casual mobile games, _Diner Dash_ (2007) and _Kim Kardashian: Hollywood_ (2014). Both are currently available in the iTunes and Android app stores, and were released by Glu Mobile Inc. I chose these games as two of the most popular casual games currently on the market, though a similar analysis could be made with any number of recent games that represent a workplace.

The academic field of game studies has been divided between narratology, which holds that games should be studied through methods of close reading developed
for literature and film, and ludology, which argues that games should be studied as unique media objects, purely through their rules, mechanics, and elements. Jim Bizzocchi and Joshua Tanenbaum offer a useful method for the close reading of gameplay experiences as texts, drawing on literary theory to build a set of techniques for the analysis of digital media. Working from Geoffrey Winthrop-Young's assumption that narrative is a media technology, Bizzocchi and Tanenbaum describe an oscillation between two levels of engagement. Academic analysis of gameplay must come from a player who is at once engaged—"the scholar enacts the play of a naïve gamer"—and detached, aware of the experience as it unfolds—"she plays the game in a state of hypermediation" (275). Following this, it becomes possible to analyze both simple and complex games as both a reader and a player. Henry Jenkins (2004) suggests understanding video games "less as stories than as spaces ripe with narrative possibility" (119).

Procedural rhetoric, as defined by Ian Bogost (2010), operates parallel to this narrative-based rhetoric and forms a basis for the ludic method of games analysis. This method treats a game as a machine and aims to analyze its internal logic and the arguments it constructs about its world—the assumptions the player is forced to make to succeed. In Bogost's construction, game engines and frameworks serve as forms in the same way that the sonnet and the short story do in literature; with this understanding, a Newtonian mechanics simulation is akin to a limerick. In the same way, games have procedural genres similar to literary genres, and identification of these can lend a useful understanding of tropes. Common genres include the platformer, the first-person shooter, the infinite runner, and the turn-based adventure game. Aspects of this method entail appreciating a game as a computer executing set rules, and is a more technical and mathematical approach. The ludology strain of games analysis, with its consideration of games as complex systems, aims to investigate the usefulness and success of games in communicating their inner logic to the player.

The analysis I present here represents an attempt to combine these two methods in order to best approximate the player experience by taking into account time, difficulty, and engagement. My intention is to also tease out moments of ludonarrative dissonance, points when narrative and gameplay do not line up in rhetoric. In constructing this analysis, it was my aim to consider the views of both the naïve and critical player. To do this I played both Diner Dash and Kim Kardashian: Hollywood every day over a period of three months in the summer of 2014, investing as much time as each game would allow, and taking detailed notes after each session noting affect, events, changes in game mechanics, and narrative progression.

**Analysis**

I have divided my analysis into three sections. The first two offer a close reading of each game individually: I place Diner Dash in the historical context of a Fordist work ethic during Hardt's process of postmodernization, and align Kim Kardashian: Hollywood with a postindustrial ethos as defined by Kathi Weeks. I follow with an analysis of the representations of affective labor, time structures, and currencies that underlie the two games and their parallel ludonarrative dissonance, arguing that Diner Dash displays a tense transition between industrial and postindustrial understandings of social mobility and the place of affective labor, and that Kim Kardashian: Hollywood creates a narrative of continuous social progress without reflecting this in the mechanics of the game. Both create a promise of self-actualization through labor without following through with any experiential change. It is not my intention to present every possible piece of evidence generated by each game. Rather, I attempt to create an overview of each with illustrative examples.

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9. Clint Hocking, a former creative director at Ubisoft (now LucasArts), coined this term in 2007. Of Bioshock, Harding writes: "The leveraging of the game’s narrative structure against its ludic structure all but destroys the player’s ability to feel connected to either, forcing the player to either abandon the game in protest (which I almost did) or simply accept that the game cannot be enjoyed as both a game and a story, and to then finish it for the mere sake of finishing it."
Diner Dash, the Industrial Work Ethic, and Social Mobility

In Diner Dash, the end goal of each level is to earn enough money to progress to the next. This is obtained by pleasing customers enough with good service that they tip highly and pay without leaving in exasperation. As Flo, players must place customers at a table, with the opportunity to gain additional satisfaction by matching the color of the diner’s shirt with the color of their seat. Flo must wait for them to decide what they want, then take their orders. She must then deliver the order, wait for the chef to make it, deliver the food, wait for the customers to eat it, bring them their check, and clear their dishes. Depending on the difficulty of the level, the player must move through this process simultaneously, without neglecting any single group of customers, for four to ten tables. Flo has two hands, and can carry two items—orders, food, checks, dirty dishes—simultaneously. Customers have hearts over their heads indicating how happy they are, and these diminish if Flo doesn’t complete any of these tasks in time.

As Flo, the player is presented within a story of entrepreneurial hope and a tale of class optimism in line with Kathi Weeks’s definition of the industrial work ethic’s “focus on work as a path to social mobility” (60). The player of Diner Dash finds their avatar sitting at a desk at the game’s start, before she opens her own restaurant. The narrative of Diner Dash is one of empowerment and self-determination, though the entire mechanics of the game involve serving others. There is a story of progress in Diner Dash, as successful gameplay allows Flo to customize her restaurant and move to higher-class spaces. After the final level Flo is rewarded with enlightenment, which comes in the form of a third arm, presumably so she can work even more efficiently. Diner Dash emphasizes the importance of entrepreneurship and agency, forcing its player to value time management skills and efficiency. It simultaneously removes agency from the player, allowing only a limited range of action and portraying the emotions of customers without offering an interiority to the player character past energized and exhausted.

Kim Kardashian: Hollywood, Postindustrialism, and Self-Actualization

Kim Kardashian: Hollywood depends on a rags to riches narrative in line with what Weeks calls “the postindustrial emphasis on work as a practice of self-realization” (60), asking the player to work toward self-actualization in the form of celebrity. At the game’s start, the player is working retail and approached by Kim Kardashian, who recognizes the avatar’s worth and invites her into her world of public celebrity. The rise from retail to stardom is portrayed as sharp then gradual—the game’s first moments show the player’s sudden induction into Kim Kardashian’s social set, and the rest of gameplay is a slow rise toward “A-level” stardom, the in-game height of fame, obtained via the turn-based accumulation of various resources. The narrative of Kim Kardashian: Hollywood portrays the entertainment industry as a pure meritocracy, and offers no separation between professional work (booking advertisements, appearing at photoshoots and red carpet events) and social leisure (dating, attending parties).

Fame, measured by in-game Twitter followers, can be gained by completing photo shoots and fashion shows, making appearances at events, dating celebrities already at higher levels of acclaim, and buying new clothes, accessories, and properties. Kim Kardashian: Hollywood offers no real opportunities for insubordination10 or exploratory play. Like Flo in Diner Dash, the avatar in Kim Kardashian: Hollywood are women without families, offering a mythology of success without attachments, self-determination without personal history. While Adrienne Rich observed in 1980 that “heterosexual romance has been represented as the great female adventure, duty, and fulfillment” (124-5), Glu Mobile advertises Kim Kardashian: Hollywood as a “red carpet

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10 In Trash Junkie, Beatriz Preciado (2013) make a similar observation of Paris Hilton and her media empire: “Despite her seeming proclivity for vice and idleness, the Paris Hilton phenomenon exhibits no insubordination against the capitalist economy. On the contrary: her entire life and sexuality are being transformed, by devices of extreme surveillance, into work—into digital images that are transferable worldwide. Her triumph is having known how to recover her body and her sexuality as ultimate values on the global-exchange market of pharmacopornographic capitalism” (280).
adventure” where the ultimate aim is not familial and financial stability but fame and acclaim.

**Immaterial Resources and Ludonarrative Dissonance**

Both *Diner Dash* and *Kim Kardashian: Hollywood* represent and require the management of affect in the non-player characters (NPCs) and the central avatar, and give energy, customer satisfaction, and relationship health a solid materiality alongside resources used to collect goods in-game. In both games, the resources that must be managed are a mix of material—money, furniture, and clothes—and immaterial—energy, happiness, social capital, and cultural capital. The quantification of these resources—dividing material goods, human health, and affect into similar units—serves to flatten them each into comparable and exchangeable currencies. In *Kim Kardashian: Hollywood*, the player has multiple running resource bars: energy, which replenishes over time; money, which is awarded at many small moments throughout the game when certain actions are taken; a level bar indicating experience points that accumulates with actions; and silver stars, which can be purchased for real money. In addition, there is a section of “achievements” that can be unlocked with certain actions, giving players a combination of the four other resources.

The currency in *Diner Dash* is less varied—successful completion of a level comes with a cash reward, which can be used to improve the restaurant of the game’s setting to better complete future levels, and energy is used up with gameplay and replenishes over time, limiting the amount that the game can be played in any one session. Each level involves attempting to serve customers in a series of ordered tasks, and if these are not completed fast enough the customer’s happiness, represented by three red hearts, begins to decrease and the amount of their final monetary tip decreases accordingly. Both games allow their players to circumvent the wait by purchasing one of these currencies—stars in *Kim Kardashian: Hollywood* and energy in *Diner Dash*—with real-world currency.

Both fall into a category of “time management” games, meaning that many of their mechanics emphasize the use of resources or actions limited or controlled by time. To be asked to manage resources under time restrictions is feel a sense of urgency, but also tedium—time management games are tied up with work, a mad hustle alternating with periods of waiting. They emphasize action, reflexes, decision-making, and efficiency. Both games fill their screens completely, demanding their players’ full attention. *Diner Dash* employs the element of continuous time within each segment (level) of gameplay, meaning that its play progresses in real time, requiring the engagement and the full attention of the player. This is in contrast with the discrete (or turn-based) time in *Kim Kardashian: Hollywood*, which emphasizes control, choice, rationality, and calm. Time management games require their players to make both the correct choices—being a smart player—and quick choices—being a skilled player.

From the outset of *Diner Dash*, Flo is cast as an entrepreneurial hopeful, a cunning businesswoman building an empire. The actual action of the game, however, shows Flo almost entirely as a waitress, seating and serving others between simple menu choices of shop improvements between levels. This is ludonarrative dissonance, a lack of agreement between what *Diner Dash* communicates as a story and what it communicates as a game. The rhetoric of *Kim Kardashian: Hollywood* contains a similar dissonance. The player is offered boundless opportunity at the game’s start, before embarking on a gradual rise toward success through effective management of networking and relationships. Although the game promises ascension toward fame and fortune, gameplay does not ever change and there is no final conclusion or moment of victory—playing as a D-List celebrity is essentially the same as an A-List celebrity.

Though the two games differ in the meanings they ascribe to the work represented within the gameplay, both build a narrative of change that is unsubstantiated in the static mechanics of the game. There is no real end to the quest for A-list status in *Kim Kardashian: Hollywood*, as attaining the top rank means the new imperative to maintain it, with actions that are identical to the social climbing necessary to gain that position. To remain an A-list celebrity you must tap on the screen to stay attentive during photo shoots, which is exactly how your avatar got there. Similarly, *Diner Dash* offers a “endless shift” mode for those tired of the process of constructing up the diner—in order of building up resources, on an endless shift Flo serves customers until the player
is overwhelmed by the speed and volume. The dissonance here is the central irony of both games: though they promise redemption through hard work—a true win-condition—no change ever comes. Nevertheless, Kim and Flo must play on to manage their worlds.

**Conclusion**

Games offer a way to simulate and view complex systems from the outside; to pick them up and play with them as a child might play with a toy machine, to understand what they are able to do and where they are broken. The process of coming to understand the levers and gears of a game—its procedural rhetoric—is an opportunity for cognitive estrangement from familiar systems of labor, a way to understand dynamic networks and nuanced relations with a fresh set of eyes.

Quietly and perhaps unintentionally subversive, *Diner Dash* and *Kim Kardashian: Hollywood* approximate a first step toward naming and honoring the processes by which affective labor is extracted from workers. Even in their simplicity and mundanity, the games operate as instruction manuals. They train their players, as Columbia’s *Warcraft* players were trained in office drudgery, how to relate to the emotionally demanding work in their lives. By blurring the boundary between work and play, including the literal quantification of affect in hearts and happiness meters, Kim and Flo teach their players to value immaterial forms of labor alongside the production of objects, feminist work akin to the manifestos and pamphlets that the International Wages for Housework Campaign was spearheading in 1970s Italy. When Silvia Federici wrote *Wages against Housework*, she wasn’t calling for hourly wages for housewives as an end in itself—she wanted recognition of housework as labor specifically to bring it into the realm of things that can be refused and revolted against. To radically reorganize affection, love, and care in the labor market is no simple task, and *Diner Dash* and *Kim Kardashian: Hollywood* certainly offer no optimistic or easy solutions. What they do offer is a first suggestion, incredible in its existence on a mass-market scale: to make affective labor count, to think critically about our fraught relationships with our work, and to playfully reimagine what might be.

Identifying the tensions between labor and leisure, work and play, gives rise to any number of interesting academic projects. As games become more widespread and sophisticated, and casual games continue to casually pervade their players’ lives, the imperative to understand them will only grow. Games scholarship is beginning to find a foothold in the humanities, but there is much potential for more research following sociological methods, especially those based in ethnography and interviewing. In addition, my same question could—and should—be approached with alternative methods such as interviewing players and studying gameplay in order to write about casual games from a more experiential perspective. Untangling the rhetorical complexities of low media, often coded and dismissed as feminine, is an ongoing job for both sociology and cultural studies.

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